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ABSTRACT
World energy problems have claimed a large, albeit dimin­
ishing, share of international attention since the winter of 
1973-1974. This diminution is reflected by the adjustment of 
energy consumers to the large increase in petroleum prices and 
the apparent acceptance of these levels as permanent by energy 
analyses in government and some academic circles. Acceding to 
excessive levels for crude oil prices can perpetuate a balance of 
payments distortion and a source of inflation in the importer coun­
tries, as well as precipitate the rash adoption of unproven 
alternative sources of energy and unnecessarily harsh energy con­
servation measures.
This study investigates the effects that two recent trends, 
nationalization of oil production by exporter country governments 
and importer country cooperation through the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), can have on the primary source of high oil prices, 
the market power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). Sources of that market power are enumerated by reviewing 
the historical development of OPEC's dominance in the world oil 
market and the structural factors that facilitate price control by 
the group of countries that form the oil-export cartel.
ix
The impact of nationalization is Inferred within the frame­
work of a limit price model of the economic self-interest of the 
national members of OPEC. Nationalization is viewed as enhancing 
the role of political or noneconomic costs and benefits in the 
collective price decision and enforcement process carried out by 
cartel producers. A review and application of factors identified 
in the literature on public enterprises and on International rela­
tions reveals two offsetting Influences. Political rewards may 
help harmonize disparate economic interests within the cartel as to 
the proper limit price level, but sovereignty concerns can be 
expected to Impede efforts to execute tactics that take advantage 
of that greater uniformity of interest. The political amplification 
of an ̂ symmetrical economic loss inflicted on different members of 
the seller group by the prospective entry of energy alternatives 
enhances the risk that chiseling will destabilize this cartel and 
the price it sets.
Antagonistic responses by the IEA can provide the focal point 
that overcomes the inability of OPEC members to execute more deli­
berate market control measures, just as complete Inaction by 
importers can permit the monopoly performance of the insecure 
export cartel to persist. Bilateral monopoly analysis indicates 
that monopsony bargaining and/or a selective emphasis on conserva­
tion measures by the IEA countries will be less successful at 
inducing OPEC to lower its real selling price than policies that 
permit or advance the rational development of energy alternatives.
x
The principal conclusion emerging from this study Is that 
nationalization together with Importer resistance have the potential 
to undermine OPEC's ability to maintain or raise the current real 
price of crude oil in the world. Activating this potential calls 
for more unity of purpose than major Importers have shown to date, 
however. This condition is unfortunate since policies available to 
governments in oil-importing nations appear more capable of pro­
ducing a downward adjustment in the long term path of real oil 




NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND SOME RECENT HISTORY
1
CHAPTER ONE
PROBLEM AND AN APPROACH
World energy problems have claimed a large, albeit dimin­
ishing, share of International attention since the winter of 1973- 
1974. The quadrupling of crude oil prices and the temporary supply 
interruptions of that period awoke industrial nations to their heavy 
and growing dependence upon abundant quantities of crude oil from 
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Problems associated 
with excessive energy prices, balance of payments distortions, 
resource depletion fears, and dependence on potentially unreliable 
sources remain of real concern.
Anxiety over these problems seems to have subsided somewhat 
since the initial disruptions of 1973-1974. Consumers in energy- 
intensive economies appear to have adapted to the significant 
increase in the relative price for petroleum products. Officials 
in major importer countries, who were initially caught unprepared 
by the radical price change, now seem reconciled to a future of 
increasing scarcity and prices for crude oil from their current 
levels.* Many economic analyses of price and output behavior and 
prospects in the world oil market that emerged shortly after the
*The Wall Street Journal, Friday, May 27, 1977 makes the 
comment, for instance, that the U.S. Government seems to have 
adopted an "inventory-clerk's" mentality as evidenced by its 
espousal of the idea that oil and natural gas are resources whose 
dwindling nature must now be recognized and adjusted to.
2sudden price Increase have also accepted the new level as given.
This acceptance of current price and output patterns, and adapta­
tions to them, may be premature.
Two recent developments, the nationalization of crude oil 
producing properties by governments in major oil-exporting regions 
and interest by officials in major oil-importing countries in 
coordinating energy policy, alter the conditions under which the 
current real price level for oil was achieved. If these developments 
can be expected to affect the stability of the existing price, then 
Ignoring them can immobilize efforts to correct excessive energy 
prices, needlessly perpetuate balance of payments problems connected 
with oil imports, and provide an unnecessary source of world infla­
tion. It seems appropriate, therefore, to investigate some 
anticipated effects of nationalization and importer coordination 
on the durability of the present world oil price.
The expected effects of nationalization and oil-importer 
coordination on the stability of the real price of oil at or above 
the level achieved in the mid-1970's are the topics of this study.
The Impact of these developments can only be understood within the
2See, for example, Joseph A. Yager and Eleanor B. Steinberg, 
Energy and U. S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 
Publishing Co., 1975); the works on OPEC reviewed in D. Fischer,
D. Gately, and J. F. Kyle, "The Prospects for OPEC: A Critical
Survey of Models of the World Oil Market," Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. II (December, 1975), pp. 363-86; or Stephen W.
Salant, "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A
Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol. LXXXIV, No. 5 (October, 1976), pp. 1079-93.
A
context of recent history. Given this Institutional setting, 
theoretical abstractions can assist in identifying key economic 
and political Influences on price stability. A convenient approach 
is to select the appropriate economic model, determine its implica­
tions for world oil price stability, and assess the robustness of 
these implications given the political factors endemic to exporter 
nationalization and the countervailing influence Introduced by 
coordination among importer governments. Since this approach should 
more accurately Indicate the relative stability of current oil prices, 
this study describes, theoretically interprets, and evaluates the 
impacts of exporter nationalization and importer coordination on 
the stability of the current real price of oil.
This study is organized into three parts. Chapter Two 
completes Part I by providing a history of the development of the 
exporter cartel and the importer cooperative in the market. In 
Part II a theoretical interpretation of an economic cartel of oil 
exporters is formulated (Chapter Three), the movement toward 
nationalization is described (Chapter Four), and the implications 
of this nationalization on the behavior of the export cartel are 
deduced (Chapter Five). Part III contains a description of the 
proposed policy of the import cooperative (Chapter Six) and an 
enumeration of the logical impact of such policies on the world 
price as unilaterally determined by the nationalizing export cartel 
(Chapter Seven). A summary of major insights concludes the study 
(Chapter Eight).
5
The main conclusion of the study Is that nationalization 
and Importer coordination have the potential to undermine the 
ability of the export cartel to sustain the current real price of 
oil in the world market. Political amplification of an asymetrical 
loss inflicted on different members of the seller group by the 
prospective entry of energy alternatives and sovereignty objections 
to the implementation of a limit pricing strategy that would block 
that entry loss are the major findings that support this conclusion. 
Largely because of continuing uncertainty about the direction and 
vigor of policy reactions by major importers, the finding of the 
potential for a price drop cannot be advanced as a prediction of 
an impending price drop. Nevertheless, the contribution of this 
study is the demonstration that the explicit consideration of 
nationalization and importer coordination weakens support for the 
assumption that world oil prices will remain at or above their 
current real level.
CHAPTER TWO
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD OIL MARKET
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
is the crude oil-exporting cartel that sets the world oil prices.
This cartel of oil producers consists of seven Arab countries (Iraq,
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or the U.A.E.,
Algeria, and Libya) in the Middle East, and six other countries
spread over four continents (Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia,
Ecuador, and Gabon).^ In the mid-1970,s these thirteen countries
together accounted for over 90 per cent of the oil exports, 66 per
cent of the crude oil production, and 80 per cent of the proven
2reserves in the noncommunist world.
The purpose of this chapter is to review some of the important 
events that laid a foundation for the emergence of the OPEC nations 
in the early 1970's as the dominant element in the level of the 
world price of oil. One of those events was the absence of a joint 
energy policy among governments in major oil-importing countries.
As a belated remedy, the International Energy Agency (IEA) evolved
1The term "Middle East members" will be used throughout this 
paper to refer to the OPEC producers located around the Persian Gulf 
and in North Africa. This group Includes the seven Arab producers 
and Iran.
2Ecuador and Gabon are an empirically Insignificant component 
of OPEC, since together they contribute just over one per cent of the 
group's aggregate oil production. It may be more accurate, therefore, 
to conceive of this as an eleven member cartel.
7
as the Instrument through which major oil-importing nations have begun 
to coordinate energy policies. As should become evident in the 
following discussion, the interaction of several forces provided an 
unusually favorable opportunity for the success of a supply side 
coalition by oil-exporter governments at the particular time that it 
occurred.
A. The Changing Role of Payments to Governments 
in International Crude Oil Prices 
Exploration and production costs have been the smallest 
component in the price of crude oil from OPEC, and particularly 
Middle East deposits, for the entire post World War II period.
For instance, Exxon has published data which Indicate that, of a 
typical sales price for Middle East crude oil of $2.05 per barrel 
in 1948, only $0.60 was needed to cover these operating costs.
Similar figures for 1960 were a $1.80 price and a 20c cost, for 
1970 a $1.40 price and a 10c cost and for 1975 a $11.50 price and
3a 25c cost. Due to less fortunate geological circumstances, costs 
are much higher in other parts of the world. Since oil of the same 
quality obtains uniform f.o.b. prices in free world trade, Middle 
East crudes have long offered their owners an enormous windfall 
profit. The history of the international oil Industry from 1945 
through 1973 has been characterized by the Iranian Oil Minister
3Exxon Public Affairs Department, Middle East Oil, (New York: 
Exxon Corp., August, 1976), p. 15. A more detailed explanation of 
cost is developed in Chapter Three.
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as a series of maneuvers by the oil-exporting countries and the 
producing companies to divide this profit. This period of 
jockeying can be separated into four phases reflecting the pro­
gressive growth in the host government share.^
1. Phases of International Oil Relations
During the early post-war years the producing companies paid 
either a fixed royalty per barrel or a small portion of their 
total profits under a profit sharing agreement to the host govern­
ments. Exxon data indicate that the profit split during this first 
phase was approximately 20 per cent to the host governments and 80 
per cent to the companies. Nominal 50/50 profit splitting replaced 
these small, but stable gdvernment payments in Venezuela in 1948, 
and in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East in the early 
1950's. The sales price at which oil moved in this second phase 
remained close to the posted price on which tax payments to the 
host governments were computed until 1959 and early 1960. An excess 
supply of crude oil then developed in the world market with the 
resumption of short haul shipments to Europe from the Persian Gulf, 
following the Suez crisis of 1957 and the U.S. adoption of an import 
quota in 1959. The resulting fall in market price came completely
^Jahangir Amouzezer, "The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction, and Fair 
Play." Foreign Affairs, Vol. LI, No. 4 (July, 1973), pp. 679.
^James T. Jensen, "International Oil-Shortage, Cartel or 
Emerging Natural Monopoly?" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1974), pp. 335-80. Except as otherwise 
noted the rest of this section is summarized from this source.
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out of the companies1 profit portion. In an attempt to share the 
effects of what appeared to be a prolonged deterioration in price, 
the companies reduced the tax reference or posted price in August, 
1960.
The beginning of the third phase came in September, 1960 
when government officials from five leading oil-exporting countries —  
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait —  established the 
Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC). Its purpose was to work 
for the stabilization of oil prices, the unification of the group1s 
oil policies, and the collective enhancement of the oil revenues 
of the members. Posted prices were stabilized and over the entire 
decade of the 1960fs these countries gradually Improved their 50 
per cent share of the profits. In 1962-63 "royalty expensing" 
(treating royalties aB a deduction from gross income like production 
cost, rather than as a credit against tax payments) increased the 
government take to 56.25 per cent of net income from oil production.
A 1965 OPEC agreement to uniformly tax on the full posted price of 
all oil, rather than on pre-arranged allowances off posted prices, 
further increased the host country share.^ By 1970 this split had 
reached about 75/25 as market prices slipped well below the 
stabilized posted prices.
^"The Birth of OPEC, and How It Grew," Business Week,
January 13, 1975, p. 79.
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Table 2-1 reflects this gradual gain in the average per 
barrel government revenue for OPEC's charter members. The amounts 
quoted are In nominal dollars, and on the average this take 
increased by about 6 per cent between 1959 and 1969. Total nominal 
oil revenue for these governments increased by 111 per cent in this 
decade mainly because their export volumes increased by 105 per 
cent. Over the same period the purchasing power of the U. S. dollar 
(as measured by the implicit GNP price deflator of the U. S. Commerce 
Department) declined by 26 per cent. This deflator is not the ideal 
measure of OPEC purchasing power, but, as will be shown below, it is 
probably a good approximation for this period.
In September, 1970 the Libyan government won an agreement 
from the companies to increase the posted prices of its oil. This 
event initiated a fourth phase since it marked the first time that 
any OPEC country had ever succeeded in forcing the international 
oil companies ‘to accept an increase in the tax reference price of 
its crude oil. The companies had always determined the posted 
price before this juncture. At subsequent price conferences in 
Teheran in January, 1971 and in Tripoli in February, 1971, the major 
producing countries of the Persian Gulf and North Africa won sub­
stantial tax rate and posted price increases from the companies. 
Conference agreements set the tax reference prices about 40 per 
cent above the then existing market prices. This arrangement 
had the effect of setting the profit split at 80/20 in the countries'
TABLE 2-1
ESTIMATED GOVERNMENT REVENUE PER BARREL OF EXPORTS 
FOR THE ORIGINAL OPEC MEMBERS 
(current US Dollars)
Country 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1966 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Saudi
Arabia $0,758 $0,750 $0,755 $0,765 $0,787 $0,820 $0,832 $0,834 $0,848 $0,878 $0,871
Kuwait 0.778 0.764 0.744 0.748 0.743 0.769 0.789 0.784 0.793 0.805 0.808
Iran 0.836 0.801 0.758 0.745 0.797 0.809 0.811 0.814 0.825 0.837 0.810
Iraq 0.824 0.786 0.765 0.767 0.807 0.801 0.817 0.813 0.852 0.907 0.914
Venezuela 0.984 0.892 0.930 0.972 0.986 0.954 0.956 0.958 1.022 1.014 1.035
Source: Petroleum Press Service, September, 1971, p. 327.
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favor.^ These agreements also set out a schedule for the escalation 
of tax rates up until 1976. Further, in December, 1972 several 
Persian Gulf states began "participation" in the operations of 
their concessionaire companies. As will be explained in more detail 
in Chapter Four, these agreements had the same type of effect as the 
"royalty expensing" and "uniform tax" agreements of the 1960's —  
that of increasing the countries' tax take without changing royalty, 
tax, or posted price levels.
A series of changes in the assumptions upon which the 1971 
price agreements were based, however, led to a demand by the host 
countries for complete renegotiation in the fall of 1973. Unforeseen 
changes included two devaluations of the U. S. dollar (the currency
g
in which oil prices were listed), the slow progress of local govern­
ment takeover of oil operations ("participation"), and the surge 
in U. S. import demand (particularly after the ending of mandatory 
import restrictions in April, 1973). The effect of these occurrences 
was to erode the host governments' share of oil profits from 80 per
9cent to 64 per cent in less than two years.
New negotiations over the adjusted 1971 terms convened coinci­
dentally with the beginning of the Arab-Israell War of 1973. The
^Edith Penrose, "The Oil Crisis: In Perspective; The Develop­
ment of Crisis," Daedalus, Vol. CIV, No. 4 (Fall, 1975), p. 49.
aSmall adjustments in the original agreements had been 




company negotiators balked at the large posted price Increase 
Immediately demanded by the host governments. In an emotional 
response, the Arab ministers renounced the procedure of negotiating 
prices and taxes with the companies, and overnight they unilaterally 
raised the posted price of a barrel of the group's benchmark or 
marker crude oil from $3.01 to $5.12. In addition, output and 
destination restrictions were imposed by the Arab countries on 
October 27, 1973. This embargo was aimed more at supporting the 
war effort against Israel than at supporting the new price policy. 
However, it quickly elicited bids of up to $20 per barrel for top 
quality Nigerian and Libyan crude oil. As a result of free market 
prices of these magnitudes, the OPEC nations jumped tax reference 
prices to the $11 to $12 per barrel range at the beginning of 1974. 
The panic bidding in late 1973 demonstrated how easily the producing 
countries could enforce their unilaterally set price, and how well 
they could prosper without benefit of the companies' marketing 
expertise. Since that learning experience, the countries have 
retained exclusive price control. Complete elimination of the 
companies from crude oil pricing may be considered a fifth phase 
in the post-war company-country relations.
2. OPEC's Trading Gain 
The recent success of this cartel in ltB ultimate aim of 
increasing government oil revenues is reflected in Tables 2-2 and 
2-3, which estimate oil receipts on a per barrel basis and on a 
total basis, respectively, for the eleven main OPEC members during
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TABLE 2-2
ESTIMATED GOVERNMENT REVENUE PER BARREL OF EXPORTS 
FOR THE MAIN OPEC MEMBERS 
(current US Dollars)
Country 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Saudi
Arabia $0,883 $1,259 $1,437 $1,567 $ 7.284 $ 9.948
Kuwait 0.828 1.203 1.360 1.706 7.462 10.027
Iran 0.862 1.246 1.358 2.080 8.719 10.137
Iraq 0.957 1.415 1.507 2.759 8.906 9.554
United Arab 
Emirates 0.920 1.272 1.434 1.619 9.166 9.967
Qatar 0.915 1.264 1.445 1.966 8.421 10.625
Libya 1.090 1.786 1.966 2.897 11.029 9.605
Algeria 0.907 1.268 1.877 2.426 10.482 10.196
Nigeria 1.093 1.722 1.870 2.997 11.069 10.563
Venezuela 1.092 1.411 1.719 2.330 8.709 9.610
Indonesia 0.693 1.040 1.243 2.568 8.707 10.606
Average all 
countries $0,946 $1,353 $1,565 $2,265 $9,087 $10,085




ESTIMATED GOVERNMENT OIL REVENUES 
FOR THE MAIN OPEC MEMBERS 
(million US Dollars)
Country 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Saudi
Arabia $1,200 $ 2,149 $ 3,107 $4,340 $22,574 $25,676
Kuwait 895 1,400 1,657 1,900 7,000 7,500
Iran 1,136 1,944 2,380 4,100 17,500 18,500
Iraq 521 840 575 1,843 5,700 7,500
United Arab 
Emirates 233 431 551 900 5,536 6,000
Qatar 122 198 255 409 1,600 1,700
Libya 1,295 1,766 1,598 2,300 6,000 5,100
Algeria 325 350 700 900 3,700 3,375
Nigeria 411 915 1,174 2,200 8,900 6,570
Venezuela 1,406 1,702 1,948 2,670 8,700 7,525
Indonesia 185 284 429 950 3,300 3,850
Total $7,729 $11,979 $14,374 $22,512 $90,510 $93,296
Source: Petroleum 
p. 338.
Economist, March, 1975, p. 85, September 1976,
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the 1970-75 period. The figures in Table 2-2, like those in Table 
2-1, are average figures for each country. Over this six year period 
the 1,107 per cent average increase in oil revenue for OPEC govern­
ments has come largely from a 964 per cent increase in per barrel 
receipts. Both tables show dollar figures unadjusted for inflation. 
The most often repeated justification by OPEC leaders for this huge 
increase is that there has been comparable inflation in the price 
of goods they import from the industrialized world.
In an effort to empirically test this assertion, two 
economists in the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics have developed 
lndlcies to measure the purchasing power of OPEC revenue per barrel 
of oil vis-a-vis commodity exports from the U. S. to OPEC.^® Their 
figures cover the period June 1964 to June 1975 and show that, 
while OPEC revenue per barrel increased by 930 per cent, the price 
of U. S. exports to OPEC increased by only 78.3 per cent. Periodic 
levels of this index of prices paid by OPEC nations are shown in 
Figure 2-1 with the line labeled MPLDFL.
Three shortcomings in the construction of this index limit, 
but probably do not completely invalidate, its use to indicate the 
approximate size of the price increases with which OPEC nations 
have been confronted. Military exports to OPEC are not included; 
these are purchases which are probably significant for at least Iran
10Edward E. Murphy and Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "Trends in 
U. S. Export Prices and OPEC Oil Prices," Monthly Labor Review,
Vol. XCVIII, No. 11 (November, 1975), pp. 36-43.
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Oil Prices," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 11 (November, 
1975), p. 37; U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, January, 1976, part II, pp. 89-91 and January, 1977, 
pp. 3 and S-2.
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and Saudi Arabia. The value of exports to OPEC from Industrial 
countries other than the U. S. are not used; in 1973 these made up 
78 per cent of the total value of exports by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to OPEC. Finally, the 
MPLDFL Index only Includes commodity imports by OPEC nations; this 
leaves out service Imports which probably are significant for these 
developing countries.
With no data available on price changes for military goods 
or for non-U. S. goods bought by OPEC, there Is no way to judge 
whether the MPLDFL index is biased up or down due to those omissions. 
Commerce Department data, however, do indicate that the Inflation 
rate has been higher for the prices of services than it was for 
durable and non-durable goods. As a rough adjustment for this 
omission, the Commerce Departments price deflator for U. S. exports 
of goods and services for the 1964 through 1975 period is depicted 
in Figure 2-1 with the line labeled X P D F L . I f  military exports 
and non-U. S. exports to OPEC have not experienced widely different 
rates of inflation than have U. S. nonmilitary exports, and if OPEC 
buys various services in about the same proportion as is used to 
construct the XPDFL index, the loss of purchasing power by OPEC due 
to inflation is somewhere between the two export lines in Figure 2.1. 
Even with this upward adjustment, OPEC per barrel revenues have
^Slnce the components of this index are not weighted for 
the distribution by type of U. S. service exports to OPEC, 
this is less exact than the MPLDFL index, which does employ this 
weighting for commodity exports to OPEC.
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risen much more (930 per cent) than the prices they appear to pay 
for their Imports (probably no more than 110 per cent). That oil- 
exporters' purchasing power has Increased considerably appears 
Indisputable. In 1975 a barrel of oil bought on the order of five 
times what It did eleven years earlier.
Note, the implicit GNP price deflator for the U. S. (GNPDFL 
In Figure 2-1) is close to the two export lndicies up through the 
middle of 1968, is above these from then to the middle of 1973, and 
below them after that. As such, it seems to provide an adequate 
base to gauge the change in OPEC purchasing power up to about the 
end of the I9601s. The recent volatility of these lndicies, depicted 
In Figure 2-lb with shorter time intervals than used In panel a, 
Indicate that the general lndicies for dollar priced goods have 
provided less accurate measures of the purchasing power of petro­
dollars since 1973.
B. Market Circumstances Behind OPEC*s Success
These impressive real gains by OPEC, especially in the last 
three years, reflect far more than its ability to take more and 
more of the windfall profit from the international oil companies.
OPEC has been able to push up the price of crude oil and increase 
the size of this windfall profit to a much greater degree than was 
ever done before 1973. Several factors have been identified, through 
hindsight, as responsible for this impressive performance by OPEC.
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1. Tightening World Oil Market
One factor that allowed those who controlled OPEC oil to
increase its selling price was the end of the surplus conditions that
had for so long prevailed in the world market for crude oil. Three
parallel developments seem principally responsible for the stiffening
of the demand for OPEC-sited crude oil; (1) a rapid growth of world
energy consumption as a whole, (2) a cumulative shift in energy
consumption towards oil, and (3) the rising volume of U. S. oil
imports. Underestimation of the extent of these changes that served
to geographically concentrate a lot of market power was characteristic
of a succession of energy predictions that appeared between 1960 and 
121972. Had the oil consumer nations recognized the magnitude of 
these shifts and correctly analyzed their significance, remedial and 
cushioning measures might have been taken before the sudden price 
change that occurred in 1973-1974.
Between 1960 and 1972 overall world energy consumption grew 
at an average annual rate of 5 1/2 per cent or from the equivalent 
of 60.5 million barrels per day (MBD) of oil, to the equivalent of 
115.7 MBD of oil. A major factor in this increase was Income 
growth, with the energy consumption/real GNP elasticity roughly 
equal to unity for the major consuming regions and somewhat above
12Joel Darmstadter and Han H. Lansbert, "The Oil Crisis:
In Perspective; The Economic Background," Daedalus, Vol. CIV,
No. 4 (Fall, 1975), p. 22.
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13unity elsewhere. In the 12 month period just before October, 1973
there was a coincidence of boom conditions in Europe, Japan, and
the U. S., as real GNP grew at 5.4 per cent, 10.4 per cent, and
5.9 per cent, respectively. The consequence was a parallel surge
in energy demand in all major consuming areas at this one time.
Between 1960 and 1972 the share of oil in total energy
consumption increased from 35.8 per cent to 46 per cent, or
from 21.7 MBD to 53.2 MBD. The key factor in this shift was the
fall in the real price of oil. Petroleum prices in January, 1969,
relative to the prices for other products at wholesale, was roughly
1410 per cent lower than it had been eleven years earlier. Some 
government policies reinforced this shift to greater dependence 
on oil. For instance, during the 1950's and 1960's, the European 
Coal and Steel Community held the price of coal down to no more 
than 5 per cent of industrial cost (with the purpose of enhancing 
the competitive position of European industry in International 
markets). An ensuing relative decline in coal supplying capacity
(as coal profits were held down) was compensated for by an increase
15in the use of fuel oil. In the U. S. the relative demand for oil
13Joel Darmstadter and Sam H. Schurr, "The World Energy Out­
look To the Mid-1980's: The Effect of An Alternative Supply Path
in the U. S.," (an unpublished paper delivered at a meeting on 
"Energy in the 1980's," at The Royal Society, London, November 15, 
1973), p. 9 and table 9.
^James W. McKie, "The Oil Crisis: In Perspective; The
United States," Daedalus, Vol. CIV, No. 4 (Fall, 1975), p. 74.
15Romano Prodi and Alberto Clo, "Europe," Daedalus, Vol. CIV, 
No. 4 (Fall, 1975), p. 93. The oil companies actively penetrated
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expanded after 1970 as a combined result of: (1) a leveling off
of natural gas output; (2) environmental constraints that reduced 
power station coal use; (3) technical, safety, and financial 
delays In the spread of nuclear power; and (4) an acceleration In 
petroleum demand in the transport sector. ^
After being constant (as a per cent of consumption) for the 
early and mid-1960's, U. S. oil imports jumped from 19 per cent 
In 1967 to 35 per cent in 1973. Behind this result was the fact 
that while oil demand was surging in this period, U. S. crude oil 
production leveled off, and actually fell from, 4.07 billion barrels 
In 1970, to 3.93 billion barrels in 1973.^ Increased U. S. reliance 
on oil Imports was significant for Europe and Japan as well as for 
the U. S., since it signaled the end of the ability of the U. S. to 
serve as a standby producer during a disruption in world oil flows. 
For instance, spare crude oil producing capacity in the U. S. stood 
at around 25 per cent at the beginning of the oil supply disruptions
this industrial market by a strategy of price discrimination, 
charging low prices on fuel oil (the main competition for coal) 
and high prices on joint products like gasolines, which are not 
subject to competition from coal. The European Governments com­
pounded the effects of this strategy by placing much higher taxes 
on gasoline than on fuel oil.
^McKie, o£. clt., pp. 74-76.
^Darmstadter and Landsbert, op. cit., p. 30. This decline 
along with a parallel decline in total proven reserves is traced to 
lagging Investment by the oil Industry in the U. S. They cite figures 
estimating that capital spending on exploration and development in 
this country increased by only about 90 per cent in current dollars 
between 1963 and 1973 (with much of it being for offshore lease acqui­
sitions) , while the same statistic showed an Increase of 230 per cent 
in the rest of the world for the same period, p. 34.
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18in both 1956-57 and 1967, but only at 10 per cent in 1973. When 
compared with the greater import dependence of the U. S. in 1973, 
the ability of American supplies to cushion an oil disruption in 
1973 was considerably reduced.
With only minor export capacity available from other 
countries that produced crude oil, the above three factors supported 
other conditions that permitted monopolistic behavior by those who 
controlled production, reserves, and exports of the OPEC nations.
The surge in energy (and especially oil) demand came at a time when 
alternative oil and energy sources were either fully occupied or had 
unexpectedly failed to materialize. In order for the host countries 
to exercise this monopoly potential, the OPEC governments had to 
wrest control of the pricing of their oil from the multinational 
oil companies that actually produced and sold it.
2. Role of Independents
A development which provided the leverage for this change
in control was the rise in Importance of the "independents" in the
19world oil market. "Independent" is the term applied to any large 
18Ibid., p . 30. A coincident development which aggrevated 
the vulnerability of Europe was the fact that crude oil and petroleum 
product inventories fell by one-third between 1971 and the end of the 
third quarter of 1973. Ibid., p. 27. A similar experience in the 
U. S. made importers in these two key consuming areas more than 
usually dependent on current arrivals of crude oil, and undoubtedly 
contributed to the panic and unheard of price bids in later 1973.
19This is a major point developed by Nell H. Jacoby in his 
analysis of the world oil market: Multinational Oil (New York:
MacMillan, 1974). He estimates that between 1953 and 1972 some 350
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oil company not in the group that was operating in the Middle East 
at the end of the second world war. This original group —  the 
"multinationals," "majors," or "seven (later eight) sisters" —  
Included Exxon, Mobil, California Standard (So Cal), Texaco, Gulf, 
British Petroleum (BP), Royal Dutch/Shell, and Compagnie Francoise 
des Petroles (CFP). The term independent is derived from the fact 
that the international oil companies other than these eight depended 
on outside (the company) supplies for more than 70 per cent of their 
oil —  they were independent of their major sources.
The extraordinary cheapness of oil from the Middle East 
attracted these "independents," who began developing their own 
sources of this crude oil in 1954. George Stocking quotes detailed 
estimates of the magnitude of the cost advantage enjoyed by crude
20oil lifted from this area over that lifted elsewhere in the world.
The most crucial effect of this circumstance is that the "inde­
pendents" felt they could not compete without their own access to 
it. Unlike the "majors," the holdings of individual "independents" 
were concentrated in one producing country and constituted a much 
larger proportion of the aggregate supplies of the individual company. 
Thus, one country had the ability to shut off the only source of cheap 
oil supply available to "independents."
separate oil companies entered or expanded into the International 
oil industry, principally in OPEC territory.
20Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Con­
troversy (Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), pp. 422-423.
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That leverage was exercised In the summer of 1970. The Suez
Canal had been closed since 1967. In May, 1970 the Syrians cut
the Trans Arabian Pipeline, interrupting the only other short haul
tanker route from the Persian Gulf to Europe. Thus insulated from
undercutting by increased shipments of Persian Gulf crude, Libya*
the sole major source of cheap crude still with direct access to the
Mediterranean, began selective cutbacks on its crude oil production
in the name of conservation. These cutbacks fell most heavily on the
operations of the "independents," who had neither offsetting Persian
Gulf production of their own to substitute on their sales contracts
nor acceaa to enough tanker bottoms to get Middle East oil around
Africa to Europe. When the "majors," with their diversified sources,
were unable or unwilling to come to the aid of the "independents,"
the latter caved in and agreed to Libyan demands for tax rate and
posted price increases. The majors had to match these terms in
Libya and in early 1971 and were forced to grant comparable terms
in the Persian Gulf to protect their access to a diversified source
21of low cost crude oil. The role of these particularly favorable 
market circumstances in OPEC's success was reinforced by inaction 
and mutual distrust by the governments in its leading customer 
countries.
21For a detailed treatment of this bargaining pattern see the 
articles by Raymond Vernon, Edith Penrose, and Mira Wllkens in 
Daedalus, Vol. CIV, No. 4 (Fall, 1975); and Anthony Sampson, The 
Seven Sisters (New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1975), Chapters 7 and
10; and Jensen, op. cit.
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c * Joint Consumer Country Response to OPEC
The major oil-importer countries had managed to weather
22early oil emergencies with fair success. This success was probably 
due more to the fortuitous circumstances they enjoyed than to any 
effective response by importers as a group, however.
1. Early International Cooperation
During the 1956 Suez crisis, oil flows to Western Europe were 
interrupted, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC), the predecessor of the OECD, managed to allocate the reduced 
supply of oil among its members. The U. S. and Japan were not part 
of the system, and the U. S. provided vital support by calling on 
reserve oil production capacity to help Europe. This performance 
occurred in a period long before the U. S. had become dependent 
on Eastern Hemisphere imports for some of its own needs.
In 1967 an attempted Arab oil embargo against the U. S. and 
Britain fizzled before the OECD had time to invoke emergency 
allocation measures. However, even this ineffective embargo raised 
strong objections by some European nations to the idea of Western 
governments rerouting tankers. Officials expressed the fear that 
such action might offend the Arabs. Efforts as late as 1972 and 
1973 to develop an OECD emergency allocation system failed, when 
the U. S. refused to commit its domestic production to such a
22Joseph A. Yager and Eleanor B. Steinberg, Energy and 
U. S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1975), pp. 404-405.
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sharing scheme, and when Japan refused to join an agreement without 
such a commitment.
1 One show of unity on oil matters by the major oil-importer
Icountries may have worked to paralyze joint resistence to OPEC in
a period before the members of the latter became confident of their
Idominance in the oil market. In Jaunary, 1971 at an OECD meeting 
in Paris, the oil companies, with the aid of the U. S. State 
Department, persuaded the assembled governments not to oppose the 
increase in petroleum product prices that would result from the 
recent tax increase imposed by Libya and likely to be matched at 
the’coming Teheran and Tripoli meetings. Professor M. A. Adelman
i
argues that this advance capitulation to anticipated OPEC price
If
demhnds did much to encourage the subsequent boldness on the part
23of the oll-exporters. OPEC threats to use its oil weapon gained 
credibility with the assurance that consumer governments would not 
objpct.
2. Response to the Oil Crisis 
When oil was withhled in October of 1973, the consumer 
countries were able to do little about it. Selective cutbacks 
Imposed by the Arab oil exporters on some but not all European 
nations effectively paralyzed any joint action by the European 
Ecqnomic Community (EEC). The Project Independence discussions
2^hIs the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as OPEC Tax 
Collectors,” Foreign Policy, No. 9 (Winter 1972-73).
I
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in the U. S. further divided the consumer countries in the face 
of OPEC unity. None of the other OECD countries had, at that time, 
any domestic prospects for alternatives to OPEC oil. With time, 
however, the recognition of their Interdependence led to a desire to 
cooperate on oil matters by most of the OECD countries. To explore 
ways to try to reduce their energy vulnerability, several industrial 
nations attended the Washington Energy Conference in February, 1974.
This conference led to the establishment of the Energy 
Coordination Group (ECG) composed of the U. S., Japan, Canada, 
Norway, and eight of the nine EEC members. France refused to join, 
preferring instead to pursue bilateral, national oil deals. Two 
factors seemed primary in this split between France and its EEC
j
partners. One, unlike the other Europeans, the French insisted on 
not endorsing the central position of U. S. based oil companies in 
the world market which close cooperation with the U. S. would have 
appeared to do. Two, the French alone felt that a unified approach
I
by major oil consuming countries was not the best way to handle the 
threatening situation.
The U. S. strategy during the ECG tenure seemed to have two 
components. First, the ECG was pressed to devise a comprehensive 
framework for consumer country cooperation, including an oil-sharing 
scheme to be used in emergencies. Second, while berating attempts 
by Individual consuming countries to strike bilateral bargains with 
oil producing countries, a vigorous attempt was made to persuade 
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to stop supporting the high cartel price
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of oil. By November, 1974 this solitary U. S. effort was apparently 
abandoned as fruitless, and the ECG countries drafted an International
iEnergy Program (IEP). Several other nations promptly adhered to it.
! The IEA was provisionally established by sixteen nations in
Ii
November, 1974. In February, 1975 New Zealand joined as the seven­
teenth full member and Norway joined as an associate member. Greece 
became an associate member in May, 1976. Participation in the IEA 
is open to all OECD countries and to European Communities that wish 
to join and are willing and able to meet the Agreement's requirements. 
Table 2-4 provides information on the members and potential
members of the IEA. Note the degree of dependence on oil imports
24reflected for most of these countries in the last column ratio.
Table 2-5 indicates the IEA's relative importance in the oil world 
at the time of its inception. Again note the vulnerability portrayed 
in the percentage columns. The countries in the IEA typically
24The production from the North Sea and Alaskan fields will 
substantially alter these figures for the U. S., the U. K., and 
Norway, but not until late 1977 at the earliest. Industry estimates 
that the trans-Alaska pipeline will have a first stage capacity of 
1.2 MBD by late 1977, and a full stage capacity of 1.6 MBD in 1979, 
on a base of 9.6 billion barrels of proved reserves in the Alaskan 
North Slope.
The estimate of proved reserves in the British sector of the 
North Sea is 10 billion barrels, in the Norwegian sector 4 billion 
barrels with probable reserves of more than double that amount 
existing in the drilling area below the 62nd parallel. Industry 
forecasts put production rates at 2.3 MBD in the British sector by 
1978. North Sea production of 0.25.MBD in 1975 and more thereafter, 
has already made Norway a net oil-exporter. Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Energy Prospects to 1985, Vol. I (Paris: 
OECD, 1974), pp. 94, 98, and 101.
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TABLE 2-4
COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
OECD Membersa ECG Members IEA Members 1976 Oil
















































































United Kingdom 3̂ United Kingdom United Kingdom 97,784/11,765
United States United States United States 697,522/400,605
Sources: 1) The New York Times Index (annotated), for November 1-15,
1974 and February 1-15, 1975 (under OIL, International).
2) IEA, Oil Statistics 1976: Supply and Disposal (Paris,
1977) .
3) Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1974 and May 26, 1976.
Jugoslavia is a "special status" member of OECD.
^European Economic Community members.
cAssociate members, meaning that they are not part of the IEA emergency 
sharing plan that is explained in Chapter Six.
^Refinery intake of crude oil or semi-processed feedstocks.
^Included with the figures for Belgium.
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TABLE 2-5 
RELATIVE SIZE OF IEA IN THE 
WORLD OIL MARKET (1976)
Group Oil Consumption Oil Production
(1000 m.t.)— % of World (1000 m.t.)— % of World
IEA 1,542,267 —  52.3 513,960 — 17.1
OECD 1,710,884 -- 58.0 533,412 — 17.8
Non-Communist 
World 2,400,000 —  81.4 2,370,000 — 79.3
Communist Worlda 550,000 —  18.6 620,000 — 20.7
World** 2,950,000 —  100% 2,990,000 — 100%
Sources: 1) Council on International Economic Policy, International
Economic Report of the President, 1977.
2) IEA, Oil Statistics 1976: Supply and Disposal (Paris,
1977).
aIncludes Albania, Bulgaria, China, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, North Vietnam, Poland, Romania, 
U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia.
**The International Economic Report of the President reports world and 
communist world consumption and production figures In millions of 
barrels per day. To make these consistent with the IEA and OECD 
totals, a conversion factor of 1 million barrels per day equals 50 
million metric tons per year was applied.
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account for some 80 per cent of total world oil Imports. Chapter 
Six presents a thorough discussion of the status of the several pro­
grams adopted by this consumer organization to reduce the collective 
vulnerability of Its members.
D. Implications
The facts In this historical review suggest the following 
conclusions. The OPEC nations' success at Increasing the real 
return from their oil resources over the first half of the 1970's 
has been impressive. Several cumulative changes in energy use 
patterns and in the structure of the international oil industry 
greatly facilitated this performance by OPEC. Previously announced 
intentions not to oppose oil price hikes and distrust of each 
other by the major oil-importing countries during the crisis situa­
tion of 1973-74, prevented an immediate joint response by these 
nations to OPEC. The realization of the ineffectiveness of 
individual import country countermeasures, with the possible 
exception of costly isolation measures by the U. S., has belatedly 
led to a multilateral response by most oil-important nations.
An assessment of the prospective effects of this response 
by importers can best be devised within the context of a general 
model of the stability of the current real price of oil. Since this 
price is set and maintained by the OPEC cartel, a model of cartel 
behavior and durability is the appropriate vehicle. Chapter Three 
begins the process of enumerating such a model by reviewing the 
economic strengths and weaknesses in the seller monopoly. Refining
34
that formulation to take account of nationalization is the task of 
the remainder of Part II.
PART II
OPEC, NATIONALIZATION, AND OIL PRICES
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CHAPTER THREE
ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE STRENGTH OF OPEC
A cartel has been broadly defined as an alliance of rival 
decision making units (firms) in which members retain their separate 
identities and separate control over their policies subject to the 
terms of the formal agreement.^ The collusion usually centers on 
the fixing of a uniform price (or price spectrum) and on specifying 
methods for maintaining that price such as assigning production 
quotas to all members. This covenant promises two complementary 
benefits to its adherents. One, it provides a way for firms without 
sufficient individual market power to earn greater than competitive 
profits. Two, it serves to reduce Individual risks. Each firm is 
furnished with information and some assurance about what other firms 
in its industry (those that belong to the cartel) will do during 
unpredictable future changes in the market.
An agreement among independent rivals to hold price above a 
competitive level unavoidably Introduces pressures which tend to 
break up the coalition. A cartel can end due to internal pressures 
caused by disagreement among the conspirators, price chiseling, and/ 
or uncontrolled expansion in member capacity. Also, a cartel
^Lester G. Telser, Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory 
Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), p. 179.
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collapse can be percipltated by external pressures such as demand 
shrinkage, new supply sources, and/or (where the monopolized market 
Is only national In scope and violates antitrust policy) government 
legal action. The success of the cartel group at overcoming these 
obstacles to monopoly collaboration Is largely controlled by two 
factors. A perception by members of the benefits of coordinated 
versus Independent responses to market circumstances Is one key 
factor. Where this understanding of mutual benefits Is Insufficient, 
the comprehensiveness of the formal agreement, Including In par­
ticular the severity of penalties levied on cheaters and the 
effectiveness of enforcement, Is the second factor that determines 
the collusion's durability.
Members of OPEC have agreed to set their Individual prices 
around a common benchmark level. No central agency assigns a price 
to each exporter. The heterogeneous nature of the product of the 
cartel (due to variations In such things as sulfur content, specific 
gravity, and location) prevents these exporters from settling on a 
single price for crude oil. This producer group has not yet been 
able to agree on the proper price differentials that crude oils from 
different origins should bear. Individual oil exporters retain the 
legal right within the agreement to alter their relative prices and 
relative output shares.
To date the OPEC cartel has no known prorationing or formal 
quota scheme to Insure that the output of members is consistent with
38
the established price. Instead* these nations appear to have 
Implicitly agreed to accept the way that International oil companies 
limit production to what they can sell at the prescribed price and 
allocate this amount among the producing countries. Since the oil- 
exporting nations transfer the great bulk of their oil to the com­
panies at a fixed price, the market share of each country depends 
upon what Its resident companies can sell. Because company margins 
are very thin, processors cannot make significant price cuts. As 
long as no country makes lower offers to obtain more output, the 
market clears at the prevailing price. There appears to be no 
formal system within the cartel to respond to cheating behavior 
should, say, financial pressures tempt some members to chisel on 
the group price, although implicit political pressures probably can 
and have been used.3
The task of this and the following two chapters is to develop 
an assessment of the basic cohesiveness of the OPEC group by exam­
ining some incentives for independent and for concordant pricing
^This deficiency means that OPEC is not an export cartel as 
defined by the Webb-Pomerene Act of the U. S. Congress.
^One general criticism of the oil market models reviewed in 
the article by D. Fischer, D. Gately, and J. F. Kyle, "The Prospects 
for OPEC: A Critical Survey of Models of the World Oil Market,"
Journal of Development Economics. Vol. II (December, 1975), pp. 363- 
86 is that these models contain no explicit analysis of OPEC stability. 
Rather the various authors tend to make only "intuitive assessments" 
that the excess capacity generated by various price paths either is 
or is not absorbable by the group. See in particular pages 378 and 
380-81.
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behavior that exist within that cartel. Chapter Three concentrates 
on an evaluation of what appear to be the primary economic factors in 
the stability that the oil exporters' cartel has demonstrated to date. 
The term economic is used in the study to identify elements which 
should effect the collusive conduct of managers who are assumed, to 
act only so as to maximize the pecuniary profits or wealth of the 
owners of their respective firms. After Chapter Four reviews the 
evolution of nationalization, Chapter Five adds to this analysis of 
economic durability a discussion of the theoretical effects of 
political motives and international relations that are Injected into 
this cartel when national governments come to own the member enter­
prises. This exercise should provide some Insight into the general 
character and strength of "political-economic" cartels.
A. The Existence of Monopoly
In order for a study of cohesion and conduct for any cartel 
to be meaningful it must be assumed that the price in the relevant 
market is above the competitive level. In the market for a non­
renewable resource the competitive price does increase, primarily as 
a result of increases in the scarcity value of the resource. A cartel 
arrangement would contribute to higher prices only by imposing price 
Increases above those caused by increases in scarcity value. Con­
versely, price increases which cannot be explained in terms of 
scarcity values would support the assumption that a cartel
AO
arrangement is present and effective in contributing to the pre­
vailing price level.
Recent price increases in the world price or crude oil 
would not denote the operation of a monopoly if they can be traced 
to Increases in the scarcity value (or opportunity cost) of oil.
The scarcity value of crude oil is based on the fact that it is a 
nonrenewable mineral, meaning that its use is equivalent to spend­
ing out of stored-up treasure. If worldwide exhaustion of this 
treasure is eminent, then sellers could independently be led to the 
conclusion that a high price is simply compensating them for an 
impending loss of an income source and smoothing buyer transition 
to what replaces oil. Even though production costs may be very 
small for the marginal barrel of oil, there is a user cost that 
must be added to its current production and consumption to reflect 
the fact that it will not be available for use at a later date.
This cost is the opportunity cost that today's seller bears for the 
oil he does not save. Should this full cost be at or close to $12 
per barrel in 1976, then scarcity, not monopoly, is responslbile 
for that price level. The decision about the true source of the 
$12 price level requires an empirical estimate of the scarcity value 
or opportunity cost of current oil production.
1. Components of a Full Cost Estimate
An attempt to calculate the opportunity cost of the marginal 
barrel to oil sellers involves the estimation of four parameters.
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First, the level to which the price of a barrel of crude 
oil will eventually rise as a result of exhaustion must be predicted. 
The concept of a backstop technology Is typically invoked to formu­
late a prediction about the future celling price for energy from 
oil.^ Assuming a backstop technology is feasible, let Bfc represent 
the expected cost of providing the usable equivalent of a barrel of 
drilled oil in the form of a high cost more abundant substitute in 
the appropriate future period t .̂  Conventional oil that remains at 
time t could be sold by its holder for B dollars per barrel and no 
more.®
4The ceiling price determination is discussed by R. M.
Solow in "The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics," 
American Economic Review, Vol. LX1V, No. 2 (May, 1974), pp. 1-14.
He defines backstop technology as technology capable of substituting 
for a mineral resource at relatively high cost but on an effectively 
inexhaustible resource base. The breeder reactor or solar enegry 
utilization constitute a backstop to fossil fuel. Technology using 
relatively more abundant natural resources such as coal, oil shale, 
or tar sands provides a limited backstop to drilled oil.
^The clearest estimate of the ceiling price for crude oil 
(Bt) is provided by estimates of the cost of synthetic petroleum 
from coal, shale, and tar sands (synfuel). When the backstop is 
based on a nonpetroleum fuel, a factor for the accompanying conver­
sion of the energy producing and using capital stock must be added 
to the fuel price to obtain a ceiling price for oil that is based 
on the cost of the buyers' feasible alternative.
^This Bt figure represents the ceiling price of oil only if 
the sales of the substitutes are not monopolized, as oil sales are 
herein asserted to be.
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Second, the period or interval over which the reserve inven­
tory of oil will last has an impact on the current scarcity value, 
and therefore must be estimated. The barrel of oil withheld today 
by a producer in anticipation of future benefits permits the sale of 
a barrel which would not be available otherwise, only 1 years in the 
future, where i is the proper reserve/production ratio.^ The size 
of i determines when the ceiling price based on backstop technology 
becomes pertinent to the withheld barrel.
Third, to obtain the present value of the opportunity to sell 
a barrel of oil for B dollars 1 years from now, a discount rate (r) 
must be applied to the future receipts from the sale of this barrel. 
011-ln-the-ground is an asset whose only return to the holder is 
the price increase that it is expected to bear. For the seller to 
suffer no loss by withholding a barrel of oil, this capital gain 
must equal or exceed what an alternative financial or real asset 
would yield. With a competitive and frictionless capital market, 
r would be the return on the best investment alternative to oil-in- 
the-ground. If the expected annual rate of oil price increase (b)
?Total oil reserves probably have not been discovered, and 
future consumption rates are likely to diverge from current levels 
due to autonomous factors such as an acceleration of the develop­
ment process in less developed countries or possibly environmental 
delays to the substitution away from oil as the primary fuel source 
in developed countries. Consequently, the current reserve/produc­
tion ratio may need modification. If production growth is expected 
to exceed the growth in proven reserves, then the reserve/production 
ratio must be deflated to obtain the correct i. If new discoveries 
and revisions in reserve estimates are expected to outpace produc­
tion growth in the near future, then the proper i is an inflated 
reserve/production ratio.
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from the current level to were leas than r, the maximizing pro­
ducer would transfer future sales to the present and Invest these 
extra proceeds In the higher yield alternative assets.
Finally, since part of the expected price must defray the 
expense of producing the saved barrel In the future period, an expec­
ted lifting cost (Ct) must be deducted from the Bt amount to obtain 
the net value of oil that Is replaceable by the backstop. To con­
vert Ct to present value it must also be subject to the relevant 
discounting factor.
In addition to the scarcity cost or opportunity cost, a 
current lifting cost (CQ) must be included to obtain an estimate 
of the price that producers must receive to be fully compensated 
for selling a barrel of their oil now. Collecting terms, the full 
cost of the marginal barrel or the price that would prevail under
Qcompetitive conditions is;
Po = Co + (B " C)t (1 + r)_1
This is the level to which the current price of crude oil would 
move if the oil cartel broke up or ceased to be effective and 
market forces alone determined price.
QAn equivalent equation for the complete marginal cost 
associated with current petroleum production is derived by Dwight 
R. Lee in "Pricing of Oil and the Immediacy of the Future," The 
Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. I, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), 
p. 295.
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Detailed estimates of this price exist, so it is not neces­
sary to duplicate all of those parameter estimates here. Using a 
(B - C) value of $13.50 (in 1975 dollars), a CQ of $0.25, an i of 25 
years (or a t of the year 2000), and an r of 10 per cent, Professor
Adelman estimates that the competitive price of Persian Gulf oil in
q1975 was $1.50 per barrel. Professor Nordhaus uses a (B - C) range
of $7.60 to $11.60 (in 1970 dollars), a C of $0.06 for Persian Gulfo
oil, an i of 40 years, and an r of 10 per cent and estimates that a 
competitive or efficiency price for Persian Gulf oil plus delivery 
charges to the U. S. would be about $1.20 per barrel in 1970 and 
about $1.70 per barrel in 1980.^  Though these estimates are not 
identical, they are both small fractions of current world oil prices.
2. Causes for the Excess Price 
The discrepancy between the market price and these estimates 
of the competitive or efficiency price could be due to factors other 
than the existence of a monopolistic element in oil sales. The
®M. A. Adelman, "The World Oil Cartel: Scarcity, Economics,
and Politics," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Vol. XVI, 
No. 2 (Summer, 1976), pp. 8-11.
Pjj » $0.25 + ($13.50)2qqq (1 + 0.1)"25 - $1.50.
^-^William D. Nordhaus, "The Allocation of Energy Resources," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 3 (1973), pp. 553-57. 
Using his lower bound:
P£ >» $0.06 + ($7.60)2010 (1 + 0.1)-*° plus approximately $1.00 per
barrel in transportation cost from the Middle East to the U. S. mid­
continent “ $1.20.
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opportunity cost component, [(B - C)c / (1 + r)*-], of the p£ equa­
tion varies directly with the size of B and (B - C) and inversely 
with the size of C, r and 1. Explaining a $12 price for a barrel of 
oil by postulating appropriate values for these variables, however, 
seems to require some highly improbable assumptions about the per­
ceptions of oil sellers.
Professor Nordhaus suggests that one reason producers might 
feel that the full cost of current oil production is above his esti­
mate Is that they are more pessimistic about the future of techno­
logical advances in energy production and use than is h e . ^  In 
effect, these pessimists would argue that his choice of Bt is much 
too low. Justification for this view might involve assertions that 
the chosen Bt does not Include enough return to compensate for such 
things as environmental damage caused by the wide use of coal, safe 
disposal of nuclear waste, and unforeseen engineering problems that 
may arise in the development of and conversion to substitute energy 
processes on a large scale. A not incidental component of this 
higher cost may result from nuisance suits by environmental forces 
who would like to see the world forced to convert to a less energy-
intensive lifestyle. With a higher Bt and (B - C)t, the ceiling to
which the price of oil will rise during its remaining tenure as the 
key energy source is higher than these estimates foreseen.
^Ibid., p. 559. One recent estimate of the minimum cost of 
producing the equivalent of a barrel of crude oil from synfuels are 
in the vicinity of $12.50 to $20 rather than $7.60 to $11.60. "Shale 
Closest Among Liquid Synfuels," The Oil and Gas Journal, January 11, 
1977, pp. 24-25.
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Nordhaus reports that anything but the most drastic pessl- 
mism does not raise his discounted price significantly. Using the 
other parameter values employed In his model, a (B - C)t value of 
SO to 70 times larger (In the range of $550 per barrel of oil equi­
valent) than his best estimate is required to generate a current user 
plus lifting cost of $12 per barrel. Attributing to oil sellers an 
expectation that over the life of their reserves the price of oil 
will rise at a rate sufficient to rendezvous with this much higher 
celling requires rather extreme views about the cost of energy sub­
stitutes. Estimates that use a (B - C)t value of as much as $50, 
only raise the P£ estimate to $2.16 per barrel.
A somewhat related supposition about the inflated current 
price Is that oil producers act as a myopic asset managers rather
12than as proprietors who must eventually sell all of their commodity. 
For Instance, if oil owners treat their reserves like a growth stock 
and expect the world oil price to rise to $19.50 per barrel in 
1980, a discounted opportunity cost of $12 per barrel in 1976 is 
about right. In effect, the rate of price increase expected by oil 
sellers is based not on the long-term rendezvous with a substitute 
price, but on a projection of recent past price trends into the 
near future.
12Ibid., pp. 536, 560, 571, and 573.
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If the Nordhaus and Adelman calculations are reasonably 
accurate* then some of these owners will be unpleasantly surprised 
when they cannot realize the anticipated rate of return. With the 
expertise that oil producers can buy with their new-found wealth, it 
seems lmprobaole that they can be expected to operate under this 
kind of delusion. This explanation then implies that producers with 
large oil reserves must be confident that they can continue to find 
oil buyers who are deceived about the true scarcity cost of oil- 
produced energy.
A third avenue for questioning the P̂ J calculations made by 
Nordhaus and Adelman involve objecting to their choice of the rate 
at which future profits are discounted by oil sellers. The profit 
maximizing producer would use a rate based upon what an alternative 
financial or real asset would yield. Both Nordhaus and Adelman 
select a real discount rate of 10 percent per annum. Professor 
Adelman picks it because this was the "median after-tax return on 
equity for all (U. S.) manufacturing" between 1957 and 1965, "the 
last period of price st a b i lity.Presumably  then, it is the 
expected yield on a diversified portfolio of alternative assets to. 
oil. Professor Nordhaus chooses 10 percent because it "approximates 
the average pretax return on reproducible tangible capital, and as
130p. Clt., p. 8.
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such is a reasonable estimate of the social productivity of invest­
ment."^ Spending on capital should increase future real consumption 
at this rate, so the marginal profit gained from holding oil must 
increase at least at this rate to be as productive an Investment.
By the circumstance of possessing most of the world’s known 
reserves, the OPEC nations are the ones who pick the discount rate 
to use in the scarcity cost calculation for crude oil. To this point 
the rate at which oil prices are expected to rise (b) and the rate at 
which profits received in the future are discounted back to the 
present (r) have been treated as approximately equal.^ However, 
the rate of discount (r1) actually applied by some of these nations 
to future oil earnings may depart significantly from a rate (r) 
selected on the basis of the average yield of alternative assets.
First, there is the risk that the estimate of (B - C)t will 
be off the mark. For example, if the one used turns out to be too 
high (say unexpected technological changes put the future marginal 
profit below $13.50), the future value of the saved oil will not 
be as high as anticipated. An underestimation of the true (B - C)t
l*0p. Cit., p. 548. Ten percent was the ratio of profit 
income to the estimated replacement cost of private capital in 1968.
■^If the marginal lifting cost (C) for crude oil were zero 
[i.e., if Bt equaled (B - C)*], the two rates would be equal.
Relative to Bfc, C is minute for the Middle East. Therefore, to focus 
on other reasons for differences between these two rates, the assump­
tion of zero marginal lifting costs will be made.
49
1b also possible. Generally, the wider the variance In the esti­
mates about (B - C)t or the less certain producers are about the
level of future oil prices, the greater is the discount rate they
16are expected to apply to deferred oil earnings. Uncertainty 
about (B - C)t has the effect of reducing the opportunity cost 
component of full cost that is calculated by these (uncertain) 
producers. Apparently because of the difficulty involved in 
measuring the influence of this kind of risk on the discount rate 
choice, both estimates make no attempt to adjust for this factor. 
This conservative omission implies that the full cost estimate
may be higher than the one actually perceived by the oil producers
c c(or, perceived Pq ? is less than estimated P ).
A second type of risk that affects the discount rate choice 
can arise in connection with the location of the alternative invest­
ment opportunities. A 10 percent real rate of discount is probably 
not too high for exporting countries that can spend most or all of 
their oil proceeds on internal development projects, such as infra­
structure and basic industry. However, several OPEC nations are 
characterized as being low absorber countries because their total 
oil incomes far exceed their current ability to usefully spend
16William J. Baumol. Economic Theory and Operations 
Analysis. (Second ed.; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965),
pp. 454-55. That is, r 1 exceeds r because the return on future 
oil sales is less certain than the return on alternative 
investments.
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foreign exchange on domestic projects. ^  Governments In these nations 
must (or at least do) place a large portion of their oil revenue in 
external investments.
Part of the pecuniary return on these alternative invest­
ments may be compensation for the greater risk that low absorbers 
bear because of the external placement of their surplus income.
When their funds are committed to outside projects, the investment 
is subject to several risks which reduce the rate of return to be 
compared with the rate of appreciation in the value of oil reserves. 
Such risks include those associated with (1) Invested capital being 
held hostage by unfriendly foreign governments, (2) earnings being 
taxed at exhorbitant rates by envious foreign governments, (3) 
earnings being depreciated by adverse exchange rate movements or 
by domestic inflation in recipient countries that is induced in no 
small measure by high prices for oil imports, and (A) capital loss 
resulting from poor investment choice. Consequently, the return 
sacrificed by low absorber countries on store of wealth assets 
(even those that apparently have high yields such as development 
programs in their high absorber neighbors, the stock of growth com­
panies, or real estate in the advanced countries) could have a real, 
risk adjusted yield rate of less than 10 percent.
^Members of OPEC that are usually put into this category 
include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, the United Arab Emirates 
(U.A.E.). See H. B. Chenery, "Restructuring the World Economy," 
Foreign Affairs. Vol. LIII, No. 2 (January, 1975), pp. 242-63 or 
C. A. Gebelein, "Effects of Conservation on Oil Prices: Analysis
of Misconceptions," The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. I,
No. 1, (Autumn, 1975), pp. 53-68.
51
If the risk associated with the external placement of margi­
nal oil proceeds Is more Important to these countries than the risk 
associated with the variability of the (B - C)fc estimate, they may 
apply a real discount rate (r') below r » 10 percent to future oil
earnings and perceive a PC| greater than Pc as calculated by Pro-o o
fessors Adelman and Nordhaus. Recalculating Adelman's projection 
using a 5 percent discount rate yields a scarcity value of $4.00 
per barrel rather than $1.25. Nordhaus reports that a 5 percent 
discount rate makes a dramatic (unreported) difference in his calcu­
lations, also. Discount rates below 5 percent raise the scarcity 
value even more sharply. However, using Adelman's numbers, an r of
0.5 percent must be chosen to generate a marginal user plus lifting 
cost of $12 per barrel. Generally, a drastic change in either the B 
or the r values used by Nordhaus and Adelman is required to obtain a 
P®' in the vicinity of $12 per barrel. This requirement indicates 
that more moderate and reasonable modifications that might be made 
in those parameters, even in combination, do not produce enough 
increase in the scarcity value of crude oil to justify calling $12 
an efficiency price.
Direct evidence of the presence of monopoly activity on the 
sellers' side of the world oil market is also available. The 
maintenance of excess production capacity is consistent with the 
hypothesis that producers are withholding output in order to drive 
up the price. Under competition, producers would increase output
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as long as the extraction plus opportunity cost of the extra barrel 
Is less than the market price they would receive for It. Table 3-2, 
pages 76 77, reports the existence of significant unused produc­
tion capacity in place In most of the OPEC nations. The cost to these 
producers of Increasing production therefore involves no added explora­
tion and development costs. Thus, since the cost of Increased output 
is just what is estimated above, the excess capacity evidence indi­
cates that sellers are withholding output to hold price above cost.
Monopoly interference is thus the most plausible explanation 
for the inflated level of the current world oil price. Alternative 
explanations using higher (B - C)t values, shorter time horizons, or 
lower discount rates to adjust the scarcity value to $12 per barrel 
must rely on extreme assumptions about the value involved. Excess 
capacity evidence further supports the finding of monopoly. The 
above arguments that world oil price is above the competitive level 
do not say anything about how it is determined, and in particular 
do not imply that it is set at a joint profit maximizing level for 
the cartel. The magnitude of the p£ estimate does indicate that the 
OPEC cartel must exert enough control over members to maintain a 
selling price that appears to be several times the full cost of extra 
output.
B. Price Determinat ion
Ideally, a group of sellers that mutually agrees to raise 
price above the competitive level would attempt to maximize group
53
profits. This joint monopoly solution can be demonstrated using a 
familiar static model. Assume the group sells a sufficiently homo­
geneous product so that all sales can be made at essentially 
identical prices. Also, assume that the industry in question is 
initially operating in a competitive equilibrium. Let Dg In Figure 
3-1 represent the current demand confronting the group of firms 
that decides to act colluslvely. If a competitive fringe is tole­
rated by the group, then D is the Industry demand curve less theO
output that the existing fringe producers provide. D is the
©
residual demand curve of the dominant firm model.
A central decision body would derive a marginal revenue curve 
(MR ) from D and would construct a marginal cost curve (Imc) for© O
18the group by aggregating the individual member marginal costs.
The monopoly price (P ) and quantity (Q^) can thereby be set for 
the cartel. An output cutback (Qc - that is necessitated by 
this price policy must then be distributed among the group. Where 
a competitive fringe is permitted, the cartel must usually expect 
to have to accept all of the excess capacity needed to support P^
•̂®In the case of an exhaustible resource, this marginal cost 
can be assumed to include the scarcity or opportunity cost factor in 
current production as well as the present production costs associated 
with the marginal barrel. Inclusion of the opportunity cost factor 
means that long run marginal cost would increase with output because 
scarcity value rises as current production expands. Larger production 
now reduces the interval over which reserves will last, thus lowering 
the discounting factor applied to future sales revenue. See the 
competitive price equation on page 43.
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in the market. To maximize cartel profit, the central agency should 
minimize cost by assigning each member an output quota like q^.
Assume for the purposes of this section that the cartel can enforce 
the quotas that it decides to assign.
For a producer to join the cartel, the economic profit plus
the normal profit (within the average cost) promised at the restricted
output must exceed the normal profit that the single firm would expect
to receive at the larger output available if it acted Independently
at Pc. ^  Assuming quota enforcement, this condition should be met
except under one of the following situations. One, the individual
firm cannot adjust plant capacity easily or quickly to the smaller
level of output. Further, with its existing plant the firm must
absorb too much overhead expense for too long in operating at q tom
20make the choice more profitable over the relevant decision period. u 
Two, since the cartel will probably have to absorb all of the output 
cutback that is necessary to sustain Pm , it must control a large 
enough proportion of total industry output to permit members to 
bear the nonproductive overhead of idle capacity. If too little 
capacity (or too few firms) join the cartel, this burden can be too 
much for the cartel members to bear. Neither of these conditions
l^In Figure 3-1 for instance, the normal profit component of 
Pceq ® must be smaller then the normal profit component of cbq® 
plusT^abc.
^Because the market for crude oil is not static but rather 
is still growing, any hesitancy producers feel on this account could 
diminish. By delaying expansion cartel producers can allow output 
at the established price to grow into Inplace capacity.
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appears to exist to a degree that makes cartel membership unattrac­
tive to the OFEC countries.
The profit maximizing price depicted in Figure 3-1 is unlikely 
to be achieved in practice. Decisions made by an association result 
from negotiation, give-and-take, and compromise among the points of 
view and interests of the separate entities that make up the cartel. 
When profits are distributed according to the production quotas 
assigned to each member, all firms will seek to have their quotas 
enlarged. Certain producers that are able to exert the greatest
pressure on the central decision body can demand and receive shares
21in excess of those dictated by cost minimization consideration. ±
Where the compromise is to assign each firm an equal quota, those 
producers with different coBts will disagree on the optimum level 
for Pffl (those with higher costs preferring a higher than those 
with a lower marginal cost at each output level). Therefore, it 
seems unlikely that an association would be able to act precisely
as would a monopolist that had control of the production capacity
22of all of the members.
Another reason that the Pm depicted in Figure 3-1 may not 
be established by the cartel is that members wish to pursue an entry
21For example, firms which are less averse to risking the 
demise of the cartel by pulling out can demand and obtain an output 
share which raises their marginal cost above that of their more 
cautious collaborators.
22In theory (but seldom In practice) a profit pooling and 
sharing plan could be devised which would ensure the pure monopoly 
outcome while satisfying the demands of individual members.
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limiting price policy. If active and potential fringe members can 
expand output profitably with a market price of Pm , the dominant 
group's market and profit share will decline as this new capacity 
is developed. Further, if high cost substitute products are 
potentially available, Pm may be high enough to induce encroachment 
on the narrowly defined market of the dominant group by these 
alternative products.^ The limit price model can be used to for­
mally specify these concerns.
1. Basic Limit Price Model
Let D in Figure 3-2 again represent the demand curve facing 
0
the collusive group. Two modifications of the way in which Dg was 
conceived of in Figure 3-1 are necessary. First, the Industry 
demand curve, of which D is the residual part used by the dominantO
group in its price setting role, is expanded to include products 
that (following an adjustment period) can serve as reasonable sub­
stitutes for the product of the cartel. For example, Dg will be 
viewed as part of the demand for energy rather than as part of the 
demand for crude oil only. Second, for convenience of exposition it 
is assumed that this industry demand curve is expected to be stable,
^This possibility may be a significant omission in the 
dynamic analysis of cartel pricing behavior done by S. W. Salant. 
"Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Coumot
Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. LXXXIV, No. 5 (October, 1976), pp. 1079-93.
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so that it can serve as a long run demand curve.^ Since Dg is 
derived from this industry demand curve, it too can be viewed as a 
long run demand curve.
Suppose that the cartel group is able to operate on the com­
bined short run average cost function ACg, with the corresponding 
marginal cost MCg. Suppose furthermore that existing and potential 
fringe members have a lowest attainable long run average cost of
AC and that all of these firms can achieve this cost level in time, n
Finally, assume that the more broadly conceived market is so large 
that fringe producers expect their individual output contributions 
to have no perceptible influence on price. In other words, the 
existing and potential fringe take the price set by the dominant 
group as given.
If the price is set at P (or any price even slightly abovem
AC ), firms in the competitive fringe realize supra-normal profits, n
24To assume otherwise creates two problems which unneces­
sarily complicate the following analysis. One, as Scherer points 
out, this assumption is necessary in order to depict graphically 
a demand curve that covers more than one period, i.e., a long run 
demand curve. If the demand curve is not stable, then either the 
price or quantity demanded are not fully determined in any specific 
period by the analysis embodied in the diagram. Industrial Market 
Structure and Economic Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), 
pp. 213-14 and p. 219. Two, if some rate of growth in the industry 
demand is permitted, then questions of how this growth is distributed 
among existing and entering producers must be addressed. For a 
discussion in this vein, see J. N. Bhagwati, "Oligopoly Theory, 
Entry-Prevention and Growth,'' Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. XXII,
No. 3 (November, 1970), pp. 297-310.
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Existing producers have the Incentive to expand or replicate their 
plants and new firms have the Incentive to enter the Industry.
Since the fringe firms are not subject to quotas, as are the cartel 
members, they will respond to these incentives. In this situation 
Dg will not remain stable, but will shift to the left and continue 
shifting to the left as long as price is kept above ACn> The result 
would be a progressive decline in the dominant group's output share 
and thus its share of industry profits. Should the energy market 
be growing over time, the dominant group may suffer relative but not 
absolute decline in output. If the cartel can exert enough disci­
pline to prevent its members from expanding individual capacity, 
unit costs will not rise with the decline in market share and squeeze 
group profits from below.
To avoid the erosion of its monopoly position, however, the
cartel must set and maintain the entry-deterring or limit price of
P^ (or, more precisely a price slightly below P^) by expanding its
output to (or slightly above Q^). Since the cartel has a cost
advantage over the fringe, it could still earn supra-normal profits
N
of P. egh (less than IP abc of Figure 3-1, where N is the number of 1 m
members) currently while preventing expansion of the fringe and 
shrinkage of its market share. In choosing a price policy, the 
dominant group must therefore compare the initially lower but more 
persistent profits at P-̂  with the initially higher but eventually 
lower profits at P . This choice may be depicted in Figure 3-3,
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which shows the collusive firms' (undiscounted) profit stream over 
tlme.^
If P Is chosen, monopoly profits In the Initial period are m
of size A. Because this encourages entry, the cartel's output share 
and thus profit declines toward B over time. At some critical point 
(T) the cartel will be forced to cut price at least to the entry 
deterring level to maintain Internal discipline. If It does not the 
shrinking market share and profits will induce individual members to 
begin leaving the cartel. If price is reduced only to P^ at T, then 
the stream of profits to the cartel is described by the curve ABKCD.
If price is cut to a point below P^, in an attempt to induce nega­
tive entry (exit) by fringe producers, the profit stream is described 
by ABKCEF. The lower price at T results in even lower cartel profits, 
but as this price is maintained the cartel recaptures customers and 
increases Its profits. If P^ is chosen initially, the profit 
stream is described by the line segment GKH. The pricing strategy 
choice may then be viewed as a comparison between ABKG and HKCD.
^-*Thls figure is adapted from one used by John T. Wenders in 
"Collusion and Entry," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXXIX,
No. 6, (November-December, 1971), p. 1260.
2&Both Scherer and Bhagwati, op. cits., reason that once dis­
placements have occurred, they tend to become permanent. The 
rationales given are that there is often some conversion of capital 
stock by buyers to accomodate the new Inputs from entrants and/or 
there is buyer resentment for price now revealed to have been 
exploitative. This suggests that the absolute value of the slope 
of EF will be smaller than the absolute value of the slope of AB 
and tends to argue against a price cut to a level below Pi by the 
dominant group.
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Three variables affect the decision between the ABKCD (or
AfiKCGF) path and the GKH path. These variables are: (1) the size
Nof IP abc relative to P,egh (or A relative to G), (2) the rate at ffl 1
which profits under the P^ strategy are expected to erode due to
27entry, and (3) the discount rate applied to future earnings. The 
influence of each of these variables, assuming that the other two are 
held constant, is as follows. The greater the difference between the 
two profit sizes, the less likely it is that existing firms will 
choose to deter entry. This course is expected because of the fact 
that as the difference between A and G grows, the proximate sacri­
fice that must be made by the established firms acting to forestall 
entry (ABKG) also increases relative to HKCD. The greater the rate
at which entry is expected to occur at P , the less likely it is
in
that existing firms will choose that price. The period for which
they enjoy ABKG before cartel share has been reduced to the critical
point is smaller than if the entrant response were slower. Finally,
the greater their discount rate, the more likely established firms
are to choose P . They place proportionately less importance on the m
future profits foregone due to entry (HKCD).
2. The Role of Reserve Levels and 
Absorption Capacity 
Using this model it is possible to examine the effect on 
price preferences of each of two conditions relevant to the oil
27Scherer, op. cit., p. 222.
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cartel. First, producers with different productive lifetimes, usually
measured by reserve/production ratios, but identical in other respects,
may disagree on the choice between a and a P-̂  strategy for the
following reason. Any given rate of entry provoked by P will appearm
to be (relatively) faster to the high reserve producer than to the 
low reserve producer. An enterprise that expects to sell for only a 
period of R years (R = the reserve/production ratio after adjustment 
for the anticipated changes in each component) tends to be less con­
cerned about the profit loss after T than does a high reserve 
producer who expects to sell for a period of S years (where R is 
less than S).
The conditions under which differences in time horizons
could lead to differences in the choice between P. and P can be1 m
developed using Figure 3-3. Assume that that figure describes the 
circumstance for both producers. This assumption implies that the 
perceived difference between current monopoly profits and limit price 
profits (A - G) are equal for each producer, the future critical 
point T perceived by each is the same, and the rates at which future
profits are discounted by each are the same. For dlagramatic con­
venience the figure depicts an undiscounted profit stream. Thus, 
each producer is in effect assigned a discount rate of zero in this 
partial analysis. The only difference between the producers is that 
one has a production time horizon of R on the time vector and the
other a time horizon of S. In terms of the figure the profit
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maximizer would select F over P. If ABKG is larger than HKCDm l
bounded by its expected date of exhaustion (R or S). Based upon 
a commonly perceived location of T,^® three cases can be identified.
First, if both producers expect the rate of entry to be 
so gradual that T occurred to the right of R and S, then neither 
member would even consider the possible need to exercise restraint 
in the pricing decision. There is no KCHD marginal loss to weigh 
against the initial gain from charging Pffl. This situation may be 
considered as equivalent to that identified as blockaded entry by 
Joe Bain.^ Differing reserve levels would not lead to a conflict 
of interest about the choice of a uniform price level in this 
situation.
Second, if T occurs between R and S, the low reserve pro­
ducer still has no HKCD to consider and so would always favor Pm .
He does foresee a smaller absolute profit gain from Pm than ABKG 
because his production time horizon is inside the BK boundary. The 
high reserve producer would have a HKCD marginal loss to compare 
with the full marginal profit of ABKG, but would prefer P^ only if 
that loss exceeded this larger initial profit. A disagreement over
^The OPEC secretariat serves as a common source of expert 
information to member oil producers. The perception by Individual 
members of the rate of development of alternative sources (entry) 
and by extension of T is therefore based on the same Information.
^Barriers to New Competition, (Cambridge: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1956), pp. 21-22'.
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the F or P, choice in this case would require that a large difference m 1
between R and S exist.
Third, in the situation actually depicted in Figure 3-3 R and 
S could both occur to the right of T, indicating that each producer 
expects entry to force a price adjustment in the future. Both pro­
ducers have the same initial profits to compare with different 
eventual losses from choosing the Pm over the P-̂  strategy. A range 
of situations exist in which the low reserve producer would prefer 
Pm (ABKG > HKCD bounded by his expected date of exhaustion) and the 
high reserve producer would prefer P^ (ABKG < HKCD hounded by his 
more distant expected date of exhaustion). The difference from case 
two is that this conflict of Interest does not require a large 
interval between R and S.
In sum, everywhere that the high reserve producer would 
choose Pm , so would the low reserve producer. There are situations 
where the converse does not hold. Thus, the potential for disagree­
ment exists and such disagreements would always find the high reserve 
producer (other things equal) on the side of a P^ strategy.
Another difference between the national members of the OPEC
cartel which can lead to a disagreement on profit maximization
grounds over the choice between P and P. is the difference betweenm l
their absorptive capacities. Those producers with economies that 
have a greater ability to spend foreign exchange receipts on pro­
ductive domestic projects now are likely to apply a greater discount 
rate to future oil profits than are low absorbers. The former have
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more secure Investment alternatives to oll-in-the-ground than do the 
latter for the reasons outlined on page 50.
To see the effect of this difference on the price choice, 
assume that two producers have identical time horizons(R * S in terms 
of the previous analysis), that both expect the same rate of entry 
and each perceives the same T, and that A - G is the same for each. 
Suppose, however, that producer W  has a greater rate of discount 
than does producer Z (rw > rz). Producer Z has a higher regard for 
extra profits that are lost after entry forces an adjustment in 
price (HKCD) relative to current extra profits than does producer W. 
Consequently, at some time horizons where HKCD discounted at rz would 
lead to a choice of P , HKCD discounted at r would not. Table 3-1X _
presents an example demonstrating this situation.
For sellers of a nonreproducible commodity the choice is 
not likely to be so clear cut as in the model above. Because the 
fixed supply of such a commodity will eventually be exhausted, some 
replacement or entry is inevitable and thus probably acceptable to 
the dominant group. The alternatives for the cartel become not a 
choice between Ignoring entry or deterring all entry but a choice 
between faster or slower rates of entry. This more difficult prob­
lem can be fitted into the above model if it is assumed that the rate 
of entry is directly related to the amount by which the price set by 
the cartel exceeds ACn , or equivalently the amount by which current 
cartel profits exceed P^egh.
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TABLE 3-1
EXAMPLE OF THE EFFECT OF DISCOUNT RATE DIFFERENCES 
ON THE LIMIT PRICE CHOICE
1) Consider a situation whara A - G (In Figure 3-3) la equal to 100, where the annual 
rate of entry elicited by this difference le n - 0.1, end where the annual discount
rate for producer W Is • 0.1 and the discount rate for producer Z Is rK - 0.05.
2) For P. to be preferred to P , the following expression must be negative:n
T_1 -i uV, - (A - G) I (1 + r + n) 1 - <K - C), £ (1 + rj"1
J 1-1 . J 3 i-T J
where J - W, Z(producer), T Is the point at which the price must be cut to sustain
the cartel (assumed to take place at the beginning of a year), and U Is the uniform
time horizon for both producers.
3) Assume profit must be cut by 1/4 at T to stop the flow of entry. Then
(K - C)j - 3/4 (A - G) (1 + rj + n)~T
price must be cut at the beginning of the 3rd year.
2 1 1 U :I (1 + 0.1 + 0.1) 1 - 75 (1.2) 3 Z (l.l)"1
1-1 1-3
£ (1 + 0.05 + O.ir1 - 75(1.15)”3 Z (1.05)'1
1-1 * 1-3e
The problem is to find a 0 where Vw > 0 but < 0.
5) Consider U - 5
Vw - 100 (1.53)
V, - 100 (1.63)
Consider U - 7
Vw - 153 - 43.4 (3.13) - 153 - 136 - 17 > 0
VE - 163 - 49.3 (3.93) - 163 - 193.6 - -30.6 < 0
Consider U - 9
Vw - 153 - 43.4 (4.02) - 153 - 174.5 - -21.5 < 0
V, - 163 - 49.3 (5.25) - 163 - 258.9 - -95.9 < 0
*
6) This indicates that, as producers' uniform time horizons expand, those with 
the smaller discount rates will opt for P. over P before those with larger 
discount rates. n
- 43.4 (2.06) - 153 - 89.4 - 63.6 > 0
- 49.3 (2.47) - 163 - 121.7 - 41.2 > 0
4) Let T - 3, i.e.,
vw -  100
Vj - 100
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This assumption seems reasonable. Due to imperfection in 
the information about costs and potential profits, a small positive 
gap between price and ACn will induce entry or expansion by only 
the most alert and rash entrepreneurs. As the size of this gap is 
increased, it becomes more difficult to overlook the profitable 
opportunity, so the rate of encroachment by the fringe should 
increase.
The prices treated in the above model, P and P., can bem l
conceived of as upper and lower limits, respectively, to the price
choices available to this cartel. The choice between a price closer
to P , with its higher rate of entry, and one closer to P,, with its m
lower rate of entry, depend on the same variables as the choice
between P and P,, themselves. In particular, the prediction that m 1
producers with larger total reserves relative to output rates and/or 
smaller discount rates tend to prefer a price nearer P^ than do pro­
ducers with smaller reserve/production ratios and/or larger rates 
of discount remains unchanged.
C. Pressure on the Established Price 
If the assumption that the cartel can automatically enforce 
the quota it decides to assign to each member is relaxed, another 
problem besides the choice of a uniform price can plague the col­
lusive group. The problem stems from the fact that a price 
collectively fixed above the competitive level creates Incentives 
for individual members to expand output beyond the quantity which 
will sustain the agreed upon price. Suppose the group agrees to
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raise the market price to the level of as depicted In Figure 3-4. 
This level may be either at or close to a short run profit maxi­
mizing price or to a limit price where the group has a cost
advantage over entrants. Each firm In the cartel is expected to
N
confine itself to some prorata quantity like q^, where Eq^ ■ on 
D for an N member c a r t e l . F i r m s  that feel victimized by theirO
assigned quotas may be tempted to cheat.
Even firms that do not feel victimized by the output and 
profit sharing arrangement at the reduced output have the urge to 
cheat. As long as other firms In the cartel adhere to F^, the demand 
curve facing a single member Is d. It is more elastic than the cartel 
demand curve at since a price cut by the Individual member would 
attract sales away from other members. Because the marginal revenue 
(mr) at for the producer acting independently exceeds its own 
marginal cost, this firm can increase its individual profits by 
expanding output beyond q . The cheating member can add up to theIk
amount depicted by the triangle xyz to its profit by pushing output 
to qv .
If the demand curve faced by the cartel is very inelastic 
over the relevant range, the overcapacity created for its members
30lf P^ is a limit price, there is no simple rule to assign 
each member an output share as there is in the joint profit maxi­
mizing monopoly collaboration. If each member sets its own output 
at the level where its marginal cost equals group marginal revenue, 
too little will be produced. If output is set where price is equal 
to marginal cost, too much is provided to the market to support P^. 
Negotiation must establish some intermediate output rule for the 
members of the group. Scherer, op. cit., p. 223.
Price
FIGURE 3-4
THE DILEMMA OF A CARTEL 









by the price hike is relatively small. In such a situation, the 
individual members do not have much extra capacity to employ in an 
attempt to enhance their profits in the short run. The revenue 
Increase generated by the price rise, however, can provide internal 
financing for an expansion of production capacity by selfish 
members.
When the single member depicted In Figure 3-4 Is able to 
increase Its sales volume without attracting attention, the output 
of the average firm still operating at the agreed upon price would 
be cut to - qv/N-l. If the number of collaborators (N) is large 
and the commodity sold by the cartel is homogeneous, this output 
loss may be so diffused and small that no one loyal member would 
perceive and react to it. Thus, the price cut may go undetected.^1 
The temptation to cheat tends to be intensified by an awareness of 
the fact that rivals in the cartel face the same secret profit 
opportunity. This situation is referred to as the prisoners' 
dilemma. If it pays for each member to cheat on the assumption that 
the others will not, then each is under pressure to cut price by some 
amount (to protect itself) no matter what the others in fact do.
Where buyers and sellers are typically paired because of 
proximity or because of the attachment to minor product variations,
1-^George Stlgler, The Organization of Industry (Homewood,
111.! Richard D. Irwin, 1968), Chapter 5 and Telser, op. cit.,
pp. 200-205, develop a probability model to indicate the latitude 
for secret chiseling in such a situation as a function of seller 
numbers, buyer turnover, and/or market variability.
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the danger of undetected cheating la considerably reduced. Even If 
product heterogeneity does not segment the market for sellers, a 
small N can make the average sales loss large enough to attract 
attention. Upon detection, the usual assumption Is that those 
cheated will attempt to recapture their accustomed share of the 
market with retaliatory price reductions. The consequence Is a 
reduction of profit for all members.^ Therefore, a price cutter 
In an oligopoly cartel must anticipate only a temporary gain fol­
lowed by a period of more permanent loss relative to its assigned 
share of cartel profit.
The cheater does not always have to be deterred by the 
prospect of detection by rivals. After losing some sales to the 
lowered price, rivals may feel that they retain enough demand to 
profit more by continuing to charge than by matching the price 
cut and Increasing the chances for a price war. Similarly, after 
beginning the rounds of price cutting, one or a subgroup In the 
cartel may come to recognize the negative sum outcome of this 
activity and set the "conditional optimal price" of a price leader
32d . k . Osborne has worked out a theoretical system whereby 
the cartel can assign quotas that embody the most efficient response 
by loyal members to cheating that is detected. This system depends 
on all of the other members acting in unison to regain only their 
accustomed share of the market. "Cartel Problems," American Eco­
nomic Review. Vol. LXVI, No. 5 (December, 1976), pp. 835-44.
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33and allow the other member(s) to cheat. If the "other" member(s) 
can count on this reaction, detected cheating can be profitable 
after all.
A cheater that has a sufficiently high rate of discount 
may find cheating profitable for another reason. If detection and 
full retaliation occur only after a lag, the present value of the 
proximate cheating gains can outweigh the discounted value of more 
extended future losses.^ Alternatively, a price cutter may gain 
even after complete retaliation. For instance, If entry Is slowed 
by the price reduction, future earnings for some members may be 
Improved rather than worsened by the price reduction. Consequently, 
the greater chance for detection In small numbers, segmented cartels 
need not necessarily preclude cheating. Thus, an economic cartel 
may not only have difficulty In choosing the rate at which to allow 
entry but also In preventing some of its members from violating the 
compromise agreement.
D. The Economic Character of the Oil Cartel
Two sources of economic conflict in a cartel, choice of a 
uniform price level and maintenance of a price above marginal cost,
33G . Warren Nutter, "Duopoly, Oligopoly, and Emerging Com­
petition," Readings in Microeconomics, ed. William Brelt and 
Harold M. Hochman (New York.; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
1968) especially pp. 288-89.
^G. Warren Nutter and John H. Moore, "A Theory of Competi­
tion," The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (April, 
1976), pp. 39-65.
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have been developed In the above two sections. Due to circumstances 
In the world oil market secret chiseling by members for economic gain 
seems to be leas of a threat to OPEC than the more open difference 
over the choice between a monopoly price and a limit price. This 
section summarizes the set of facts that lead to this conclusion.
1. Conditions that Discourage Chiseling
As already noted, OPEC has no apparent prorationing plan for 
controlling individualistic behavior by members. Table 3-2 presents 
estimates of the overcapacity burden born by the OPEC nations during 
1975 and 1976. The first two columns are the daily production 
capacity of each nation listed in millions of barrels per day (MBD). 
The last two columns are computed by subtracting average dally pro­
duction from this figure and dividing by the capacity. It appears 
that most OPEC producers have the capacity to respond to cheating 
incentives.
In a growing world market for energy and for crude oil this 
current excess capacity in OPEC need only be a temporary burden.
The market demand at the current price level is expected to grow 
into existing capacity. The cartel will face a continuing excess 
capacity burden only if it cannot prevent uncoordinated expansion by 
individual members. As world demand grows some producers may approach
35see, for instance, Central Intelligence Agency, The Inter­
national Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985, U.S. Government
Printing Office, stock number 041-015-00084-5, April, 1977.
TABLE 3-2
EXCESS CAPACITY BURDEN ON OPEC PRODUCERS
Country Caoacitv fMBD^a Production (MBD) Excess Caoacitv (%">
Dec. 1975 Dec. 1976 Ave. 1975^ Ave. 1976 1975 1976
Ecuador 0.25 0.225 0.160 0.187 36.0% 16.9%
Gabon 0.25 0.25 0.225 0.218 10.0 12.8
Indonesia 1.7 1.7 1.305 1.505 23.2 11.5
Nigeria 2.5 2.3 1.785 2.068 28.6 10.1
Venezuela 3.0 2.6 2.345 2.295 21.8 11.7
Iran 6.8 6.7 5.350 5.884 21.3 12.2
Algeria 1.0 1.0 0.960 0.990 4.0 1.0
Libya 2.5 2.5 1.480 1.947 40.8 22.1
Iraq 3.0 3.0 2.260 2.090 24.7 30.3
Kuwait 3.5 3.5 2.085 2.151 40.4 38.5
Qatar 0.7 0.7 0.440 0.486 37.1 30.6
TABLE 3-2 CONTINUED
Country Capacity (MBD)a Production (MBD) Excess Capacity (%)
Dec. 1975 Dec. 1976 Ave. 1975k Ave. 1976 1975 1976
United Arab
Emirates 2.34 2.38 1.665 1.941 28.8 18.4
Saudi Arabia 11.5 11,5 7.Q75 8.578 38.5 25.4
OPEC 39.04 38.355 27.135 30.340 30.5 20.9










Source: Calculated from estimates made by the C.I.A. and reported In the Monthly Energy
Review of the Federal Energy Administration, December 1975 and 1976.
a Million barrels per day.
k Average for last eight months of 1975.
c Includes the last seven producers listed in the table.
d Includes the last four producers listed in the table*
e These are the excess capacity percentages for the residual subgroup of producers to the 
subgroup listed in the row label.
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capacity utilization more rapidly than others. If the former group 
of producers can and do expand output capacity rather than delay 
additions and force marginal demand to go to other cartel members, 
then the latter group may have a continuing excess capacity burden. 
Because the expansion of crude oil producing capacity involves 
exploration and discovery uncertainties rather than calculated 
capital installation, the coordinated control of capacity expansion 
may be more difficult than in a manufacturing or an agricultural 
cartel. In any case, the need to avoid this competitive expansion 
in capacity to allow the current excess capacity burden to ease 
requires further coordination by the oil cartel. Several charac­
teristics of the oil market support the development and persistence 
of producer coordination if the conflict over the choice of a uni­
form price can be controlled.
a. Concentration and Interdependence
The size distribution of producers and exporters in the 
world oil market and within the OPEC portion of this market is of 
a nature that facilitates detection of price cheaters. Table 3-3 
presents several concentration measures for the nations in OPEC.
The individual entries in the table are percentages calculated by 
dividing the share of the subgroup identified in the column headings 
by the relevant market identified in the row labels. Concentration 
measures indicate one dimension of monopoly power and are used to 
suggest or test hypotheses about the intensity of competition among 
existing firms in a given market. When concentration is high, each
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TABLE 3-3
CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN TUB WORLD OIL HARKET OF THE HID 1970's
Market/
Measure









Production6 53 8 31.4 34.3 36.9 14.4
Reserveŝ 68.0 50.8 49.7 54.8 23.4
2. In Free World
Exports'1 91.7 54.3 59.4 62.7 24.3
Production6 65.6 38.3 41.7 44.9 17.5
Reserveŝ 80.9 60.4 59.1 65.1 27.9
3. Within OPEC
Exports'1 100 59.2 64.8 68.3 26.6
Production® 100 58.4 63.7 68.6 26.7
Reserveŝ 100 74.7 73.1 80.5 34.5
Sources: Assembled and computed from data In Bureau of the Mines, International
Petroleum Annual, various years; World Oil. February 15 Issue for 
various years; and the Oil and Gas Journal, last Issue in December 
of various years.
a Includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Qatar, and the U.A.E.
b For exports and production these four are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and 
Venezuela. For reserves Iraq replaces Venezuela as the fourth member of this 
subgroup.
c Includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, and the U.A.E.
** The ratios In this row are averages computed from estimates for the years 1973 
and 1974. Due to lags in data reporting, figures for 1975 were not available 
by mld-1977.
® The ratios in this row are averages computed from yearly production for the 
years 1973-1976.
£ The ratios in this row are averages computed from January 1 estimates for the 
years 1972, 1974, and 1976.
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of the firms cannot help but recognize that aggressive actions such 
as price reductions will significantly affect major rivals. Whether,
i
In the end, this will leave the aggressor financially worse off 
depends on the price makers ultimate goal and on how quickly and in 
just what way existing and potential rivals react. Uncertainty 
about the speed and the severity of these reactions may induce all 
of these firms to exercise mutual restraint so as to avoid the 
possibility of precipitating a price fall to the competitive level. 
With low concentration any detection of and reaction to price cutting 
is likely to be less swift, so the hesitancy about incurring Its 
uncertain effects is reduced.
Unavoidably, there is imprecision about the demarcation 
between "high" and "low" concentration. In very pronounced cases 
this fuzziness is less of a problem. A more troublesome problem 
in using concentration indices comes in defining the industry 
meaningfully —  leaving out firms which are not competitors and 
including only those that are rivals. In the world oil market 
three measures are usually reported.
Proven reserves constitute potential production of crude oil, 
and therefore form a significant measure of the size and importance 
of a country or a tightly knit group in the oil market. However, 
since this indicator is only relevant in the long run, the correct 
market over which it should be measured probably must include a 
factor for the sources of energy that will eventually be used in
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place of oil. For this reason reserve concentrations say less about 
the extent of monopoly power in the current market than do oil flows, 
which are less subject to competition in the short run from other 
energy sources.
Production concentrations are not entirely satisfactory mea­
sures of world market interdependence either. Many countries that 
are far from self-sufficient in oil production have little prospect 
for finding more domestic reserves to exploit. Western Europe out­
side the North Sea and Japan are examples. Since these minor 
producing areas will always import a large portion of the petroleum 
that they use, their own limited output only reduces the size of the 
world market somewhat. Further, since exports from different surplus 
producing countries are reasonably interchangeable, the world market 
shares of individual countries that are large oil producers are not 
threatened by this minor production. Concentration over this dimen­
sion probably understates the true quantum of market power in the 
international oil market because it defines that market a little too 
broadly.
Export concentration Is probably the best market measure, but 
two modifications of reported exports are necessary. Due to some 
refining in major oil producing countries, a significant part of the 
petroleum that flows in international commerce does not ever cross 
borders as crude oil. Total oil exports must include both crude 
petroleum exports and net finished product exports if the inter­
national oil market is to be accurately delimited. Refinery situs
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should not affect the relative Importance to the International 
oil market of those who export oil. Since the product exports 
reported for various countries Includes petroleum that is re­
exported after being received from outside sources, these data 
must be revised to avoid the double counting of some oil when 
various countries' exports are aggregated. This modification was 
done for the figures reported In Table 3-3 by deducting each 
exporting country's imports of crude and unfinished oil from its 
crude and refined product exports. Since a breakdown of imports 
and exports by country in the Sino-Soviet bloc is not available, 
this same adjustment could not be done for these countries. There­
fore, a figure for total world exports could not be obtained. An 
aggregate figure for exports to countries in the free world was 
obtained by computing the net exports from the Sino-Sovlet bloc 
and adding this to export figures for free world countries.
The two to four year averages used to calculate the concen­
tration ratios in Table 3-3 hide changes over time that have occurred 
in those measures. The change has been very small during this short 
period, however. For the purpose of indicating the relative impor­
tance of groups in the world oil market, average figures provide a 
clearer impression than would a matrix three or four time that size 
containing Indices for each year.
According to Scherer the U. S. Justice Department has con­
sidered industries where one firm control 50 per cent of the
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relevant market or where four firms control 80 per cent or more of 
the relevant market to have concentration of sufficiently pronounced 
proportions to expect monopolistic behavior. ^  The oil-export 
market does not meet the monopoly test of these strict guidelines.
That particular measuring rod applies to Industries confined 
to one national market and In which no explicit agreement among 
rivals is assumed to exist. OPEC by definition violates the latter 
condition. An explicit understanding on the limits of competition 
should make It easier for the sellers in less concentrated markets 
to sustain a price well above competitive levels. A world wide 
agreement should further enhance the success of collusion since it 
reduces the Import threat present in the exploitation of national 
monopolies. In his survey of historical cartels, Ekbo found that 
90 per cent of international cartels that were effective at main­
taining a price In the monopolistic range for at least four to six 
years contained four producers that provided more than 50 per cent 
of the total flow of trade in their commodity. ^  The structure of 
OPEC meets this monopoly test In terms of the free world export 
market. The general availability of data from trade journals 
and various government agencies on crude oil shipments (after a short
^Scherer, op. cit., pp. 465 and 481-82.
■^Paul Leo Ekbo, "OPEC and the Experience of Previous Inter­
national Commodity Cartels" (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Energy Laboratory Working Paper, No. 75-008WP, August, 1975), 
pp. 25-26.
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lag), as well as variations In the characteristics of the product 
from different producers, helps this structural concentration 
discourage attempts to secretly chisel.
b. Product Peculiarities
Several features of oil production ease the burden on member 
producers of the current excess capacity that monopolization 
r e q u i r e s . O n e ,  crude oil or petroleum products cannot be recovered 
from scrap and recycled, so refiners are proportionately more depen­
dent upon virgin, raw material Inputs than are copper, Iron, or 
aluminum processors, for instance. Two, because oil Is liquid, 
combustible, and consumed In such large volumes, importers can less 
easily and cheaply stockpile enough of it to meet domestic demand 
for some months than they can with almost any other internationally 
traded commodity. The expense and limitations on such an effort 
should make buyers less resistant to a higher price for oil.
Three, crude production does not use large quantities of 
local labor inputs. Consequently, high employment considerations 
In exporter countries are less likely to deter temporary shutdowns 
or production slowdowns to defend price than they are in countries 
that export labor-intensive commodities. Fourth, unlike agri­
cultural commodities or manufactured goods, crude oil not produced
^®Iam Smart, "The Oil Crisis: In Perspective; Uniqueness
and Generality," Daedalus, Vol. CIV, No. 4 (Fall, 1975), pp. 267-70.
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today does not represent a sale that is lost forever. The same 
barrel of oil that could have been produced and sold today but was 
not, can be produced and sold at a later time. The nonrenewable 
nature of the commodity is responsible for this solace to excess 
capacity producers. There is of course no guarantee that this saved 
oil will command as high a future price as current production policy 
banks on. Fifth, a stability advantage is derived from the fact 
that nationalizations have been accomplished at purchase prices 
covering only depreciated book or original value. The fixed cost 
pressure on OPEC nations to produce at high rates therefore is lesB 
than it would be if these countries had paid full replacement value 
prices for their oil producing plant and equipment. These circum­
stances all serve to ease the pressure to cheat that OPEC members 
might otherwise feel.
c. Economic Sophistication
Finally, the chiseling attraction in OPEC might be con­
siderably less than in comparably structured and favored cartels 
due to a difference in perceptions by its leaders. The major 
participants, the oil ministers of the larger OPEC nations, are 
graduates of highly rated business schools in the U. S., Britain, 
or France.'*® As such, they have probably become well acquainted
3®0sborne, op. clt., p. 841.
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with cartel theory. Therefore, they should understand their own 
roles in the cartel, and in particular, that the economic incentive 
to chisel on the group price is more apparent than real. Admittedly, 
noneconomic pressures (not felt by the typical businessman) may 
prevent oil ministers from avoiding price chiseling, but that does 
not detract from the fact that they should well understand the long 
run consequences of such behavior and be very circumspect about 
attempting to cheat on the group.
2. Disparity Over Permissible Entry
The fact that rivalry and cheating for immediate gain is 
discouraged by industry structure, production characteristics, and 
managerial understanding may not eliminate the divisive tendency 
within the cartel of Individual economic incentives. The price set 
by the group appears to be high enough to attract entry (after a 
development lag) of new productive capacity into the oil industry 
and into the energy industry in time.
a. Displacement Prospects
Most OPEC oil production capacity has a significant lifting 
cost advantage over outside sources. Lifting cost plus the cost of 
transportation to major market for Middle East oil is estimated at
about $1.50 per barrel (In 1975).^ The estimate of these costs for 
non-Mlddle East OPEC sources Is about a dollar per barrel higher.
In contrast, Congressional committee estimates of the (lifting) cost 
of new crude oil production In the U. S. as of 1973 were $6.73 per 
barrel for only the continental U. S. or $5.49 per barrel plus trans­
port cost when Alaska is added.^ Unconventional sources of crude 
oil, called liquid synfuels, face an even greater cost disadvantage. 
The U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration estimates 
that a 50,000 barrel per day shale oil plant could produce crude of 
quality comparable with Arabian crudes In 1976 for a cost of between 
$12.50 and $20 per barrel.^ These cost estimates apparently do not 
Include a factor for environmental restrictions that may be Imposed, 
and thus are probably low estimates. Other synfuel options such as 
coal liqulfaction are reported to be even more expensive.
Though comparisons are more difficult to make, It appears 
that the cost of development of a backstop technology fuel (uranium) 
Is in the economically feasible range. Professor Houthakker esti­
mates that uranium fuel for electricity generation is available at
^Exxon Public Affairs Department, Middle East Oil (New York: 
Exxon Corp., 1976), p. 15 and Joseph A. Yager and Eleanor B. Stein­
berg, Energy and U. S. Foreign <blicy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 
Publishing Co., 1975), p. 238, or Jacques Cremer and Martin L. 
Weltzman, "OPEC and the Monopoly Price of World Oil" (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Energy Laboratory Working Paper, No. MIT-EL- 
76-015WP, April, 1976), Appendix.
^1U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Estimates of the Economic Cost of Producing Crude 011,
84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976.
^"Shale Closest Among Liquid Synfuels," op. cit.
43a per barrel equivalent cost of $5 to $7. Regulatory delays and 
restrictions on the construction of nuclear power plants will Impede 
Its displacement of oil, however. Also, the near term threat to 
OPEC from the conversion to this or other fuel alternative (solid 
coal or solar energy) is mitigated by one Important fact. Even 
after the development of the capability to exploit these fuels, 
much recently acquired oil burning capital stock will remain In 
operation for a substantial period, thus perpetuating a large market 
for oil.
OPEC seems to have a significant cost advantage over the 
potential oil and substitute fuel sources that threaten its current 
market dominance. Given time at the current real price level,
energy alternatives! can begin to encroach on the market position
of the existing OPEC producers. For example, James Griffin reports 
a long run (20 years) price elasticity of demand for fuel oil inputs 
to electricity generation of between -2 and -3 in the OECD group of 
countries.^ Due to the size of OECD in the world oil market (70
^Hendrik S. Houthakker, The World Price of Oil: A Medium-
Term Analysis (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute of
Public Policy Research, October, 1976), p. 37.
^"Inter-Fuel Substitution Possibilities: A Translog Appli­
cation to Intercountry Data," International Economic Review (forth­
coming). Griffin argues that the smaller elasticities found by
others err by allowing for only a one year adjustment period after
a price change. His pooled sample is superior because it takes 
advantage of the fact that different countries have faced different 
relative fuel prices long enough to allow the stock of energy con­
suming capital equipment to adjust across countries.
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percent of all crude oil consumption In 1973) and the proportion of 
Its oil consumption devoted to electricity generation (between 30 
and 40 percent In the early 1970*8), oil may be displaced by the 
late 1900's from a significant portion of Its current market.
On the supply side, non-OPEC oil sources appear to have the 
potential to Increase production substantially. For example, Profes­
sor Houthakker cites estimates that the U. S. may hold untapped 
domestic petroleum reserves as large as 100 billion barrels In partly 
depleted oil reservoirs or In reservoirs no longer capable of pro­
duction using technology largely developed with the effort elicited 
at the pre-1974 price level.^ The recent higher prices will lead to 
considerable Investment In new knowledge about the earth's crust 
and about better extraction methods which will pay production divi­
dends mostly In the long run, also.
These entry prospects must be tempered by the recognition 
that alternative oil and energy producers that would compete with 
OPEC face two sources of downside risk. One, there is the risk to 
high cost entrants that once OPEC begins to suffer from outside com­
petition it will cut the cartel price to a point below the cost of 
production by the competition. Members can profitably maintain
4sHouthakker, op. clt., p. 16. Current geologic estimates 
by one oil company (Mobil) put total recoverable reserves in the 
non-communist world at 1.35 trillion barrels, of which only about 
300 billion barrels has been consumed by 1977. The Oil and Gas 
Journal, April 18, 1977, pp. 36-37.
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prices just below the cost of these alternatives for a period that 
will probably bankrupt the non-OPEC producers. Two, the companion 
risk is that the cartel will collapse under the entry pressure and 
market competition will force fuel prices below the cost of the crude 
oil alternatives. The conversion of capital stock that must accom­
pany fuel conversion provides some protection to non-oil alternatives. 
Also, discussions about oil floor prices in major consumer countries 
indicates that OPEC may not be allowed to threaten competitors with 
deliberate price reductions.
If entering producers can insure against these risks, OPEC 
should come under mounting pressure to moderate the price it sets.
If the new fuel producers remain outside the cartel, as they have 
the incentive to do,^ the collusive group must accept a decline in 
its market share in order to sustain the chosen price or price path. 
Should the new capacity seek to join the cartel, the internal policing 
problem for the collusive group would be aggravated as would any 
presistent over capacity burden on the original members. Due to 
differences among the nations in OPEC, either prospect may have a 
detrimental influence on the economic stability of a cartel selecting 
a price above the level of P^.
^Outside producers get the full benefit of the higher price 
set by the cartel without paying any of the cost (by way of reduced 
output) of maintaining it.
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b. Limit Price Differences
The limit price analysis conducted earlier in this chapter 
indicated that either of two producer characteristics may lead to 
different economic preferences about the choice of a uniform price 
level. One characteristic identified was the individual producer's 
time horizon. A standard indicator of this factor is the current 
reserve/production ratio of the producer. It probably should not 
be Interpreted too literally since either or both of its components 
will usually change over time. Assuming that the various producers 
expect to experience about the same proportional change in these 
components, however, it does serve as reasonable indicator of rela­
tive time horizons. Table 3-4 reports average reserve/production 
ratios for the eleven main producers in OPEC over the 1974-76 period.
Another differentiating characteristic identified earlier was 
the variation in discount rate. Previous discussion tied this factor 
to the absorbing capacity of the domestic economies in the producing 
countries. Exporters with high absorber economies are expected to 
apply a greater discount rate to future profit than are exporters with 
low absorber economies. A logical Indicator of absorptive capacity 
would seem to be the per capita oil revenue of the producer country. 
Governments of nations with smaller per capita oil incomes probably 
have more domestic pressure for spending on internal projects and thus 
should have a higher rate of time preference for oil revenue than 
should nations with relatively small populations. Table 3-4 reports
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TABLE 3-4
LIMIT PRICE VARIABLES FOR ELEVEN PRODUCER COUNTRIES
Country (Reserve/Production)a Average Annual Oil 
(Revenue/Populat ion)
Saudi Arabia 49 $3,926
Kuwait 89 $7,397









Source: The reserve/production ratio Is calculated from data
reported In the Oil and Gas Journal, December 29, 1975 
and December 27, 1976. The per capita revenue figure Is 
calculated by dividing the numbers in Table 1-3 by popula­
tion estimates from U. S. Bureau of Census, World 
Population: 1975: Recent Demographic Estimates for the
Countries and Regions of the World (Washington U. S. 
Government Printing Office, August, 1976).
a Average for the figures for the years 1974-76.
k Average for the figures for the years 1974-75.
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average per capita oil revenue for the same eleven countries as it 
does reserve/production ratios.
The coincidence of relatively low absorptive capacities and 
relatively high reserve/production ratios of the first four or five 
nations listed should lead them to prefer a rate of entry or develop­
ment of alternatives slower than that preferred by the last six or 
seven nations listed. If the cartel can be split into two subgroups, 
a saver group led by Saudi Arabia and a spender group led by Iran 
and Venezuela, the significance of the difference in these two dimen­
sions can be more concisely brought out and related to the duopoly 
analysis developed earlier. The Saudi Arabian subgroup, consisting 
of the Arabian Peninsula sheikdoms plus Libya, has a composite per 
capita oil revenue of $4500 annually (Implying a relatively low dis­
count rate like rz) and a reserve/production ratio of 53 years 
(Implying a distant time horizon like S). The spender subgroup has 
a composite per capita income of $174 annually (implying a rela­
tively high discount rate like rw ) and a reserve/production ratio 
of 27 years (Implying a shorter time horizon like R). The combi­
nation of R < S and r > r Imply that both variables increase thew z
saver groups preference for the limit price relative to the pref­
erence of the spender group.
If substantial utilization of coal, solar, and nuclear 
energy is or appears likely to be made by energy consumers and/or 
if significant additions to non-OPEC oil production capacity are
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made during the 1980's, OPEC may be forced to trim its real price. 
Should the oil cartel be obliged to lower the price level it sets 
for crude oil very much, saver countries will have made a greater 
economic sacrifice to defend the current price than will have the 
spender countries. Saver countries will have more oil sales left to 
make at the lower limit price path. Also, saver countries may have 
grown enough to use all of their oil proceeds, thus providing a more 
intense need for oil income that is received in this future period. 
The shorter time horizon and a higher discount rate combine to make 
the economic significance of a future price adjustment less Important 
to spender countries. Consequently, profit maximization considera­
tions (viewed In a long term framework of limit pricing rather than 
In the short term framework of chiseling) can drive a wedge between 
the Interest of different members or subgroups in the oil cartel.
One change in the nature of OPEC may have much to do with 
how well the cartel overcomes this economic disagreement about the 
proper price level and the disruptive potential it generates. During 
the last few years a large and growing proportion of productive 
capacity has been nationalized by the member status of OPEC. In 
preparation for a theoretical treatment of the effect this pro­
prietary change might be expected to have on the behavior of the 
cartel, Chapter Four reviews the rationale and progress of nationa­
lization by the oil-exporting countries.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP OF OPEC OIL PRODUCTION
Traditional economic considerations of producer interest and 
cartel stability and behavior are not entirely adequate to analyze 
OPEC prospects. During the late 1960's and early 1970’s governments 
in most oil-exporting countries began acquiring ownership of at 
least some of the crude oil raised from their territory. The large 
oil price increases during the early and mid-1970's were achieved 
by the OPEC cartel while most of its members shared the ownership 
of their indigenous oil operations and thus the profits with the 
international oil companies. The mechanism used by host governments 
to elevate and fix prices under this combined ownership condition 
involved a complicated mixture of as many as four prices for each 
barrel of oil extracted from the ground and induced company com­
pliance in sustaining the price established by the cartel. One 
purpose of this chapter is to explain this pricing system and the 
way it was used to increase the price of crude oil.
By January, 1977 five OPEC governments had concluded the 
nationalization of all of their domestic crude oil production. The 
other eight members have reached various intermediate stages in 
achieving complete national ownership of local production operations. 
Removing the International oil marketing companies from crude oil 
ownership in OPEC ends the use of a system that had proved successful
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at permitting members to monitor each others' selling price and at 
tying oil company Interest to that of the producing companies. Also, 
government takeover of production introduces political and Inter­
national relations objectives more directly Into the pricing and 
output decisions made by cartel members. By explaining the Insti­
tutional changes In the pricing system associated with this 
proprietary change, this chapter provides a basis for the theoretical 
interpretation of the consequences of nationalization for cartel 
performance.
A. How Oil Prices Work 
The joint ownership of oil properties resulted in a dichoto- 
mization of each barrel of oil. Equity oil is that portion of the 
total oil lifted that the international producing companies such as 
Exxon or Texaco own. Until the 1970's all of the oil produced in 
most countries was of this type. Participation oil is the portion of 
the total oil lifted that is owned by the producer countries such as 
Saudi Arabia or Iran. In the Persian Gulf participation oil at 
first was 25 per cent but has since grown to 60 to 100 per cent of 
all oil produced. The current equity and participation portions in 
each of the OPEC nations are detailed in a subsequent section of this 
chapter.
1. World Oil Price Relationships 
Each quality of oil produced bears its own posted price.
Crude oil from one reservoir is usually of somewhat different quality
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and value than that from any other. For Instance, a barrel of 
hlgh-gravlty or light oil Is usually worth more than a barrel of 
low-gravity or heavy oil at the same location. The difference 
results from the facts that It generally costs less to produce 
gasoline from light oil than from heavy oil and that gasoline is 
one of the more valuable end products of petroleum refining. High 
sulfur content makes for more refining expense to produce a fuel 
oil derivative environmentally acceptable in some places, so other 
things equal, low sulfur oil tends to be more valuable than high 
sulfur oil. Oil produced closer to market carries a higher well­
head price than more distantly produced oil, which must bear a 
larger transportation charge.^ To provide an idea of the size of 
the variations in price, Table 4-1 lists a sample of the posted 
prices applying at various times since 1970 for some of the more 
important crude oils produced in the world.
The posted price is not an actual sales price for OPEC oil.
It is only an artificial creation on which taxes and royalties that 
apply to the equity oil are based. By shifting all market risk to 
the companies it provides these governments with a predictable income 
regardless of fluctuations in the selling price. All of the other 
prices that apply to OPEC crude oil are derived from the posted 
price, the level of which has been unilaterally set by the producer 
countries since 1973.
‘'‘Producers nearer the market thus receive relatively more 
rent per barrel than do more distant producers.
TABLE 4-1
KEY WORLD CRUDE OIL PRICE POSTINGS 
(dollars per barrel)
Source-Type 8/31/70 2/15/71 1/20/72 1/1/73 8/1/73 10/16/73 1/1/74 ll/l/74c 11/1/75 1/1/77
Persian Gulf


















Libya 2.18 2.55 3.67 3.78 4.58 8.93 15.77 15.77 16.06
(12.00) (12.32) (13.81)




Light 1.70 1.70 2.26 2.96 3.73 4.75 10.80 12.60
(12.80) (12.80)
TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED
Source-Type 8/31/70 2/15/71 1/20/72 1/1/73 8/1/73 10/16/73 1/1/74 ll/l/74c 11/1/75 1/1/77
Venezuela




Flat NA NA 3.60 3.60 3.85 4.20a 5.20b 8.46d 7.76e NA
Source: Project Independence Blueprint, Final Task Force Report, Federal Energy Administration,
Department of the Interior, November, 1974; and Petroleum Economist (various issues).
aEffective 11/1/73.
^Effective 2/1/74.
cState sales price in parenthesis. In the Persian Gulf it is usually 93Z of the posted price; in 
other areas it is set at different proportions of posted price. After the countries achieve com­
plete nationalization of their oil, as Kuwait and Venezuela did at the beginning of 1976, the tax 
reference or posted pirce has no meaning so it is dropped.
^Composite of 60% old and 40% new oil at prices of $5.20 and $13.35 respectively.
Composite of 60% old and 40% new oil at prices controlled from 3/1/76 at $5.25 and $11.53
respectively.
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One location, the Persian Gulf, supplies some crude oil to 
all the regional markets In the non-Communist world. Spare capacity 
sufficient to replace a total denial of oil from this source does 
not now exist elsewhere In the world. In the absence of price con­
trols or quantitative restrictions, the landed price of oil In each 
region from all sources must be approximately equal (except for
various quality premiums or discounts). Consequently, all prices
2must be related to the price from this one area. During the last 
few years a combination of ownership levels and several kinds of 
prices have been used to set the composite price of Persian Gulf oil. 
An example using the (marker) crude oil upon whose price the other 
OPEC prices are based, Saudi Arabian light crude 34° (which is the 
principal export of that country), is the best way to illustrate how 
prices In this region have been set. For the period November, 1974 
to November, 1975 the posted price of this particular oil was set 
at $11.25 per barrel, f.o.b.
2. Mechanism for Maintaining Price
The price at which Saudi Arabia and other producers sell their 
participation oil directly abroad, usually to European state oil
2This interdependence of world oil prices despite the absence 
of a centrally located commodity market, as is found in say wheat or 
copper, is carefully pointed out by Houthakker in The World Price of 
Oil; A Medium-Term Analysis (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute of Public Policy Research, October, 1976), pp. 2 and 6.
3The following explanation is gleaned largely from informa­
tion in the New York Times. "How Oil Prices Work: Ownership Level 
Vital," November 12, 1974, p. 59; the Oil and Gas Journal, "OPEC 
Crude Oil Prices to Rise Jan. 1," December 23, 1974, pp. 15-16; and
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companies, is called the state sales price. During 1975 this was 
set at 93 per cent of posted price, or $10.46 per barrel for 
Arabian light. Since the producing countries lack the marketing 
outlets and long term contracts to dispose themselves of all of 
their participation oil, they set a price at which the international 
oil companies producing in their country must buy back the unsold 
portion of the participation oil. For 1975 this buy-back price 
settled at 93 per cent of the posted price, or also $10.46 per barrel
4of Arabian light.
The price of equity oil is determined by the international 
oil companies, but is carries a tax floor cost imposed by the 
countries which keeps this price in line with the ones applying 
to participation oil. The tax liability per barrel of equity oil 
is calculated as follows. Royalty payments (20 per cent of the 
posted price) and production costs (a reasonable estimate is about 
25$ per barrel of Saudi crude) are deducted from the posted price.
An income tax rate (85 per cent in 1975) is applied to this dif­
ference to get the net income tax owed per barrel. With the 1975 
posted price this resulted in a tax and royalty on each equity
Edward E. Murphy and Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "Trends in U. S. Export 
Prices and OPEC Oil Prices," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XCVIII,
No. 11 (November, 1965), pp. 39-40.
^The buy back price was initially set at 94.8 per cent of 
posted price, or $10.66 for this period. By March 1975 it had been 
rolled back to the level of the state sales price.
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barrel of Arabian light of $9.69. When production cost and some 
company profit are added the resulting price Is about the same as 
on participation oil.
A table using the approximate proportions of each type of 
oil sold In 1975 can be used to Illustrate why refiners paid In 
the vicinity of $12.00 per barrel of Arabian light, and why the 
Saudi government made about $10.15 on each barrel of that quality 
of oil produced. See Table 4-2 for these calculations. Note the 
fixed dollar amounts that apply to each of the three components 
of the government take per barrel.
This scheme, by establishing a fixed amount royalty and tax
payment, such as $9.69 per barrel on the equity portion of Arabian
light crude oil, imposes what is really an excise tax. Although It
nominally Involves a percentage royalty payment and a percentage
Income tax, and was so recognized for foreign tax credit purposes
5by U. S. law until June 30, 1978, the operating companies cannot 
reduce the amount of this tax by cutting price and making less 
Income. In combination with the fixed price and proportion for 
participation oil, this tax system creates an effective floor to the 
price that can be charged for Saudi Arabian light oil (and through 
replication, other OPEC crudes) entering International commerce.
^A January 16, 1978 ruling by the Internal Revenue Service 
ended the companies' right to deduct these foreign tax payments 
from their U. S. tax obligations. Facts on File, January 1 - March 
31, 1978, Facts on File Incorp.
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TABLE 4-2
COMPOSITE PRICE OP ARABIAN LIGHT, 1975
Price Type
Portion of Total 





1) Direct State Sales 
at $10.46 per barrel 5% $ 0.52
2) Buy-back sales at 
$10.46 per barrel 55% 5.75
3) royalty and tax at
$9.69 per equity barrel 40% 3.88
Average Saudi take per barrel
4) production cost and pro­
ducer company profit on 
equity portion (estimate)








* With 42 gallons per barrel this works out to a price of just 
over 28.5c per gallon of crude oil.
V
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3. Pecuniary Incentive to Nationalize 
Since government take is higher on the participation oil 
(93 per cent of the posted price) than on the equity oil (about 86 
per cent of posted price), there is the incentive under this system 
for host governments to increase their participation in local oil 
operations. The seven percentage point difference in these two 
revenue figures seems to overstate the gain to host countries from 
their takeover of 100 per cent ownership of the local affiliates of 
the international oil companies. With both equity and participation 
oil, the companies are forced to recover the production costs (about 
25C per barrel of Saudi oil) for all the oil that is lifted in the 
price they charge for the equity portion only. After complete take­
over of these operations, the local owners must assume at least the 
variable portion of the costs involved in the production of theirg
crude oil. Since total production costs are two per cent or less 
of posted price, the size of this gain to the countries is more on 
the order of five per cent of the posted price.
B. Primer on Nationalization 
Even before the evolution of this pricing system and its 
modest economic incentive for 100 per cent participation, the OPEC
g
Even if local managers cannot conduct the operations as 
efficiently as the company managers did previously, the governments 
can and do hire the previous companies under service contracts to 
continue to conduct the operations for a fee approximating production 
costs. For example, the Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1976 reports 
that the companies that will be pushed out of ownership of oil 
production in Saudi Arabia will continue to operate these facilities 
at a contract fee of 21c per barrel.
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nations sought to take over the oil operations in their lands.
During the nascent period of local oil activity, each of the countries 
that now make up OPEC had to offer very attractive concession terms 
to entice exploration and development by competent outsider operators. 
These less developed countries (LDC's) had neither the skills, 
capital, nor access to markets to develop their resource base.
For their part the international oil companies could justify very 
generous concession terms. These high payoffs were to compensate 
for the risks of oil exploration in foreign countries and the cost 
of oil development and related activity in remote regions. In many 
cases the companies had to provide capital not only for oil opera­
tions but also for the construction of basic infrastructure like 
port facilities, roads, and water systems before any oil deposits 
could be exploited. In time the bargaining leverage that gave rise 
to these liberal concessions shifted against the companies, however.
1. Reversal of Bargaining Advantage
After large discoveries had been made and profitable opera-
7tlons established within the host country, two factors changed.
First, exploratory risks were no longer as high as they had been 
at first, uncertainty about the structure of production costs was 
reduced, and essential infrastructure investment had been made.
^E. W. Erickson and Leonard Waverman, The Energy Question:
An International Failure of Policy, Vol. I (Buffalo: University
of Toronto Press, 1974), p. xxi.
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As a result, other foreign Investors were willing to accept less 
attractive terms. Second, the Initial Investments that became 
successful were, by the nature of extractive production, made In 
large discrete lumps. As such, they became potential economic 
hostages and reduced the flexibility of the company with regard 
to alternatives.
Faced with the potential of alternative operators and bur­
dened with a large sunken investment, the original companies were 
willing to accommodate less attractive terms from the host govern­
ment rather than pull out. The emergence of a large number of 
"independents" with the capability to conduct international oil 
operations undoubtedly were keys to this effect on the relations 
between the oil "majors" and the OPEC governments. The simple 
revision of concession terms usually does not satisfy host govern­
ments, though.
2. Pressure for Local Government Control
Direct foreign investment, in the form of a multinational 
oil company, is inevitably perceived as a challenge to the 
national sovereignty of the host countries. Though they do provide 
otherwise unavailable economic benefit in the form of factor pay­
ments to locals, training to domestic workers, and tax revenue to
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the host governmentt these foreign owners also Impose political
g
costs. The costs center on the actual or potential exercise of 
control over the national economy that Is acquired by the foreign 
parent companies and by the home governments of these parent com­
panies. Companies that operate throughout the world can award or 
deny scarce capital and technology to Individual countries and can 
shift production from one country to another. A demonstration of 
this potential occurred when the oil majors curtailed exploration 
and production In Iraq in the 1960's because of the Instability
and turnover in governments and made up for lost oil by producing
9more in other Persian Gulf countries.
Home governments to the parent companies of the local 
producing affiliates can also interfere in the host national economy. 
These foreign governments may, for Instance, constrain the foreign 
operations of the parent companies in order to carry out policies 
regarding say antitrust law or East-West trade. No national govern­
ment, jealous sovereign that it Is, cares to have an important part 
of its economy subject to control by decision centers located beyond 
its reach. Premature seizure of this control, however, Is restrained 
by the high economic cost of such action.
O
This cost/benefit approach is presented In Franklin R. Root, 
International Trade and Investment 3rd Ed. (Cincinnati: South-
Western Publishing Co., 1973), Ch. 25.
9Zuhayr Mikdashi, "Cooperation Among Oil Exporting Countries 
With Special Reference To Arab Countries: A Political Economy




Until native expertise Is gained, the takeover of oil opera­
tions risks alienating nonreplaceable foreign know-how and access to 
markets, and with that a major current source of Income. T. H. Moran 
suggests that in LDC’s there is a high "esoteric value" placed on the 
services provided by the foreigners.^ Domestic skills and con­
fidence In the ability to run the export Industry only slowly 
Increase and dispel the Ignorance and myBtery surrounding capital- 
intensive mineral extraction. Also, as happened In Iran In the 
early 1950's, isolated attempts to completely expropriate oil 
company property face the threat of boycott by buyers who can get 
their supplies from less aggressive, rival countries.
With time, and the demonstration effect of the value of 
skills in production, transportation, and marketing that is pro­
vided by successful foreign ventures, basic native expertise is 
accumulated. If the other producing countries will imitate a 
domestic takeover, or will at least prevent an offsetting increase
in production from their oil fields, the boycott threat to the
12expropriating country is also reduced. Once armed with such
^Multlnatlonal Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: 
Copper In Chile. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974),
pp. 165.
^Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters (New York: Viking
Press, Inc., 1975), p. 230.
12This value of producing country unity is pointed out by 
Erickson and Waverman, op. cit., p. xxii. Extending this reasoning, 
one would expect that once home takeover of foreign investment has 
been completed, some of the benefit of belonging to the producer
109
capability and support, the economic cost of seizing local oil 
operations Is reduced, sooner or later, below the perceived political 
cost of the failure to do so. The Inevitability of domestic takeover 
of natural resource properties Is a common conclusion reached by the 
authors cited In this review discussion.
b. Public Takeover
In all OPEC nations this domestic takeover has been In the
form of nationalization by the host government, rather than In the
form of acquisition by private Interests. Nothing said so far
accounts for this particular form of native takeover. Viable
reasons as to why a public acquisition Is effected can be suggested.
First, natural resources, in post-colonial developing countries
especially, are regarded as a national heritage that belongs to the
13whole native population. With this guiding philosophy, it Is 
easily arguable that the government, as the institutional extension 
of the people, should administer the utilization of this heritage.
No private party whether domestic or foreign has as much moral claim 
to control of the public resource deposit as the national government. 
Further, native private parties may lack the level of oil skills 
that have been acquired by the bureaucrats of host governments 
through their taxing duties. The loyalty of competent foreign
group will be lost. If other costs and benefits of the group are 
unchanged, the glue holding the organization together should be 
less sticky as a consequence.
13Root, op. cit., p. 627.
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owners, who might agree to become domestic corporations and citizens, 
would always be In doubt.
Second and more generally, politicians In the host countries 
can be expected to maximize their power to do what they perceive to 
be In their country's interest. In nations where oil constitutes 
such a dominant part of the economy, as with those that belong to 
OPEC, economic power rests with those who control oil revenues. The 
turnover of such power to private nationals would entail some sharing 
of this power, in the form of whatever oil revenue is not taxed. This 
condition is not consistent with the goal of the politician. Govern­
ment takeover thus seems to be the most likely way in which the 
domestic control of extractive properties in LDC's will be 
accomplished.
C. Progress of Nationalization in OPEC
Early attempts at wholesale nationalization of oil company 
holdings met with and succumbed to the exclusion of the perpetrating 
country from the world oil-marketing system. Mexico in 1938 and 
Iran in 1951 seized the foreign owned oil properties under their 
respective jurisdictions. In both cases concerted exclusion of 
that country's crude by the international oil companies succeeded 
in reimposing foreign company control over the oil produced in 
these countries.^ By the late 1960's though, important members 
of OPEC had gained sufficient bargaining strength to begin a more
^Sampson, oj). clt.
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successful nationalization of company assets. This section outlines 
the extent of nationalization through 1976. The purpose Is to show 
the degree to which OPEC has become a cartel composed of national 
enterprises, that is, a political-economic cartel in the sense to 
be considered in this study.
The North African oil-exporting countries have used the 
most radical nationalization shhemes of any OPEC nation. In 1967, 
right after the Six Day War, Algeria seized the non-French oil 
companies and In 1971 confiscated properties responsible for two- 
thirds of the output of French oil companies operating in the 
country.^ It has been held back, however, from completing the 
takeover arrangements because of technical difficulties resulting 
from the shortage of a trained native staff. Libya nationalized the 
holdings of British Petroleum (BP) in late 1971, and in 1973 it 
nationalized the holdings of BP's American partner and seized 51 per 
cent interest in the properties of all the other foreign companies 
operating In the country. Libyan refusal of an offer by Occidental 
Petroleum to sell out in 1975 indicates that it also is not yet 
ready for full takeover. The ability of these two countries to 
escape company retaliation for their early and rash takeovers was 
due in part to their oil's high quality (light crude with low sulfur
15Except where otherwise specified, the sources of national­
ization information on individual countries is either, Joseph A. Yager 
and Eleanor B. Steinberg, Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 16, 30, 53-55, 74-76,
114 and 117; or the Petroleum Economist, Vols. XLII (1975), pp.
374-75, 449-50, and 452 and XLIII (1976), p. 6.
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content) and to the heavy dependence of Europe on this source.
The closed Suez Canal made Persian Gulf crude more costly to trans­
port, so that North African oil was much more profitable for the 
companies to use, even If it did validate expropriation.
Iraq also began a successful nationalization program in 1967. 
In 1972 it seized the concession of the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum 
Company, which operated in the northern part of the country. After 
the 1973 Middle East war, the government took 38 per cent of the 
Basrah Petroleum Company, the last Iraq oil operation owned by 
foreign companies. That percentage was accomplished by national­
izing the Mobil and Exxon shares and 60 per cent of the Royal 
Dutch/Shell share. Subsequently the financial stake of the govern­
ment rose to 77 per cent when it took over a 5 per cent share 
belonging to an individual and 60 per cent of the remaining 57 per 
cent still in foreign hands (BP and CFP —  the French equivalent of 
BP —  each had 23.75 per cent and Shell had 9.5 per cent). In 
January, 1976 Iraq assumed full state control of the Basrah Petroleum 
Company and the Khor-al-Amay oil terminal at the head of the Persian 
Gulf, with a promise of fair compensation later.
In Iran a 1954 agreement between the Shah and a consortium 
of foreign oil companies recognized the country as the legal owner 
of its oil reserves. The companies, however, retained the right 
to determine production levels. A 1973 agreement gave the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) the power to set production targets 
and restricted the companies to the roles of purchasers of oil and
113
of performers of services under contract to NIOC. Thus, complete 
state control In Iran must be dated from 1973.
Venezuela began to use state contracts with private companies, 
rather than concession agreements, in the 1960's to explore new oil 
fields. The government nationalized exploration and production of . 
natural gas in 1973 and achieved complete control of the older crude 
concessions and producing assets of foreign operators in essentially 
one step on December 31, 1975. The companies were promised compensa­
tion totalling about $1 billion and were given contracts calling for 
technical assistance fees in the range of 15 to 21 cents per barrel 
for subsequent production.
In Indonesia the state oil company, Pertamina, has long held 
the rights to explore and exploit the country's petroleum reserves, 
but it shares these rights with foreign companies on a contract 
basis. Unlike the policies in other OPEC nations, the government 
allows contractors to recover their costs before profits are divided, 
and so uses elements of free enterprise to encourage exploration and 
development. Indonesian oil reserves are, however, fully 
nationalized.
The slogan "participation" has been adopted as a general term 
for the step-by-step nationalization route employed in most oil- 
exporting countries. More properly, it denotes the special form 
of gradual and negotiated expropriation that has taken place in the 
Persian Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar, 
as well as non-OPEC countries Oman and Bahrlan, had all achieved
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60 per cent participation In their domestic oil operations by the 
end of 1975.
In January, 1976 Kuwait announced its takeover of the 
remaining 40 per cent foreign interest in the Kuwait Oil Company 
in an agreement taking effect from March 5, 1975. Terms for BF 
and Gulf Oil included compensation of $50.5 million and the 
opportunity to buy 0.95 million barrels of oil per day (MBD) for 
5 years at 15 cents off the government's official selling price 
(with up to 60 days credit) and the opportunity to buy not less than
0.4 MBD for 5 further years. Kuwait, with most of its oil already 
discovered and sufficient native experience for the relatively 
more limited scope of its oil industry, had less need for further 
outside help. This circumstance seems to explain its relative 
advantage over other Gulf States when it came to timing 
nationalization.
Complete Saudi Arabian takoever of the assets of Arabian 
American Oil Company (ABAMCO) ~  which is jointly owned with four 
American oil companies -- had not been finalized by the end of 1977, 
though "handshake" terms had been settled.^ The heavy Saudi 
dependence on ABAMCO (the only Middle East oil consortium with a 
fully developed corporate structure of its own), both for more oil 
development and marketing outlets for its huge output and for
^Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1976 and February 17,
1978.
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general economic development services, Is largely responsible for 
Its more extended takeover process.
Abu Dhabi and Qatar are both lagging in completing takeover 
because of insufficient native expertise to handle their own opera­
tions, even with the aid of outside technical services and personnel. 
The latter country has announced plans for full nationalization, 
though. Dubai and the smaller states in the United Arab Emirates 
(U.A.E.), which have just started oil industries, have as yet 
expressed no desire even for participation. The dominance of Abu 
Dhabi in the U.A.E. can probably be expected to lead the rest of 
this federation into more and more national control as those 
reserves are developed, however.
The newness of oil operations in three OPEC members —  
Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon —  makes these countries too heavily 
dependent on outside help to achieve more than partial control of 
their outputs for several years yet. Mexico, which hopes to become 
the next member of OPEC, already has a state monopoly on 
production."^
In summary, five countries had achieved complete national­
ization or 100 per cent participation by mid-1976 —  Iraq, Iran, 
Venezuela, Kuwait, and Indonesia. Further, the preponderant OPEC 
exporter, Saudi Arabia, will achieve that status momentarily. Four
^"Debts, Trade Deficit Forcing Mexico Into OPEC," Oil and 
Gas Journal, May 10, 1976, p. 33.
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other states —  Algeria, Libya, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar —  own and 
control a large majority of the oil produced from their lands.
Three members —  Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon —  own substantial, 
though smaller portions, of the oil lifted in their lands. Only 
the lesser states In the U.A.E. do not yet subscribe to national­
ization or participation arrangements. The clear impression is 
that OPEC is progressively becoming, if it is not already in all 
important aspects, a cartel of state-owned companies.
D. Influence on Cartel Operation 
By eliminating the production of equity oil, the national­
ization of domestic operations by OPEC countries greatly simplified 
the system by which the price of various members' oil is determined. 
In addition to terminating the need to present a joint front to 
prevent oil companies from boycotting crude from individual countries 
that take over local oil properties, nationalization may destabilize 
the oil-export cartel in two ways.
1. Loss of a Price Monitoring System 
When the exports of OPEC nations consist of both equity and 
participation oil, the cartel price is floored on the fixed formula 
tax liability of the producing company. In the example of the 
previous section this formula yielded a $9.69 per barrel tax cost 
to the operating company. Even in these relatively authoritarian 
countries, the established tax laws (which resulted from compromises 
among factions and which are part of the public record) are probably
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harder to change than prices. Moreover, company tax payments are
easier to monitor than purchase payments, which involve often com-
18plicated installment terms. This formal price supporting structure 
would remain intact if private domestic parties replaced the inter­
national oil companies as owners of local oil operations in OPEC 
nations.
After the producer countries nationalize production, they 
begin setting prices which do not have the floor of clear tax 
payments. Compliance by particular countries, which may be 
attracted by the prospect of larger current sales at lower price, 
is less certain because no tax laws would be violated by covert 
price cutting. Also, since the major companies typically have had 
equity holdings in more than one member country, OPEC nations have 
had a lever to gain indirect access, through common equity 
partners, to actual transfer prices for oil produced in other 
countries. When oil companies have no equity stake left, they 
have less to lose from refusing to provide information on a 
potential cheater. The government cartel would be left with only 
its own bureaucracy to enforce the established price in each 
transaction when international companies begin making undivulged
18Gerard M. Brannon, Energy Taxes and Subsidies (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 168-69. Sheik Yamani,
the oil minister of Saudi Arabia, has expressed concern over the 
loss of this feature contained in the old pricing system.
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purchase payments rather than standardized tax payments for the oil 
they receive. Thus, to the extent that tax laws are harder to change 
and easier to administer than are selling prices, the act of national­
ization Increases the exposure of the cartel price to market pres­
sures. Moreover, excluding the multinational oil companies from 
sharing in the profits derived from production in one country 
increases the willingness of the main purchasers of crude oil to 
buy from alternative sources that may offer better terms.
2. International Oil Company Interests
This proprietary change may not completely separate the
Interests of the exporting countries and the International oil
companies regarding the price of crude oil. Three considerations
can dampen the incentive of the companies to price shop after their
equity stakes in the oil of one country have been liquidated. First,
the access to a portion of the oil exports of one country at slightly
favored prices (for instance as Gulf and BF have to Kuwaiti oil) can
have the same kind of an effect as a small equity share in tying
19companies to individual countries. Nationalization terms that 
award a former producing company preferential prices make it more 
in that company's interest to perserve a price structure that grants 
an input cost advantage over its major rivals.
19Edward R. Fried, "World Market Trends and Bargaining 
Leverage," in Yager and Steinberg, o£. cit., p. 268.
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Second, for fear of sudden price falls, the international
oil companies may not aggressively exploit weakness in this cartel
of state owned enterprises. Leif H. Olsen suggests that these
companies have a vested interest in not seeing the price of oil
20come down suddenly. This development may force the vertically 
Integrated companies to sell a lot of their in-process inventory, 
which was bought at high cartel prices, at lower competitive prices. 
This reverses the situation that gave these companies their astronomi­
cal profits in 1973 and 1974. Fried further suggests that, without 
greater competition than now exists among the major international 
oil companies, they may actually act to shore-up the weak price in 
an unstable market. Apparently, this sort of activity occurred 
in the soft oil market of the 1960*s, when the companies informally
allocated production quotas among producer countries in the absence
21of OPEC's ability to do so formally.
Third, the complete nationalization by OPEC of the known 
low cost oil producing properties in the world makes the "majors" 
as well as the "independents" rely on non-company sources for most 
of their cheap crude oil inputs. This situation may tend to make 
these companies pliable to the wishes of an organic or unified OPEC, 
much as the original "independents" were to Libyan demands in
20Testlmoney reproduced in U. S. Congress, Senate, Multi­
national Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, part II, 
p. 253.
21Fried, oj>. cit., pp. 13 and 269.
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221970. The crucial assumption In this presumed subordination of 
company actions to OPEC wishes is that the OPEC nations operate 
as one in dealing with the unattached oil companies. Without this 
solidarity the companies have the opportunity to shop around among 
several suppliers for more favorable terms. The original "inde­
pendents" had only Libya to deal with in 1970, since the "majors" 
owned most of the rest of the Middle East oil deposits.
Despite the possible doubts about the interest of the
international oil companies in pressuring OPEC to reduce price,
the oil market relationship has been changed by nationalization.
The oil companies have shifted their emphasis away from the disposal
of profitable crude oil toward the procurement of crude oil for
their refining and marketing operations to run at a profit. OPEC
must begin to function as a cartel without the direct benefits of
company support and without the monitoring facility of a tax 
23system. Hence, discussions about OPEC price control focus on the 
collusive motives of the membership and the capability to maintain 
price discipline. Chapter Five assesses the robustness of the
22The pliability in both cases is based on the fact that the 
companies have huge capital investments in tankers, refineries, 
and marketing outlets which must be fed by oil from these major 
world sources. If this oil is withheld, losses to competitors and 
stockholder displeasure quickly threaten the job tenure of company 
managers.
23Exxon asserts that aggressive price shopping by oil com­
panies have caused considerable fluctuation in the production levels 
of several contries. OPEC; Questions and Answers (New York: Exxon
Corp, 1976), pp. 25-27.
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economic stability of OPEC as outlined in Chapter Three in light of 
the noneconomic concerns that become more significant in cartel 
decision making following nationalization.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE INFLUENCE ON NONECONOMIC FACTORS ON OPEC DURABILITY
Governments have long participated In international commodity 
agreements and export cartels. Their role has typically involved 
such activities as monitoring prices, storing excess output, and/or 
enforcing quotas for the domestic, private producers in the coalition. 
The participation of states probably introduced some nationalistic 
and political concerns into the behavior of private groups. Where 
all of the domestic producing capacity is owned and operated by the 
national government, noneconomic motives should pay a more central 
and decisive part. Political and state goals no longer have to be 
furthered by trying to indirectly influence the private owners of 
the export businesses. The term political-economic cartel, or PEC, 
will be used to refer to an export cartel where the producing 
facilities are owned and operated by various sovereign governments.*
To provide a framework for analyzing the distinctive nature 
of a PEC, we may note that the ownership of member enterprises by 
national governments produces three characteristics that are not 
found generally in economic coalitions. One, nonpecuniary rewards
*OPEC after nationalization is the most promlnant example 
of this public enterprise cartel. Participation arrangements by 
members of the International Bauxite Association appear to have 
started converting this group into a PEC also. For details see 
C. Fred Bergsten, "A New OPEC in Bauxite," Challenge, July/
August, 1976, pp. 12-20.
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become an Important element in the utility functions of the decision 
makers in the monopoly. The term nonpecuniary will be used to refer 
to rewards not received in the form of money profits or salaries. 
Unlike the situation considered in managerial discretion models 
of firm behavior, these rewards can have significance both to the 
(political) managers and to the owners (the national citizenry) 
of the enterprise.
The second distinctive feature of this type of cartel is that 
its members are each sovereign unto themselves. There is no law to 
limit, abridge, or deter collusion among the participating firms in 
the interest of social efficiency or welfare. Also, no authority 
exists which has the power either to arbitrate disputes between 
the independent producing entities or to enforce their compliance 
with the cartel agreement. Unlike private firms and cartels, 
these government enterprises have the more complete freedom to 
compete or monopolize without fear of or recourse to outside 
authority.
Finally, external Issues can alter the willingness of member 
enterprises to join and conform to the agreement. External issues 
are international situations which are unconnected to the collusion 
among the cartel members, yet may modify the incentive of the 
various firms to act in an economically concordant manner. These 
factors can be Important because the member enterprises are part of 
an institution that responds to political and cultural as well as 
to economic stimuli.
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To further narrow Its scope, the following analysis will
concentrate on the effects that these three conditions can have
on the conduct of individual members, rather than on the conduct
of an organic cartel. Professor Machlup makes the distinction
between cartels governed by direct democracy where members not only
negotiate on the cartel agreement or "constitution" but also
negotiate on particular cartel decisions such as changes in price,
and representative democracy or oligarchy cartels where committees
or one or two firms make the latter type of decision for the whole 
2group. The fundamental difference for this analysis is that in 
a cartel run by other than direct democracy, members come to accept 
the organization as datum and orient their Individual decisions 
toward maximizing their interests within rules set by the group.
Under a direct democracy government, all cartel rules and even 
the permanence of the collusion are subject to constant negotiation 
among the membership. Machlup concludes that where members jealously 
guard their autonomy, a direct democracy view of the cartel is most 
appropriate.
By applying this approach to OPEC we assume the political 
sovereignty of the oil producers rather than the dominance of Saudi 
Arabia is the most important characteristic of this cartel's manage­
ment. Though Saudi Arabia has more than double the proven reserves
2F. Machlup, The Economics of Sellers Competition, (Baltimore, 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), pp. 480-90.
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of any other OPEC member and la the largest producer and exporter 
In the cartel, Its ability to alone dominate cartel price and output 
decisions is limited. In particular, it may have the power to 
moderate price increases that further endanger its own future profits, 
as it did with some difficulty in 1977. But a solitary Saudi effort 
to significantly lower the current cartel price toward a level that 
would more surely delay entry into the energy market could be 
expected to generate more determined opposition from the other 
members. There is a difference between treating the Saudis as the 
most powerful party in OPEC negotiations and treating them as the 
dominant party making decisions that are consistently accepted by 
the rest of the membership. Hence, it seems appropriate to explore 
the role of noneconomic interests in the process of negotiation, 
compromise, and agreement among the several firms in the PEC, rather 
than concentrate only on the role of noneconomic factors in the 
Saudi decision function.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore what effect non- 
pecuniary management goals, sovereignty, and external issues might 
have on the ability of a group of sellers to compromise divergent 
pricing interests and to suppress cheating that dissatisfaction 
might inspire. In essence, the following analysis enumerates 
some contributions the above three characteristics can make toward 
the success of the recurrent bargaining activity among members of 
a direct democracy cartel. By applying the resulting insights to 
OPEC it is possible to describe ways in which political elements
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aggravate and ways In which they alleviate the conflict over the 
limit price —  monopoly price choice raised by differences In the 
time horizons and time preferences found within this oil cartel.
A. The Role of Nonpecunlary Rewards 
Nonpecunlary rewards can play an Important role In the 
operation of public enterprises for several reasons. These firms are 
created and managed by people and thus reflect the interests and 
attitudes of the Individuals that are powerful In them. The huge 
salaries, bonuses, and dividends that often accrue to leaders of 
successful private firms may be deemed unseemly and even unnecessary 
to elicit and compensate maximum effort from officials whose 
supposed duty it Is to patriotically serve their country. Louis 
DeAlessl suggests that a ceiling (either statutory or informal) 
on pecuniary rewards effectively lowers the opportunity cost of
3nonpecunlary sources of utility to the managers of political firms.
If managers of the same general quality extract the same total 
compensation from either private or political firms, then leaders 
in the latter enterprise must be relatively more interested In 
nonpecunlary rewards. Goals such as personal prestige, status, or 
power should then take on greater significance in the preference 
functions of the leaders of public enterprises. These rewards are
3"An Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regula­
tion," Public Choice, Vol. XIX (Fall, 1974), p. 8.
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available both from within the firm and from associations into 
which the firm can be led by the political manager.
Managers of political firms are also presumed to have more 
freedom to pursue this type of welfare at the expense of their 
employers than are managers of private firms. The basic reasoning 
is that it is more difficult to concentrate the ownership of public 
firms behind the detection and policing of managerial behavior.
The owner of a political firm must change the political jurisdiction 
in which he works and resides, organize his neighbors behind a unified 
effort, or engage in other high cost activity to do what the owner 
of a private firm can do by simply purchasing stock. Certain 
situations increase this discretionary latitude. For instance 
top officials in authoritarian countries tend to be less encumbered 
with legislative guidelines and oversight than their counterparts 
in more democratic nations. ,'Charismatic,, leaders seem to play a 
dominant role in the policy-making process in some third-world 
states, where "bureaucratically complex organizations" do not exist 
and are thus unable to mold decisions made by the individual leader.^
The tendency for the political manager to place relatively 
greater value on nonpecunlary goals and to have greater freedom
^L. DeAlessl, "Managerial Tenure under Private and Government 
Ownership in the Electric Power Industry," Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. LXXX1I, No. 3 (May/June, 1974), p. 646.
^Bahgat Korany specifically cites Arab-Islamlc societies as 
nations in which this personalized policy-making is most often seen. 
"Foreign-Policy Models and Their Empirical Relevance to Third-World 
Actors: A Critique and an Alternative," International Social Science
Journal, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (1974), pp. 88-89.
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to pursue them does not mean that the Interests of citizen-owners 
will necessarily be slighted. "Statesmanship11 rewards, which the 
political manager derives from the exercise of his discretionary 
power to do what he perceives to be in the general Interest of 
the citizens, may provide more utility than efforts to enhance 
personal income and perquisites.^ The political manager may thus 
derive benefit from a special kind of altruism. This type of 
motivation is often assumed in analyses of relations between state 
entities.
The traditional approach to the study of international 
relations has been to construe the nation-state as a unitary actor.^ 
Rather than emphasize "statesmanship" motives, political scientists 
have pointed to the constraints on Individuals who would attempt 
to employ national resources in unpopular ways for a justification 
of this concept of state behavior. An example is provided in a book 
by Robert Gilpin. The political managers define the national interest 
in pursuit of which their agency is operated. The latitude to do 
this defining in terms of their own Interests, however, is to 
varying degrees constrained by larger influences. These Influences 
center around
^Roland MeKean, "Property Rights Within Government and 
Devices to Increase Government Efficiency," Southern Economic Journal, 
Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (October, 1972), pp. 177-86 suggests that the 
employment selection processes found in government tend to weed out 
people least likely to exhibit a taste for this kind of reward.
^For a discussion and critique of the use of the state- 
centric abstraction or "realist" model see Robert 0. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International
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cultural values and considerations relevant to the 
security of the state Itself —  geographical position, 
the evolution of military technology, and the inter­
national distributions of power —  [which] are of greater 
Importance.®
An example of such a conflict between economic Interests and national 
interests cited for the U. S. is the prohibiting of American sub­
sidiaries from bidding on certain lucrative sales contracts with
9the Soviet Union, Cuba, or China. In the case of less developed 
countries (LDC’s) the failure of the ruling elite to take these kinds 
of constraints into account and the ensuing change of ruling elites 
is the more evident manifestation of their effect. The overthrow 
of King Idis in Libya in 1970, in part for his not being sufficiently 
anti-Israeli and sufficiently demanding with international oil 
companies, is an example of this. Therefore, though individuals 
make the decisions about the utilization of nationally owned resources 
for their own benefit, they are expected to be restrained by the 
views and costs of others overthrowing them. Also noteworthy is 
the fact that nonpecunlary values can be important to the owners 
as well as to the managers of political firms. Statesmen, acting
Organizations," World Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (October, 1974), 
especially pp. 39-42 and the group of articles in International 
Social Science Journal, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (1974), on "Challenged 
Paradigms in International Relations."
QRobert Gilpin, U. S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, 
New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 39.
9Ibid., p. 144.
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as the public desireB, may pursue nonpecunlary rewards In the way 
they operate the national firm, therefore.
For our purposes It Is not necessary to judge whether the 
constraints on non-statesmanship behavior by political managers are 
effective. Important nonpecunlary rewards derived by both interests 
from the state enterprise are likely to be harmonious when the firm 
is engaged in International business. Power or prestige or status 
gained for the country by Its national economic venture are 
rewarding both to the citizenry and to the leaders who operate the 
firm. Before proceeding with an analysis of the effect of these 
parallel noneconomic goals on firm behavior it is important to 
clarity how they may appear in the relevant utility function.
Normally various ltemB in the utility function are viewed 
as substitutes where one good is traded against another. This 
strict substitutability need not necessarily hold in a management 
function where goals other than profit maximization occur. These 
other objectives may only alter the decision about which definition 
of profits to maximize. Professor Machlup reckons that many models 
based on alternatives to profit maximization would yield solutions 
equivalent to those of the marginalist model if the definition of 
profits were suitably altered.^ This approach is adopted here.
Rather than attempt to directly introduce prestige into the theory,
10F. Machlup, "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral,
Managerial," American Economic Review, Vol. LXVII, No, 1 (March,
1967), p. 1-33.
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we will concentrate Instead upon how this motive affects the profit 
choice of the firm. The public enterprise is assumed to seek to 
maximize the profit that maximizes the power or prestige enjoyed 
in the gaining thereof.
1. Prestige Maximization
Consider a nation-state that aspires to enhance its inter­
national status or prestige through the operation of its national 
enterprise. Such nonpecunlary profit might be gauged in either 
of two ways. In one view prestige could be directly related to 
what the state has the "power to do." The rationale would be that 
the less dependent the government is on foreign powers for economic 
and political resources, the greater is its prestige. The size of 
the government budget or the size of the national army might be 
convenient proxies. With this outlook, the national firm would be 
operated so as to maximize its current profits or cash flow.
An alternative perception of status might be termed the 
"prestige of having." The noneconomic reward comes not from 
size but from possessing something that makes "others" pay 
attention to it. For instance, the number of importance of 
foreign visitors and the amount of world attention focused on the 
country are the essence of its prestige. If the relevant "others" 
are suppliants (needy nations seeking aid for some cause), then 
prestige motivations will again lead to cash flow maximization.
The wealth of the country is the object of foreigners' attention.
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On the other hand, If the relevant "others" are buyers, then efforts 
to maintain market share and customer loyalty are more important. 
Where market entry or displacement of the product of the national 
firm is possible but controllable by the firm's behavior, the 
maximization of cash flow would not be consistent with prestige 
maximization. Long term profit maximization would yield more 
noneconomic benefit than short term cash flow under this perception.
The Importance of this reward structure involving a com­
bination of economic profits and political or prestige "profits" 
is that the set of values with which the collusion can work to 
achieve a compromise between firms with divergent interests Is 
expanded. Before this insight can be applied to OPEC one conceptual 
problem must be broached.
Where the individual manager neither is effectively con­
strained by constituent pressure nor acts on statesmanship motives, 
he may tend to be more interested in short, rather than long, term 
goals. The stream of benefits received by the manager of a political 
firm tends to be related only faintly to the future well-being of the 
firm. This circumstance derives from two conditions. One, the 
longevity of the political manager is limited either to the lifetime 
of the coalition backing him or to his physical lifetime. Two, the 
transferability of political power is very restricted relative to 
economic power. There is nothing equivalent to money which permits 
the exact valuation, accumulation, and complete exchange of its
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11benefits. In other words there Is no futures market for political 
capital. Hence, political managers are unable to fully capture 
the future gains from right decisions taken on behalf of their 
employers, while they can be made to bear the consequences of 
currently unpopular or bad decisions. Accordingly, they attach 
a lower discounted value to future rewards than would their 
employers. Specifically, any market share losses and the attendant 
prestige losses caused by current pricing may be a problem only for 
the leader ten, fifteen, or twenty years from now.
An exception to this short run bias may be found in the 
situation under consideration. Where power is passed by blood lines, 
the longevity of individual leaders tends to increase and the welfare 
of the successor may be important to today's leader. If political 
power and its prestige rewards (like money) can be inherited, then 
future rewards may be as valuable to the political manager as to 
his employers or to an equivalent private manager. Consequently, 
even where political managers have wide discretionary power in the 
operation of a public business, they may not concentrate only on 
short term goals. The ability of prestige rewards to enhance the 
value of long term profit in a public enterprise then may not be 
ineffectual.
"^See James Coleman, "Political Money," American Political 
Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4 (December, 1970), pp. 1074-1087, 
for an interesting discussion of the similarities and differences 
between money or economic power and political power.
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2. Implications for OPEC
To Infer how these prestige motives might influence the oil 
producers, one or the other of the status perceptions must be 
attributed to the government of the particular country. Arab states 
have a common bond In their opposition to Israel. As such the most 
important "others" in the prestige evaluation of Arab oil producers 
may be the Arab nations directly Involved with the struggle. Poli­
tical prestige and pressure would then be in support of maximizing 
current revenue so the friendly defense efforts can be funded.
A short term bias of a selfish and independent political manager 
would reinforce emphasis on this objective. Not only should he suffer 
little, if any, from future market losses, but also his current 
prestige is enhanced by his conspicuous involvement in the righteous 
cause.
The non-Arab producers are not as involved in that cause.
The most important "others" in their prestige evaluation may thus be 
the Importers of petroleum. The development intentions and 
feasibility in most of these nations could enhance the value they 
place on being important in the community of economically advanced 
nations. Protection of their accustomed share in the energy market 
would therefore tend to have some prestige worth to these oil 
producers. Most of these countries do have extravagant national 
spending plans and Venezuela apparently feels some foreign aid 
responsibility toward the rest of Latin America, so current earnings 
are Important. Nevertheless, non-Arab members may have some
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noneconomic incentive to guard future markets so as to preserve 
stature in the developed world. For this motive to be significant 
in the operation of these national firms, leaders must be assumed not 
to Ignore or be allowed to Ignore the value of rewards received in the 
future.
Making that assumption, this Interpretation of political 
motivations suggest that they serve to offset an economically based 
conflict among OPEC members over the choice of the uniform price 
level or price path. The split between Arabs and non-Arabs roughly 
matches the split between savers and spenders that was developed 
in Chapter Three. Accordingly, politics may induce Arab/saver pro­
ducers to place a greater value on current profits than would 
economic rationality alone. Therefore, prices closer to an entry 
encouraging monopoly price would be less objectionable to these high 
reserve, low discount rate producers. Conversely, non-Arab/spender 
producers may be receptive on prestige grounds to the idea of limit 
pricing. Unless the non-Arab producers are controlled by near­
sighted leaders, the presence of nonpecunlary rewards in preference 
functions of decision makers seems to provide the oil PEC with a 
valuable extra dimension for compromising the divergent interests 
about the choice of a common price level.
Only the potential offsetting quality in bargaining pre­
ferences is asserted here, since the quantification of these 
countervailing influences on member goals is not attempted. The 
level of a common oil price chosen by the group should not be
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modified If the strength of prestige motives are roughly equal In 
the various members. Only the affinity by economically different 
producers for the collective price choice is Increased. Despite 
the circumstances described above, if political managers with short 
term bias do dominate all member decisions, the pattern of non­
economic interests might not be allowed to offset national economic 
differences. Personal prestige rewards would then increase the 
chances that members would agree to a price like P^ that maximizes 
immediate Income at the expense of future income and stability. 
Generally, prestige concerns seem to solidify a compromise price 
choice or to tilt the preferences of all members toward a short 
run profit maximizing price for the group.
3. Nonpecunlary Rewards from Collusion 
Additional implications about the effect of nationalization 
on OPEC operations can be found by shifting attention from the role
of politics within member firms to its role in relations between
them. The existence of interfirm collusion provides several non- 
pecuniary benefits to political managers and thus Increases their 
willingness to reach compromises which allow for continued joint 
action. Long term consequences of this willingness may hamper
extended collaboration in the PEC, however.
a. Noneconomic Benefits in the PEC
One benefit for the officials of colluding nations has 
already been mentioned in connection with the earlier discussion
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of the nationalization process. The joint front of the cartel
facilitates the takeover of property previously belonging to multi-
12national companies by the local government. This expectation Is
based on the fact that buyers have fewer alternatives to which to
shift patronage and thereby penalize the expropriating country
when several nations simultaneously engage In takeovers. Foreign
buyers have little choice but to deal with a national company.
Pnce completed nationalizations have become prevalent, this
benefit from belonging to the intergovernmental cartel should fade.
A more lasting benefit to political managers, particularly
if they represent LDC's, can be provided by the PEC. By raising
price and improving the terms of trade for the commodity exporter,
the collective monopoly offers a method of achieving the capital
accumulation (considered essential for development) that avoids some
13disadvantages Inherent in other methods. Savings do not have to
be generated through high levels of internal deprivation. Foreign 
investment (particularly in the form of a near autonomous multi­
national corporation) that looks much like neo-colonial exploitation 
does not have to be courted. Finally, foreign aid with its debasing 
and dependency producing properties does not have to be relied upon. 
Instead, the development funds come out of the monopoly profits earned
12Supra, p. 108,
13Robert T. Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society (5th 
Ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), pp. 248-49.
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from the sale of a commodity to largely foreign buyers. The PEC 
provides the benefit of a less painful and a more dignified way for 
the country to raise development funds.
This source of funds should be particularly attractive to 
government officials. Not only are they spared the political cost 
of extracting the funds from the domestic populace or foreign inter­
ventionists, but also they have more personal and direct control 
over the development process. Unlike the situation with a private 
export cartel, all the benefits from the improved terms of trade are 
funneled through government spending, rather than shared with domestic 
producers and consumers.^
Waters also does a thorough job of explaining various non- 
pecuniary rewards that enhance the popularity of international 
organizations in influential circles. For instance, the staffing 
of the international agency and the domestic supervisory and infor­
mation roles that accompany the cartel gives senior bureaucrats the 
right to select employees, allocate jobs, and hold sway over even 
larger staffs. He further mentions that, for national prestige 
reasons, officials in international organizations enjoy traveling 
and office conditions that are superior to those of their domestic 
peers.
1 /Alan R. Waters suggests that more than a few senior poli­
ticians in developed and less developed countries feel that economic 
decisions are more efficient if arrived at through political 
bargaining then if made by market forces. "The Economic Reason for 
International Commodity Agreements," Kyklos, Vol. XXVII, Fasc. 4 
(1974), p. 780.
Keohane and Nye Introduce a concept which suggests that
administering officials may have an interest in cooperative behavior
15for less tangible reasons. The same officials, who represent 
different governments and who meet recurrently concerning certain 
specific matters, often develop what is described as a sense of 
"collegiality." This personal attachment can be reinforced by their 
membership in a common profession like economics, engineering, or the 
military. Collaboration tendencies are increased in such situations 
by the necessity of reporting on and defending home country actions 
periodically in these semipublic forums. The coordination Inducement 
is described in the following quotation.
It was costly not just in terms of time and effort, but 
perhaps more important, in terns of the embarrassment of 
having many members of the club —  professional colleagues 
—  charge that another member was not living up to some 
of its international commitments.16
In sum, this argument is that a common reward structure, that 
benefits both top leaders and administrative officials from various 
member countries and that is associated with the existence of the 
PEC, would seem to encourage greater efforts at cooperation on the 
part of individuals. In particular, one would expect that manage­
ment latitude and personal rewards would increase efforts by
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operatives to find ways to compromise conflicts, such as the choice 
between a monopoly price and a limit price, which endanger the 
continued existence of the OPEC organization.
b. Latent Difficulty
The "collegiality" relation among senior and staff officials 
can, however lead to long run problems for the PEC. Keohane and Nye 
point out that where the same individuals conduct the intergovern­
mental negotiations, "transgovemmental elite networks" come to be 
formed. These institutions, by
linking officials in various governments to one another by 
ties of common interests, professional orientation, and 
personal friendship, ... may permit the development of 
flexible bargaining behavior in which concessions need 
not be requited issue by issue or during each period ...
[The results are] the development of "political bank 
accounts," where mental reckoning of political credits ^
and debts relaxes the need for all payoffs to be immediate.
The inference is that collective action may be very successful for a 
time because of this "flexible bargaining behavior."
Turnover does occur in the ranks of the negotiating officials. 
When one or two key officials leave the policy-making or administering 
elite networks, especially if they leave "deficits" in their "poli­
tical bank accounts," "surplus" officials can suffer losses which 
make further cooperation less likely. Successors might not assume 
these political debts. Even if they do, they are unlikely to place 
a value on these obligations as high as did their predecessors.
17Ibld., p. 46.
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James Coleman points out that the inability to set a quantifiable 
value on political capital greatly hinders its accumulation and 
exchange.
Private cartels can, of course, develop similar negotiating 
networks. One would suppose though, that the officials of these 
latter enterprises, being concerned more narrowly with pecuniary 
income, would be more inclined to secure agreements with tangible 
"qu^ pro quo" pledges, whose ownership or obligation can be passed 
on to successive managers. Basically, this counter-argument is 
that the political capital in these "bank accounts" is less certainly 
transferred; that intergovernmental relations are more likely to 
rely on such "capital" to continue cooperation than are relations 
among private businesses; and that these "political bank accounts" 
may thus enhance short run unity only at the cost of greater long 
run disunity. To the extent that the success of a particular PEC 
is based on the mutual understanding of the officials of member 
nations, its special strength may be limited to the tenure of its 
initial leaders. Further, vestiges of its early strength —  resent­
ment for repudiated or undervalued "debts" -- may act to hasten the 
break up of the PEC after some key individuals leave.
This point may appear rather tenuous. However, it does serve 
to temper the impression that personal utility and personal ties among 
leaders in intergovernmental commodity coalitions always work to
180R. cit., pp. 1078-1080.
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support group solidarity. If a PEC imposes some penalties on 
individual actors, they can be expected to consciously work for 
its demise.
The impression fostered in the papers by Waters and Keohane 
and Nye is that the participating officials steadfastly work to 
preserve and promote cooperation in the international organizations 
to which their governments belong. Both papers explicitly dis­
regard penalties which might create disunifying Incentives for 
individuals, since each seeks to explain only some personal factors 
which enhance international cooperation. For instance, things like 
personal animosity, jealousy, or xenophobic feelings, may lead these 
officials to sabotage some efforts at international cooperation. 
Individual philosophical differences can make effective communica­
tion more difficult and personal contact less pleasant, and thus 
indirectly undermine recurrent negotiations. PEC officials with 
truly statesmanship motivations may also work against a cartel 
price that can damage the future welfare of their own country.
The presence of these factors can be uncovered only by detailed, 
case-by-case analyses. In this more generalized survey it is 
enough to acknowledge that, given the unusual freedom of operation 
that political managers may enjoy, any personal disutility 
inflicted by the PEC associations will tend to weaken attempts 
to overcome friction concerning price preferences and thus can 
endanger the performance of the PEC.
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B. Sovereign Oligopolists 
In this section attention is shifted from nonpecuniary 
incentives of members to the ability of the group to insure that 
collusive intentions are carried out. The political autonomy of 
the firms participating in the PEC means that they face no legal 
threat to their monopolization attempt. The cartel must contend 
only with market forces in its endeavor to organize the seller 
side. This same member sovereignty also creates several conditions 
which can impair the coordination of member activity and the 
detection and deterrence of price cheating.
1. Limits to Economic Integration
By their collective nature and monopoly restriction, all
cartels inherently admit the possibility of price chiseling. The
surest way for groups to avoid this debilitating behavior is for
the members to permit the establishment of a strong central agency
with the power to assign, inspect, and enforce quotas for each
member. Completely fixed portions of the market available to
the group serve to eliminate the incentive for price chiseling.
Each member faces a demand curve with the same elasticity as that
of the cartel demand curve at the established price. Therefore,
19under this scheme no extra profit can be made by price cutting.
19A member restricted to a 10 per cent share of the market 
would be restricted to 10 per cent of the change in market quantity. 
Thus, the numerator of the elasticity fraction is the same size for 
the firm as for the whole industry. This is another way to state 
the effectiveness at deterring cheating of the quota rule developed
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a. Aversion to Direct Transfers
Sovereignty considerations seem likely to prevent a PEG 
from adopting allocation formulas. For instance, quotas may be 
assigned so as to minimize the cost of providing the total output 
on which the cartel settles. High cost producers would then be 
assigned small or even zero current output. In a cartel selling 
a nonreproduclble commodity, producers with relatively larger
20reserves tend to have lower costs than do small reserve producers. 
Where user costs dominate full cost functions, high reserve firmB 
would be the low cost or large quota producers in the cartel using 
a cost minimization quota rule.
To gain the acceptance of the low reserve/high cost pro­
ducers, some transfer of funds from large quota producers probably 
would be required. The onus for profit reallocation is especially 
intense where the high cost firms place great value on current 
revenue, for instance, because they are high absorber economies.
However, government participations are not likely to 
voluntarily submit to schemes that have them become dependent on 
other nations for essential transfers. When the government producer 
has the output capacity to avoid such dependence, that kind of 
scheme would seem particularly unlikely. Too much leverage over
by D. K. Osborne, "Cartel Problems," American Economic Review, Vol. 
LXV1, No. 5 (December, 1976), pp. 838-39.
20As demonstrated in Chapter Three, p. 43 , the full cost of 
a non-reproducible commodity consists of a production cost component 
(current lifting cost) and an opportunity cost component (profit 
receivable at date of exhaustion discounted back to the present).
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the operation of the government and the welfare of the nation that
Is heavily dependent on earnings from that one commodity would be
given to foreign rivals. National governments are Institutions
accustomed to exercising sovereignty over domestic matters. This
hypothesis Is close to the earlier explanation of why host countries
tend to force multinational corporations to relinquish local con-
21cessions as soon as feasible. OPEC nations that have just obtained 
control over oil revenue from one International entity are not 
likely to turn around and share It with another.
The implication for the oil PEC Is that low reserve members 
will not accept quotas which reduce their output levels significantly 
without compensation. However, their sovereignty concern will also 
not allow them to become dependent on direct financial transfers from 
low cost members. Another type of quota which may be excluded by 
political sovereignty concerns is best developed by direct reference 
to OPEC.
b. Significance of Relative Shares
i
An analysis of absorptive capacity by C. A. Gebelein
indicates that Saudi Arabia alone has the capability to accept
substantial reductions in the world oil demand without compromising
22practicable spending programs. He estimates that even by 1980,
21Supra, p. 106.
22"Effects of Conservation on Oil Prices: Analysis of Mis­
conceptions," The Journal of Energy and Devel^Ejnent, Vol. I, No. 1 
(Autumn, 1975), pp. 53-68. Constantine Fliakos and Ronald D.
Lewlson make the same assertion on p. 73 of the same journal in
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Saudi Arabia would need to produce only 3.2 MBD (compared with a
1976 production rate in excess of 8.5 MBD) at current prices
to cover all of its Import demands. In other words, Saudi Arabia
individually could absorb a 17.5 per cent reduction in the demand
for OPEC exports without curtailing spending on social projects.
During the 1975 recession, demand for OPEC oil was down only 12
per cent from 1974 levels. In his calculations it also appears
that a group of other low absorber nations in that area have
similar capability. Kuwait, the U. A. E., Qatar, and Libya could
together absorb a 12.5 per cent reduction in total OPEC output
23without necessitating any belt tightening.
These figures are derived from an estimate of maximum 
government spending on administration, infrastructure, and defense 
that is feasible with a fully employed indigenous and expatriate 
labor force. Subsequent reports indicate that spending by Saudi 
Arabia, and probably the other OPEC countries identified above as 
the low absorbers, are not constrained by as much as these estimates
their article "Prospects for International Oil Supply and Demand: 
1975, 1980, 1985," as does Raymond Vernon in "The Oil Crisis:
In Perspective; An Interpretation," Daedalus. Vol. CIV, No. 4 
(Fall, 1975), p. 9.
23Gebelein does indicate that there can be technical 
and engineering factors, such as long term damage to oil 
reservoirs, which may limit the amount of downward adjustment 
of field production. Ibid., p. 54.
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24suggest. Nevertheless, these saver countries have the ability 
to reduce oil production with much less hardship than do their high 
absorber partners.
The OPEC group could employ this facility to ease financial 
pressures on member governments in countries where internal spend­
ing needs are most pressing. As demand grows, low absorber 
producers might be asked to permit high absorber members to supply 
as much of the extra consumption as the latter have or can Install 
the capacity to handle. If demand slumps, low absorber nations 
would be asked to accept most or all of the output cutback. In 
effect this quota scheme would involve a transfer of customers 
or sales, rather than of excess oil revenue, among the members of 
the cartel.
Under such an arrangement, the high absorber producers 
might be persuaded to accept somewhat lower prices than they would 
have insisted upon at the old market shares. Because their sales 
volume expands relative to the market, the somewhat lower price 
would not hurt their revenues. This scheme would defer a larger 
portion of the output of the high reserve countries than would 
the situation where the overcapacity burden is more equally shared. 
But, it would also tend to lessen pressure on importers to find
^Spending rates in Saudi Arabia as reported by The Wall 
Street Journal, April 29, 1977, would have required production to 
average at least 6 MBD in 1975-76 and over 7 MBD in 1976-77. 
Gebeleln notes that his estimates may not coincide with the need 
perceived by policy makers in OPEC governments. Ibid., p. 67.
148
energy alternatives to OPEC oil. The market price of oil would 
not be quite as high, so the switch from OPEC oil, by say the 
year 2000, could be a bit less than It might otherwise be.
A basic tenent repeatedly observed In International 
relations would seem to severaly limit the ability to use this 
form of transfer to stabilize the cartel. The relative share of 
good fortune or of burden appears to be crucial to any joint 
activity by sovereign states. The zero sum nature of political 
calculations and Its Implications for a PEC Is described In the 
following two quotations from Robert Gilpin.
The essential fact of politics Is that power Is always 
relative; one state's gain In power is by necessity 
another's loss. Thus, even though two states may be 
gaining absolutely in wealth, In political terms It 
Is the effect of these gains on relative power positions 
which Is of primary Importance... Though all may be 
gaining or declining in absolute capability, what will 
concern states principally are the effects of these 25 
absolute gains or losses on relative power positions.
He goes on to attribute this zero sum nature to the psycho­
logical dimension of power (which he calls the basic concept in 
political science), which makes It hard to quantify. Perceptions 
of power relations then assume critical significance.
Power as such is not the sole or even principal goal 
of state behavior. Other goals or values constitute 
the objectives pursued by nation-states: welfare,
security, prestige. But power in its several forms
25pp. cit., pp. 34 to 36.
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(military, economic, psychological) is ultimately the 
necessary means to achieve these goals. For this 
reason, nation-states are intensely jealous of and 
sensitive to their relative power position. The 
distribution is Important because it profoundly 
affects the ability of states to achieve what they 
perceive to be their interests. ^
The measure upon which this relative position is judged may 
be hard to isolate. In a PEC selling a reproducible commodity, 
an agricultural crop or a manufactured good, this determination 
is most easily made by reference to market shares of output or of 
its counterpart, excess capacity. With a uniform cartel price, 
these shares determine relative revenue or wealth/power positions 
for the member national enterprises. Fluctuations in these shares, 
whether caused by natural shifts in market demand, by price 
chiseling, or as a consequence of reliance on one or a few member 
firms to assume most of the output restriction necessitated by the 
high cartel price, would then be expected to strain the solidarity 
in a PEC.
In a PEC that sells a nonreproducible commodity, a naturally 
occurring resource that exists only in limited supply, current 
market shares may be of less significance. Today's smaller share 
of sales means tomorrow's larger share of the existing reserves.
Given the size of proven and probable world oil reserves and the 




dominance of the future energy market by high reserve countries in 
OPEC is not assured. As a consequence of this doubt, current market 
shares or excess capacity proportions tend to be the safest and 
simplest measure of relative well-being among countries endowed 
with large oil deposits.
The implication of this reasoning is that the more modest 
economic need or spending capacity attributed to certain OPEC pro­
ducers will not determine how much output reduction the cartel can 
tolerate. Just as high absorber members can be expected to oppose 
quota and transfer schemes that make them dependent on gifts or 
loans from other oil exporters, low absorber members will probably 
oppose accepting too large a share of the current excess capacity.
A national concern for relative status, rather than an economic 
evaluation of the need for current revenues, may force each 
country to insist that its own firm share equally in output growth 
and that firms in other countries share in output declines.
A variant of the model presented In Chapter Three can be 
used to illustrate the basic point being made. In Figure 5-1, 
let MC represent the marginal cost for a cartel consisting of a 
low absorber producer (LA) and a high absorber producer (HA). Let 
D represent the stable demand curve (as in Figure 3-2, page 58 ) 
confronting this cartel in the absence of entry by alternative 
sources into the energy market. Let De represent the demand 
curve left to the cartel, in say 1985, following a given amount of 









entry will not occur, so Dg and coincide at and below that price. 
The further above price is at first set, the more entry by non­
cartel sources should occur. Thus, D should be more elastic abovee
P, than D .1 g
Suppose the group decides to operate at P^ and assigns
producer LA the role of residual supplier, fulfilling demand only
after HA has sold all it is capable of providing. In terms of
Figure 5-1, HA would provide its capacity output, Oh, per period
and receive revenue of P^ahO, and LA would provide whatever else
the market will absorb at P (hm with a revenue of afmh beforem
entry). Assume that while member production capacity remains as 
described by MC, entry reduces the sales of the group to Ok at the 
price P . Under the residual supplier agreement at the fixed price, 
sales for HA would be unchanged. For LA, however, sales would fall 
to hk and revenue to ackh. Total income drops below expected income 
only for the residual supplier.
Even if member production capacity does decline, the same 
deterioration in the relative share left to LA occurs if the 
displacement amount (km) exceeds the fall in the production 
capacity of HA. Likewise, if the market expands (D shifts to the
o
right), the rotation to De could still shrink the output and profit 
share left to LA. The combination of any increase in production 
capacity in HA (increase in Oh) and and entry alteration of cartel 
outoup (km) would have to exceed the size of the expansion of the 
quantity demanded from the cartel at P^ (Om).
153
A belated realization that an Initial price of P^ would not 
have resulted In this asymmetrical sacrifice can intensify the 
reaction by LA against the cartel. At P^, HA revenue of PjbhO would 
not have grown relatively to LA revenue of belh. Political regard 
for relative output or revenue share can render just the prospect 
of share deterioration unpalatable to the low absorber producer.
The entry contingency may force each member government to InBlst 
that Its own firm share equally in output growth and that firms 
in other countries share in output declines.
Data cited in Table 3-2, pages 76-77 indicate that while 
aggregate OPEC output increased just under 12 per cent in 1976, 
output from low absorbers Saudi Arabia, the U. A. E., and Libya 
increased by between 16 and 30 per cent over 1975 levels. Other 
factors, such as greater recovery by their particular international 
company customers, may be more directly responsible for these 
performances. However, the larger output expansion by those 
producers that bore a disproportionate share of the excess capacity 
in 1975, probably helped ease political tension among the nation­
state members.
The exclusion for political considerations of this quota 
scheme employing residual producer(s) is the most Important con­
sequence of our emphasis on member sovereignty, rather than the 
dominant firm, as characterizing behavior in the oil cartel. If 
the Saudis are largely unchallenged as price leaders in OPEC 
deliberations and if they act accordingly, their concern for
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relative shares within the cartel would be limited. They may act 
from economic and anti-Israeli interests confident in the belief 
that the rest of OPEC will follow their lead. Casual observations 
such aB the data cited in the previous paragraph and the pricing 
division in the cartel during the first half of 1977 argue against 
this mature price leadership approach, however.
Professor Adelman suggests that OPEC uses a subtle form of
side payments at the present time to induce high absorbers to share
27the overcapacity burden. By agreeing to current price levels and 
Increases that are higher than would appear to maximize the 
discounted wealth of their oil deposits, high reserve countries 
are transfering some of their future profits to low reserve 
countries today. If side payments in the form of uneconomically 
high price levels and increases for all OPEC oil cease, high 
absorber willingness to accept some of the excess capacity burden 
may evaporate.
The arguments to this point support the proposition that 
national sovereignty considerations will make it difficult for the 
oil cartel to replace its current output allocation and side pay­
ment system with one of the two alternatives suggested above.
While relying either on high cost members or on low absorber 
members to bear most of the burden (with compensating transfers)
2 7 "The World Oil Cartel: Scarcity, Economics, and Politics,"
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Summer, 
1976), p. 14.
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of holding output below a secular trend are not the only allocation 
schemes that can be used In a dynamic market situation, they appear 
to be the most logical candidates for OPEC consideration.
The Importance of thlB proposition Is that OPEC faces more 
than the normal problem confronting any cartel that attempts limit 
pricing. The negotiation of individual quotas that provide enough 
aggregate output to hold market price just below the entry inducing 
level Is made more difficult by the need to avoid altering relative 
positions and obvious transfers. Sovereignty obstacles to adopting 
what seem to be the best alternative sharing tactics implies that 
the oil PEC may be unable to pursue a limit pricing strategy, even 
if members agree to in principle, because a way to allocate the 
necessary output and resulting profits cannot be instituted. The 
practical exclusion of coordinated limit pricing does not mean that 
the current expediency system for distributing cartel output and 
profits can not be made to work for a prolonged period.
2. Enforcement Substitutes
A general bias against the delegation of the power to 
determine output (formal prorationing) to the cartel (i.e., to 
rival nations) would seem to characterize a cartel of sovereign 
governments. This kind of collusion is more likely then to rely 
on methods other than formal quotas as a means for discouraging 
cheating and insuring that the joint price is being observed. Some­
thing akin to the government in a local price fixing arrangement 
that acts as an unbiased and external policer for the cartel might
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thus be rather Important to the PEC. The successful control of a 
chiseling incentive could require this outside assistance to do 
such things as monitor and report individual prices, discourage 
output or capacity expansion by members, and/or slow the entry 
of new sources of supply into the lucrative market. Several of these 
functions can be performed for the PEC and thus substitute for the 
absence of a single government with jurisdiction over the several 
member firms.
a. Military Force
A member government with a relatively strong military force 
can use this tool to enforce discipline and discourage cheating in 
the group. The free rider problem in the cartel is handled not by 
a collective decision to relinquish secrecy or discretion over the 
disruptive activity to a central agency, but by the superior power 
of one member that acts in the interest of the group. The 
militarily dominant national member can destroy or occupy and shut­
down the productive capacity of rivals that attempt to cheat, just 
as a national government can impose civil penalties on cheaters 
in a private cartel that is authorized to operate within a country. 
The military threat also could be directed at an unrelated activity 
of the offending nation if that target were more accessible. The 
mere threat of military action may be sufficient to discourage 
chiselers. One condition compensating for the absence of a
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supporting authority for the cartel would then appear to be the
28existence of one member with unquestioned military superiority.
Because one member rather than a consensus of members per­
forms the enforcement function, that power may be used to benefit 
only the interests of the individual producer. For this capability 
to replace a neutral enforcement authority it is necessary to further 
specify that it be in the perceived interest of the militarily 
dominant member to use its power to support the cartel agreement.
A circumstance which can produce this result is economic sophisti­
cation on the part of the leaders of the militarily dominant 
member. Where they understand and appreciate (1) that chiseling 
by one produces losses in the pecuniary profits received by other 
individual collaborators and (2) that defensive responses will 
result in negative sum outcomes for all members, they should
decide neither to consider cheating themselves nor countenance it 
29by others. A supportive circumstance would be where the dominant 
military member is also the largest producer. Pursuit of that rank 
will then not provide a justification for cheating by the enforcer 
that can be defended by armed might.
28If two different members are strong militarily relative to 
the other members, they may engage in mutual rivalry and thus divide 
the resolve to use force against a cheater.
29An exception would occur when the militarily dominant 
member preferred a lower price than the one set by the PEC. Cheating 
which moves the cartel price in this direction would not be opposed 
by the militarily dominant member.
158
Assuming that the military capability is expected to be 
used to support the cartel, it is possible to identify some condi­
tions under which it will be most effective. Geographical 
concentration of producing nations will make it easier to carry 
out military missions against cheaters. Also, the less dependent 
the militarily dominant member is on arms resupply sources under 
the control of organized customer interests, the more likely it is 
to expend weapons in support of a high price. Buyer pressure 
against such actions and exercised through the threat to withhold 
replacement arms is less important. By facilitating the use of 
martial tactics, these conditions enhance the deterrence to cheating 
provided by the possession of superior military power by a single 
member satisfied with the cartel price.
b. Importer Assistance
Countries that import the product of the PEC may aid the 
cartel inadverently or on purpose by performing some enforcement 
or detection functions for the group. Governments in consumer 
countries occasionally impose quotas or tariffs on the imports 
from some countries or from all countries for reasons unrelated 
to the economics. Importer governments are political institutions 
that respond to more complex incentives than the pecuniary well­
being of consumer groups. For instance, importers may assign 
quotas to the exports of certain countries for security reasons,
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30for social justice considerations, or to pressure the exporter
to remedy some other grievance between the nations. Though the
intent may not be there, the effect is to help enforce prorationing
where the PEC may not be able to otherwise.
In a related situation the Importer government may over
respond to consumer political pressure for lower prices. Since
this government cannot control the price charged by foreign
suppliers, it may control the price charged by domestic producers
in order to lower the average price of the good to its consumer
constituency. The result is a reversal of the infant industry
argument for protecting and assisting in the development of local
producers. Instead of helping an immature domestic industry, the
importer government is protecting vocal, domestic consumers. The
international cartel is helped by the penalization of new producers
whose entry or expansion might compete away some of its business.
Even where such partisan efforts are avoided, importer
governments may still provide some valuable service to the PEC.
" [T]he fondness of the bureaucracy of all developed nations for
31publishing output statistics" generates information which assists 
cartel members in checking on each other's loyalty to the agreement. 
This service may be particularly useful where the members are
30A case in point is the U. S. government embargo on direct 
purchase of Rhodesian chrome by American firms.
31Osborne, oj>. clt., p. 842.
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sovereign states that can distort or keep secret their sales records. 
Data from the buyer side may be all that is available. At the 
least, it provides statistics against which to compare those pro­
vided by (potentially cheating) collaborators. In either case the 
ability of the cartel to detect cheating is enhanced.
Authorities in 1100*8 may even succeed in enlisting the con­
scious aid of governments in importing nations in enforcing the
monopoly price. This would legitimize the export cartel by making
32it an international commodity agreement (ICA).
The richer importing countries may consent to and join ICA's
33for a combination of reasons. That vehicle provides legislators 
with a politically less costly method than aid appropriations for 
transferring development resources to LDC's. Also, commodity cartels 
promise on an International level the same sort of humanitarian 
benefits that agricultural support programs do within the U. S.
In these commodity market's where demand and supply are often 
highly inelastic, drastic price changes are thought to constitute 
a clumsy and costly means of effecting economic adjustments. This 
disguised form of aid is far from ideal, however. A few of its 
drawbacks Include the facts that aid distribution becomes a function 
of commodity distribution, non-LDC producers are benefited, the
Boris C. Swerling points out that the longest lived ICA's 
have required consumer country support, or at least not unified 
opposition. "Commodity Agreements, International," Internatlonal 
Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Vol. Ill (1968), p. 19.
33Waters, op. cit., pp. 748-86.
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subsidization can lock the LDC into production of that one com­
modity, and the donor has no influence over the use to which the 
funds are put.
Ultimate consumers in import countries may also accept the 
higher prices with little resistance. The commodity in question 
often represents a minor portion of their budget and may be 
Included in small amounts in a large variety of items they directly 
consume. The cost of information to the individual consumer about 
the relative importance of the cartel is often too high to permit 
pinpointing this reason, above others, as being behind a widespread 
price rise.
Even there the cause is obvious, the cartel or XCA may not 
be vigorously opposed. It is argued that stable commodity price, 
whether done with ICA buffer stocks or with export cartel restric­
tions, may assist industrial countries in controlling their own 
inflation. Sharp price increases for mineral and agricultural 
products lead to increases in prices and in wage demands by labor 
faced with higher living costs in developed countries. When 
commodity prices subsequently fall sharply, companies and unions 
don't often accept price and wage reductions. Commodity price 
surges thus may help ratchet up inflation rates.
34Nicholas Kaldor, "Cartelization: The Economic Impact
of the New Restraints," Business Week, May 9, 1977, p. 82.
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c. Implications for OPEC
Since crude oil prices were stable at the pre-1970 level 
the possible offsetting benefit to Industrial countries of reducing 
price swings does not apply to OPEC. Nevertheless, the oil cartel 
may benefit from the suspicion that export monopoly combinations 
among LDC's might have some redeeming features. To the extent that 
U. S. price controls slow the development of more U. S. oil and 
gas production and that the proficiency of statistical gathering 
agencies in the developed world discourages attempts to secretly 
cheat, OPEC benefits from Inadvertent Importer assistance. U. S. 
officials have been accused of encouraging the OPEC monopoly as a 
way to Improve the competitive position of American exporters that 
consume petroleum. The export advantage thesis is that American 
firms use less imported fuel than do European and Japanese firms 
and thus pay less for energy inputs as world prices rise above the 
controlled prices of U. S. oil and gas.
The oil PEC seems less likely to be assisted by the threat
of military action against cheaters, even though military capability
has increased greatly in OPEC. Iran has occupied three islands
at the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf, Abu Musa and the two
35islands of Tumbs, since November, 1971. This seizure of territory 
formerly controlled by the U. A. E. improves Iran's ability to
35Zuhary Mlkashi, "Cooperation Among Oil Exporting Countries 
With Special reference to Arab Countries: A Political Economy
Analysis," International Organization, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1 (Winter, 
1974), p. 13.
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blockade oil shipments out of the Persian Gulf and thereby provides 
It with a more credible threat to discipline cheating by the 
countries who rely on this route to their customers.
A Saudi Arabian arms build-up would also seem to provide it
with the potential to act as a quota enforcer In the Persian Gulf.
Professor Adelman has suggested that it has the capability to
destroy or occupy and shutdown neighboring production operations
36that threaten to force too much excess capacity burden upon it.
Rapid expansion of production in the U. A. E., for instance, could 
entice such behavior by its more powerful neighbor. The fact that 
nationalization is lagging in the smaller states of the U. A. E. 
might help induce just this kind of expansion in production. The 
companies will have access to equity crude in these areas for some 
time yet. If this oil is more profitable than the contract oil 
they buy from national companies in OPEC, international companies 
can be expected to push its extraction now.
Given the history of regional squabbles in the Middle East, 
military measures in support of the cartel are not out of the 
question. Several considerations, however, argue against their 
effective use. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran has the capability 
to engage in military action against OPEC members outside of the 
Persian Gulf. Even within that area this capacllity could just
36U. S. Congress, Senate, Multinationals Subcommittee of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Multinational Hearings, 94th Congress, 
1st session, 1975, part 11, p. 6.
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as plausibly be used to protect price chiseling favorable to one 
of these two regional rivals. The comparable military power of 
these two nations with different political and economic interests 
may neutralize the ability of either to forcibly discipline cheating 
by client states of the other.
3. Absence of Adjudication Procedure
One other problem derived from member sovereignty may plague 
a PEC. Jacob Vlner suggests that the probability of irreconciable 
conflicts arising among nation-states in any business relation Is 
greater than in a similar relation among private enterprises. When 
government management is substituted for private management in an 
international market, he asserts that any:
... sense of grievance will result much more directly 
in an issue between governments, and the fact that a 
government or governments is involved will give the 
incident a much greater potency in Inflaming public 
opinion in the countries concerned.37
Though he is referring to relations between state controlled 
(whole) economies (state trading), countries that depend on the 
cartelized commodity for a large share of foreign exchange earnings 
would certainly attach roughly equivalent significance to economic 
relations surrounding that one commodity. Even if the PEC countries 
do not trade much with each other, they are negotiating and may
37Jacob Vlner, "International Relations Between State- 
Controlled National Economies," Readings in the Theory of Inter­
national Trade (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, Inc., 1950), p. 441.
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commit to a number of agreements. For instance, subgroups in OPEC 
are discussing joint production, marketing, or transportation 
efforts, and the whole group is attempting to negotiate suitable 
price differentials for their various crude oils and may even try 
production control schemes, any of which provide an arena in which 
"grievances" can arise.
Viner suggests that governmental operation of economic 
enterprises is dangerous to the continued cooperative relations 
between colluding parties for two reasons.
First,
the boiling point of patriotic public opinion is lower 
where governments are immediately involved in controversies 
than where either they are not formally Involved at all 
or are Involved only because of their Intercession on 
behalf of Individual nationals.
The difference is due to the reward structure. Private enterprises 
are normally nonpatriotic, in that their own resources are not 
deliberately used at financial cost to private owners to serve 
national ends of power, prestige, or prosperity. As such, they 
should have much less ability to mobilize "patriotic public opinion" 
behind their grievance, the advantageous settlement of which will 
benefit relatively few, than should a national enterprise whose 
"winnings" promise to be shared to some degree with all citizens.
Second, intergovernmental relations have to a much smaller 
degree than private relations "a logical, admlnistrable, and 
generally acceptable code" whereby disputes on commercial matters
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can obtain adjudication. The disinclination of nations to relin­
quish sovereign authority over operations carried out by their
own government to an organization like a FEC was developed 
38earlier. Dispute settlement thus falls to ad hoc diplomacy, 
where the possibility of resort to force in case of an unsatis­
factory outcome biases diplomatic negotiations in favor of the 
more powerful countries. The replacement of impartial adjudication 
by biased negotiation of economic disputes works against the 
attainment of a stable monopoly equilibrium. Due to the forced 
reliance on political or diplomatic procedures, conflicts which 
arise during normal economic intercourse are less likely to be 
effectively resolved. The establishment of a more acceptable 
grievance procedure might be the most important long run benefit 
that exporters derive from bringing important buyers into their 
commodity agreements.
C. External Issues 
Issues outside the commodity cartel can enter explicitly or 
implicitly into negotiations and decisions about the activities 
of the coalition. These concerns exist apart from the cartel and 
affect it only because they are important to the same group of 
nations.
38Zuhayr Mikdashi points out that OFEC has been plagued by 
just such unwillingness in its attempt to implement conference 
resolutions aimed at setting up a high court of justice to arbi­
trate in oil and related affairs among members and to adopt a code 
of uniform petroleum laws. "The Oil Crisis: In Perspective; The
OPEC Process," Daedalus, Vol. CIV, No. 4 (Fall, 1975), p. 213.
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External Issues can strengthen the economic bond among 
members in two ways.
1. Community Interest
The general Impression seems to be that a monopoly coalition
will be benefited by the coexistence of some political Integration
among the various members. The thesis is that a prospective
chlseler must balance two kinds of costs against only one kind of
39benefit from chiseling. The increased revenues from successful 
chiseling must be weighed against the possible political costs to 
the cheater from ill will and sanctions by neighboring members if 
he is exposed, as well as the economic costs associated with the 
loss of monopoly position if a collapse of the cartel is caused. 
Presumably this concentration of political Influence on the side 
of costs from a breakup is based on the assumption that the members 
are natural allies for reasons other than the export of a common 
good. For instance, if they are compatible in language, race, 
locale, form of government, stage of development, national outlook, 
etc., they may enjoy and prefer continued friendly ties with each 
other even in the absence of this particular economic similarity.
Mikdashl points out that because of the diversity of their 
political philosophies, the history of boundary disputes even 
among the Arab countries, and their dissimilar development
39Thomas D. Willett, "Oil Import Quotas Are Not the Answer," 
The Journal of Energy and Development. Vol. I, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), 
p. 244.
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capabilities, the OPEC countries do not constitute a political coot-
40munlty as does, say, Western Europe. Disharmony due to these 
differences offsets political solidarity that might be derived from 
the common Arablsm of several meoibers. Thus, though this "community 
Interest" could add to the stabilizing tendencies of common economic 
gain in some PEC's, It probably does not in the case of OPEC.
2. Common Foes
Another supposition related to the PEC character of a cartel
Is that nations, when confronted with outside opposition aimed
explicitly at undermining their coalition, may be induced to give
greater weight to political considerations of unity than to economic
41incentives for price reductions that increase revenues. The pre­
sence of an overt threat perceived by all members can make each more 
willing to sacrifice for the common good. Israel may provide the 
focal point of a common foe for the Arab members of OPEC. If the 
interest in this common target fades or requires too much economic 
sacrifice by the non-Arab members of OPEC, this strenthenlng factor 
should dissipate. Another common target for the OPEC nations 
is the small group of preeminent multinational oil companies 
with which they nearly all deal. These seven or eight companies
^"Cooperation ...," ££. cit., p. 17.
^Willett, oj>. cit., p. 243. This expectation is possibly 
based on a fear that the outside threat will he seen more as a 
deliberate attempt by foreign powers to reimpose economic subjuga­
tion than as an attempt to return competitive efficiency to world 
trade.
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are widely viewed as having had and may still have significant 
monopsony power In dealing with oil exporter nations. Overt and 
concerted opposition by major oil consuming nations could provide 
the same kind of focal point for joint opposition by OPEC nations. 
Counter embargos of food products, for instance, or Import quotas 
or tariffs discriminatorlly applied to OPEC producers could have 
this unwanted result in the cartel. In effect, a common enemy for 
the PEC members works as an antidote to their sovereignty orienta­
tion by directing individual attention at another reason to act 
jointly.
D. Conclusion
Due to the Involved nature of many of the arguments discussed 
in this chapter, it is not possible to review concisely all of them. 
It Is possible to review the overall thrust of the foregoing 
reasoning with reference to its application to limit pricing and 
stability in OPEC. The behavior of a cartel assumed to be governed 
by direct democracy is largely a product of the bargaining interests 
and strengths of its members. The outcome expected from a bargaining 
process based only on economic self-interest can be altered by three 
characteristics resulting from the national enterprise composition 
of a PEC, nonpecuniary management goals, member sovereignty, and 
the potential influence of external Issues.
Nonpecuniary rewards are expected to take on greater signi­
ficance in the decision functions of political managers and owners. 
Under certain conditions the range of goals acceptable to cartel
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members Is expended by an appreciation of noneconomic gains. The 
configuration of prestige Interests In OPEC would seem to provide 
a clear assist to attempts to compromise the divergent economic 
preferences about the choice between a short run and a long run 
profit maximizing price or price path. Various nonpecuniary benefits 
generated by a PEC organization can further Intensify manager efforts 
to coordinate current producer activities. However, even where 
manager Interests lead to extra conciliatory efforts now, the 
economic group may suffer from long term problems connected with 
the transitory nature of political alliances.
An adherence to Individual sovereignty by members will 
narrow the choice of formal collaboration tools available to the 
PEC, and thus elevate the Importance of Informal methods of 
securing the collusion against cheaters. The governments of oil- 
importer nations provide some seemingly inadvertent and valuable 
support for price maintenance efforts by OPEC. Unless this outside 
assistance Is formalized, it should not help the oil PEC suppress 
the emotional conflicts that are more likely to arise in business 
associations among national firms than among private firms. As 
entry pressure intensifies under the encouragement of a price above 
the cost of feasible substitutes, the missing adjudication procedure 
could become a crucial weakness. If importers swing toward aggres­
sive opposition to OPEC, there is the danger of inducing the 
producers to overcome sovereignty obstacles to more stable 
coordination.
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As a general Impression, It would seem that noneconomic 
elements may enhance the ability of the OPEC group to agree in 
principle on limit pricing yet may prevent the adoption of steps 
that translate that consensus into practical operation. Expedient 
responses by importer authorities that have the side effect of 
hindering the development of alternative energy sources can com­
pensate for this deficiency in the oil PEC. Also, external threats, 
such as coordinated opposition by oil-lmporters, can provide the 
Impetus to overcome the natural reluctance of PEC members to adopt 
measures necessary to operationalize a limit pricing ambition.
Does the International Energy Agency provide this Impetus to 
formal coordination or institutionalize the Importer assistance 
to OPEC? Part III addresses these and related questions.
PART III 




The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous body 
of nineteen major oil consuming. Industrialized nations setup within 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
It is intended as a new institution to cope with the problems pre­
sented to the major oil-importing nations by the startling success 
and unity of the OPEC and OAPEC nations.1 The overriding target 
of the IEA is to allay fears that individual participants will gain 
from a relationship imposed by the oil producers and to reduce the 
dependence of industrial states on OPEC-controlled oil.
A discussion of this importer group is relevant to an analy­
sis of the oil-exporter PEC because the IEA's existence and
activities may have a significant impact on OPEC's price selection 
2and survival. Because of the relatively obscurity of the
OAPEC is the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries. It was founded in 1968 and consists of the seven Arab 
members in OPEC and Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain. This is the group 
that actually embargoed oil shipments in 1973 and 1974 and is more 
uniform in its political opposition to Israel.
2Several analyses of OPEC's future ignore or minimize the 
possibility of an effect by consumer forces on price determination. 
See, for example, Albert L. Danielsen, "Cartel Rivalry and the World 
Price of Oil," Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XLII, No. 3 (January, 
1976), pp. 407-15; Thomas D. Willett, "Oil Import Quotas Are Not the 
Answer," The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. I, No. 2 
(Spring, 1976), pp. 240-48; and Ian Smart, "The Oil Crisis: In Per­
spective; Uniqueness and Generality," Daedalus, Vol. CIV, No. 4, 
(Fall, 1975), pp. 259-80.
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oll-lmporter organization, it la useful to devote some space to 
reviewing its development and scope. The purpose of this chapter 
is to outline the status of proposed IEA programs and to offer 
some comments about their chances for adoption and success. The 
following chapter will return to the main topic of this disserta­
tion by exploring the effect the IEA can have upon the choice and 
control of the world oil price by OPEC.
A. Insurance Policy Measures
The IEA's chartering document or treaty —  the International
3Energy Program (IEP) —  contains five basic sections. Three of 
these are provisions designed to assure the participating countries 
that the chaotic and potentially disruptive atmosphere brought on 
by the oil embargo of 1973 will not be repeated. These provisions 
involve: (1) an automatic oil-sharing scheme for emergencies,
including emergency reserve and demand-restralnt obligations for 
each country (Chapters I-IV in the IEP); (2) the development of 
an extensive information system on the international oil market 
(Chapter V); and (3) periodic govemment-oil company consultations 
(Chapter VI). This section briefly explains the nature of each of 
these insurance provisions as laid out in the IEP.
3The Information on these sections, unless otherwise 
specified, is summarized from Ambassador Etienne Davignon, "The 
New International Energy Agency," The OECD Observer, January- 
February, 1975, pp. 20-25; and the text of the Agreement on an 
International Energy Program (Brussels: September 27, 1974), a
copy of which can be found in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, Serial No. 93-53, 93rd Congress;
2nd session, 1974.
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1. Supply Security Provisions 
The standby oll-sharlng system is rather detailed and precise 
in its attempt to achieve emergency self-sufficiency in a way that 
spreads the sacrifice equally for everybody. Full members, upon 
joining the IEA, provisionally agreed to the plan outlined here.
On January 19, 1976 the U. S. became legally bound to its obliga­
tions under the IEP. As of January 1, 1977, three of the seventeen
4full member states were still only provisionally bound.
a. Stockpile Requirements
One part of the system initially commits each participating 
country to the maintenance of emergency oil reserves (either as oil 
stocks, fuel switching capacity, or standby oil production capacity) 
sufficient to sustain consumption for 70 days with no net oil Imports 
(to be increased to 90 days by 1980). The Europeans and Japanese 
are in effect committed to bearing a proportionately greater share 
of the expensive stockpiling requirement. This distribution of 
the burden is due to the fact that the U. S. and Canada have 
relatively larger potential for standby oil output in the form of 
tertiary production and tar sand oil production.
In embargo situations equivalent to that in 1973, the amount 
of oil needed to meet the stated requirements should provide much
4The nations that have yet to ratify are Italy, Japan, and
Turkey. U. S. Department of State, Treaties in Forcet A List
of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the U. S. in 
Force on January 1̂, 1976 (Washington, D . C .: U . S. Government
Printing Office, 1976, p. 347, and the State Department Bulletin,
various issues during 1976.
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longer protection, since all net imports into 1GA nations would 
almost certainly not be stopped. With oil reserves equal to 70 
days of net oil Imports (as each IEA country is now supposed to 
maintain as a minimum), it would take 14 months to use up one half 
of these stockpiles, were oil supplies to be cut by 20 per cent.^ 
Since non-OAPEC countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Nigeria 
increased oil shipments in 1973-74, the actual shortfall in IEA 
imports during that six-month crisis was only about 10 per cent.
However, under the IEP definition of oil reserves all the 
stocks counted would not be available for use to the countries 
denied oil imports, unless they were willing to risk a crippling 
disruption of their petroleum distribution system. For Instance, 
the National Petroleum Council (NPC) estimated that 750 million 
barrels of oil were required at the end of 1974 to fill the U. S.g
processing and transportation system. This amount could be drained 
only at the cost of increasing disruption or dislocation in the near 
future, when it would have to be replenished. The IEP definition 
of emergency reserves includes a significant share of these operating 
stocks in all countries. Thus, the effect of a full 70 day embargo
on net oil imports would not be circumvented by the treaty
obligations.
^"IEA Tests Emergency Oil Sharing System," The OECD Observer, 
No. 83 (September/October, 1976), pp. 10-11.
6"Antitrust Shield Mulled for IEP," Oil and Gas Journal,
December 20, 1974, p. 97 and Douglas McCullough and W. E. Steger,
"A National Program for Emergency Reserves of Petroleum," (an
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The U. S. legislation ratifying the IEP —  the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-163) —  gave the 
President the standby authority to order increased output from 
domestic oil fields, and mandates the establishment of a strategic 
oil reserve. The reserve system in the bill contains two basic 
provisions. For the short term (to be built with three years) the 
Federal Energy Administration (FEA) is to acquire not less than 
150 million barrels of crude and refined products. Also, the FEA 
can require oil importers and refiners to store up to 3 per cent 
of their throughput from the preceding year. For the longer term 
(to be built in seven years after review again by Congress), the 
FEA will stockpile between 0.5 and 1 billion barrels of petroleum, 
according to sections 106 and 154-158 of the Energy Policy and Con­
servation Act of 1975 —  hereafter referred to as the Energy Policy 
Act.^ In so doing the U. S. has for now apparently opted for a 
"strategic reserve" (an in-place storage that puts it in a position 
to thwart a full embargo) rather than an "emergency reserve" (a 
smaller, less costly reserve that depends on or insures against 
only a partial embargo) as is specified in the IEP.
unpublished draft summary of "A National Emergency Energy Program," 
Energy Policy Office, October 18, 1974), p. 5.
^An explanation in digest form of the provisions of this bill 
is found in the Senate Conference Reports #94-516 or the House 
Conference Reports #94-700 of December, 1975. Also, a brief 
summary is found in Caroline E. Mayer, "President, Congress End 
Energy Battle," Oil and Gas Journal, November 17, 1975, pp. 34-36.
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In a related development the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) estimates that private storage capacity In the U. S. Is 300 
million barrels greater than during the oil embargo (up to a total
Q
of just under 2 billion barrels). Even If half of this is operating 
stock and the rest contained the same average fill ratio as in 1974 
(20-30 per cent)t commercial prudence has already set aside 30-40 
days supply of net imports (200 to 300 million barrels divided by 
7.2 million barrels per day of imports -- the average figure for 
crude and processed imports into the U. S. in 1976.
If roughly similar public plus private reserves have been 
provided for elsewhere in the IEA, the targeted protection agreed 
to in the IEP does or will soon exist. If the actual embargo 
insurance promised also exists, the psychological assurance of 
shared oil should provide a strong incentive for the members with 
high import dependence to actually use these reserves at the onset 
of an embargo to meet ongoing demands, rather than to hoard them 
for military security.
b. Sharing Commitments
A second part of the security system requires each parti­
cipating country to have a contingency program to conserve available 
oil, that can be activated in time of emergency and that is capable 
of restraining demand by the amounts specified in the Agreement.
O
"Private Oil-Storage Capacity Up 300 Million Barrels Since 
Embargo," Oil and Gas Journal. May 24, 1976, p. 36.
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The Energy Policy Act vests standby emergency power in the U. S. 
President to order gasoline rationing and to order power plants
Qand major Industrial plants to convert from oil to coal power.
It Is most convenient to detail the specified restraint amounts 
when discussing the third part of the sharing system.
This last part of the emergency scheme lays out a hardship 
sharing plan that Is to be activated when the group or any member 
experiences or is threatened with a 7 per cent reduction of its oil 
supplies (from a base figure consisting of the average of final 
consumption figures for the country from the most recent four 
quarters for which information is available). More stringent 
restraint and sharing measures are specified in the agreement If 
the deficiency reaches 12 per cent or more. For the U. S. and 
Canada the 7 per cent or 12 per cent loss and activation can be 
applied to their Eastern Regions, since their domestic markets are 
not completely integrated.^
The oil shortage percentages that activate the sharing 
scheme are based on a reduction in total oil supplies, not just in 
oil imports. As such, countries with greater import proportions 
in their domestic consumption have greater protection under the 
plan. For Instance, if the Eastern U. S. imports 60 per cent of 
its consumption, and Japan imports 90 per cent of its consumption,
9Sections 101 and 201-203 of the Energy Policy Act.
10U. S. Department of State NewB Release, International 
Energy Program (Washington, D.C.: February, 1975).
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the former must lose over 11.7 per cent of Its Imports to receive 
help, While the latter receives help when It Is denied only 7.8 
per cent of Its normal Imports.
By accepting this agreement the U. S. pledged Its own oil 
resources to a program which may be activated against Its will by 
a majority decision of an international body.^ In practice, of 
course, only under the most extreme emergency would the U. S. have 
to share any of Its domestic production with the other IEA 
countries. Its obligations could almost always be fulfilled by 
diverting some of the Imports still flowing to the U. S.
Two examples using Table 6-1 are the best way to enumerate 
the sharing procedure specified In this plan. Assume the IEA's 
total oil consumption Is 1000 barrels per day and Is divided among 
the various member countries as the percentages In the table, 
column 1 Indicate (i.e., the U. S. consumes 535 bbls/day).
First, say the oil supplies for the U. S. are cut back by 
10 per cent (53.5 blls/day), and that no other IEA country is 
embargoed (so the oil shortage for the IEA is 5.35 per cent, or 
less than 7 per cent for the group as a whole). The U. S. would 
have to cut back its own consumption by 7 per cent (37.5 bbls/day) 
with its emergency demand-restraint measures, and it would have an
11Section 251 (d) of the Energy Policy Act. Refusal to 
accept this provision before the oil crisis, blocked earlier 
international agreements on an emergency sharing system.
Joseph A. Yager and Eleanor B. Steinberg (eds.), Energy and 




APPROXIMATE RELATIVE OIL DEPENDENCE 
WITHIN THE IEA (1975)
Member
% of IEA Oil 
Consumption
% of IEA Oil 
Production
% of net IEA 
Oil Imports
Canada 5.2% 13.5% 1.1%
W. Germany 7.5% 1.1% 10.7%
Italy 4.7% 0.2% 6.9%
Japan 12.1% 0.1% 18.0%
United Kingdom 5.3% 0 7.9%
United States ' 53,5% 83.3% 38.8%
Other IEA* 11.7% 1.7% 16.6%
Total IEA 100% 99.9% 100%
Source: Calculated from data in the Monthly Energy Review of the
Federal Energy Administration (FEA), various Issues; Oil 
and Gas Journal, July 26, 1976.
* Includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
182
"allocation right" to 16 bbls/day (53.5 - 37.5) from the other IEA
countries. These other countries would either restrain their own
demand or draw down their emergency reserves, or both, in amounts
calculated on the basis of their individual dally consumption, and
sufficient to together provide the U. S. with 16 barrels of oil
per day. For example, Japan would be expected to provide the U. S.
"shortfall" times its share of the non-U. S., IEA oil consumption 
121(16 x 1Q00 _ » 4.2 bbls/day), Germany 2.6 bbls/day, the U. K.
1.8 bbls/day, Italy 1.6 bbls/day, Canada 1.8 bbls/day, and the 
"others" 4 bbls/day.
Second, assume only the three Individually listed European 
countries suffer 60 per cent cut back in their oil supplies (60 
per cent of 175 bbls/day equals a loss of 105 bbls/day). Since 
the group's supply is cut by more than 7 per cent (by 10.5 per 
cent), all members must reduce their own consumption by 7 per cent 
to get their "permissible consumption." "Total permissible con­
sumption" for the group would then be 930 bbls/day (.1000 x 0.93).
The embargoed countries, though, would still not be receiving the 
portion they would be entitled to out of the oil available to the 
group. Thus, each would have a "supply right" equal to its "per­
missible consumption" less its "emergency reserve drawdown 
obligation" ("erdo"), which would have to be supplied by other 
members. The "erdo" is equal to the individual country's share 
of the total emergency reserve (70 days of imports for the country 
divided by 70 days of imports for the whole group) times the group's
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"shortfall.’1 The "shortfall" is equal to "total permissible 
consumption" less total actual supplies [930 - (1000 - 105) =
35 bbls/day]. Note that each country's emergency reserve or 
Import share is given in column 3 of the table.
In this situation the "erdo" for Germany is 0.107 times 35 
bbls/day or 3.7 bbls/day. This says that when Germany's oil supply 
is cut from 75 bbls/day to 30 bbls/day it would: (1) restrain
demand to 69.8 bbls/day (75 x 0.93); (2) draw down its emergency
reserves at the rate of 3.7 bbls/day; and (3) be entitled to 36.1
bbls/day [69.8 - (3.7 + 30)] from other, more fortunate, IEA 
countries. Other embargoed members would have equivalent "supply 
rights." Conversely, the U. S. would have an obligation to supply 
some of the crude to fulfill the commitment to these countries.
Its "erdo" would be 0.388 times 35 or 13.6 bbls/day. Its "per­
missible consumption" would be 0.93 times 535 or 497.6 bbls/day.
So, it must drawdown Its emergency reserves at the rate of 13.6 
bbls/day and must allocate 51 bbls/day [13.6 + (0.07)(535)] to
others. Japan, Canada, and the "other IEA" countries in the IEA
would have similar obligations totaling 32.8 bbls/day. Combined 
with the "erdo" of the three embargoed countries (8.9 bbls/day) 
and the 40 per cent of normal supplies they still get, Germany, 
Italy, and Britain would each have available 93 per cent or their 
normal demand (69.8, 43.7, and 49.3 bbls/day, respectively). If 
the group's emergency reserve depletion of 35 bbls/day persisted 
long enough to use up half of the total reserves, the Governing
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Board of the Agency Is directed to propose new measures, as say 
further demand-restraint, to meet the situation. Unanimous approval 
Is required to Impose these extra obligations on the Participating 
Countries, though.
If allocation Is required, this whole emergency procedure Is 
to be carried out by the oil companies operating under IEA super­
vision, The petroleum products are to be distributed, Insofar as 
Is possible, through normal channels and at market prices. Dead­
lines for Implementing these emergency measures are set within 
the Agreement at 15 days after the finding of reduction. In effect,
the oil companies have the responsibility for devising and carrying
12out the practical side of these measures. The Energy Policy Act
of 1975, the Justice Department, and Federal Trade Commission have
all granted the U. S. oil companies participating in this coordina-
13tion scheme Immunity from antitrust prosecution.
12The Agency's managing board approved an "Emergency Manage­
ment Manual," characterized as a detailed "pushbutton" energy 
sharing program in May, 1976. "International Energy Agency Backs 
oj>. cit. Its details have not been made public. Presumably 
the adoption of this manual reflects the fact that the major com­
panies have completed drafting a cooperative allocation plan.
^Section 252 of the Energy Policy Act and "U. S. Firms 
Join IEA Supply Program," Oil and Gas Journal, April 19, 1976, 
p. 43.
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c. Importance of Specified Procedures
The fact that this emergency allocation plan Is in place 
should have at least two effects upon future behavior related to 
the oil market. First, it is expected to deter both general and 
specific embargoes in the future, since the sharing plan auto­
matically renders an embargo directed at one (or a subgroup of
14IEA members) an embargo against a prepared group of all seventeen. 
Second, it reduces the leverage that an embargo threat gives oil- 
exporters on the direction of the national policies pursued by 
heavily oll-import dependent industrial economies. The political 
benefits of oil derived influence in certain Western nations 
(resulting from the vitalness of the import commodity controlled 
by OPEC or OAPEC) should thereby be reduced.^ In other words, part 
of the political attractiveness of the oil cartel —  ability to
14Although Norway is not part of the automatic sharing 
scheme, its surplus oil production capacity being developed in the 
North Sea would probably be available in any serious emergency to 
help the IEA weather a supply interruption, much as the U. S. aided 
a European Community oil sharing scheme during the Suez crisis in 
1956.
15R. D. Hansen comments in two different articles that the 
OPEC countries have derived just such a political benefit from their 
collective action. A portion of their status and Influence with 
other LDC's is based on the fact that "Most Asians, Africans, and 
Latin Americans still see the situation as oil-exporter 'David* 
bringing down the industrial giant 'Goliath,'" which in turn is due 
to "latent hostility toward the world's rich countries that enables 
the South [a euphenism for LDC's] to place a premium on the psychic 
rewards of seeing Europe and Japan in periods of panic which out­
weigh their own suffering." "The Politics of Scarcity," The U. S. 
and the Developing World; Agenda for Action 1974, ed. James W. Howe 
(New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 46; and "The Political Economy of
North South Relations -- How Much Change?" International Organiza­
tion. Vol. XXIX, No. 4 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 926-27.
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alter policy or Induce panic In Importing nations —  is hereby 
reduced. This in-place sharing scheme should cause a commen­
surate weakening of the bond among the oil-exporting nations.
2. Information and Joint Regulation
The information system and the provision of recurring oil 
company-country consultations is intended to provide another kind 
of insurance. The OECD secretariat operates the information system 
on a permanent basis and collects two types of information. One 
kind covers the activities of the oil companies and includes such 
information as corporate structure, crude access, rates of pro­
duction, and prices. The other kind of data is collected on each 
country to insure the efficient operation of the emergency measures. 
It includes information on such things as oil consumption and supply, 
demand-restraint measures, and reserve levels.
Ulf Lantzke suggests that, until the oil crisis in 1973, 
the OECD countries worked under the assumption that a reliable
16assessment of the world market situation would be easy to obtain. 
During the crisis this proved to be untrue. Though these govern­
ments did exchange information readily and the major oil companies 
managed to more or less equally distribute the available crude oil, 
assumptions regarding the supply situation had to be constantly 
revised. The continuous information system and assessment on this
^"The OECD and Its International Energy Agency," Daedalus, 
Vol. CIV, No. 4 (Pall, 1975), p. 219-20.
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one market by the IEA should prevent some of the uncertainty and 
anxiety that surrounded the last embargo from worrying the govern­
ments of these oil-importing nations In another crisis. Further, 
it provides for collection of information that is required by members 
to monitor how well .their collaborators are abiding by their commit­
ments to the group.
The consultation provision seems to have been the major 
requirement of several of the smaller countries for their parti­
cipation in the IEA. The countries that are not bases for one of 
the multinational oil companies were (and probably are still) 
concerned about their inability to supervise the activities of 
the companies on which they depend so heavily. In response some 
have tried to build up their own national companies —  ENI in Italy, 
OMV in Austria, Statoll in Norway, and Deminex in Germany are 
examples —  to achieve more confidence in a secure supply. This 
provision in the IEP works towards the same target by guaranteeing 
the smaller countries the same degree of information on oil prices 
and emergency availability as the large countries."^ Further, the 
Agreement legally commits the oil companies to follow a policy which 
is coordinated with that of the various governments in an emergency.
■^Sections 254 and 501-506 of the Energy Policy Act 
permit the Secretary of State to transmit this information 
that is collected by the FEA to the IEA.
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3. Strength of the Embargo Protection
In sum, assuming the participating nations fulfill their 
obligations, three features of the IEP promise to make it easier 
for industrial nations to withstand an embargo in the future. First, 
an international governmental organization, rather than international 
oil companies that are subject to pressure from and influences by 
countries that have the crude oil these companies (with their expen­
sive tankers, refineries, and marketing outlets) must have, will 
make allocations. Second, the agreement provides a certainty on the 
part of member countries that even in the event of an embargo they 
will have access to a known amount of oil. Third, the demand- 
restralnt feauture serves to assure all countries that each is 
cutting back its demand appropriately.
The narrow functional objectives of these sections, the
similarity of national interests (an absence of which afflicts the
efforts of many U, N. economic bodies), and the abandonment of the
rule of unanimity (a problem in OECD and OPEC) are features which
18should facilitate the success of the IEA. Several further con­
siderations, suggested from the earlier analysis of intergovernmental 
bodies, support this prediction. First, the initial recognition of 
the importance of relative competitive or economic status within 
the IEA, and the design and adoption of an elaborate and automatic 
mechanism to prevent oil supply disruptions from altering this 
order, Institutionalizes a constraint to the cooperation among
^®Lantzke, 0£. cit., pp. 225-26.
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nations. The failure of OPEC to acknowledge and Incorporate this 
Imperative Initially, may be an Important flaw In Its makeup.
Second, the sharing scheme within the IEA Is a standby arrange­
ment, to be used In emergencies only. In effect, the participating 
countries do not have to act on their oil sharing commitments to 
each other except in a crisis situation. In time, the continuous 
coordination of prices or output restrictions may well require 
decision and actions by OPEC members to help or purposely avoid 
injuring rival producers. The consumer group Is a more passive, 
insurance policy alliance, while the producer group is involved 
in an active, continuous process of collaboration, probably 
eventually requiring the active suppression of individual interest, 
even in normal operation. Third, the supply side coordination is 
being taken over by new national companies, with their inherent 
coordination limitations as indicated in the previous chapter and 
the last part of Chapter Four. The IEA emergency coordination scheme 
on the other hand relies on the established oil industry for the 
system's practical implementation. It recognizes the importance 
for successful joint action of Insuring that the interests of 
the companies are made parallel with those of its members. Thus, 
abstracting from considerations like the characteristics of the 
crude oil (which may on balance aid the exporter cartel), the 
structure of the importer organization suggests that the IEA has 
several advantages over OPEC as a viable economic alliance. The
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provisions of the IEP reviewed In this section will have little 
direct influence on the price charged by the oil cartel, however.
B. Import Reduction Measures 
In pursuit of its second basic aim, the treaty for the IEA 
contains a provision calling for long term energy cooperation to 
reduce oil consumption and to stimulate the development of alter­
native energy sources (Chapter VII). The intermediate term aim 
of this endeavor is to shift world oil trade from a seller's market 
back towards a buyer's market by reducing the demand for OPEC oil. 
Since the IEA countries account for roughly 80 per cent of the 
world's oil Imports, they have the collective demand side stature 
to accomplish this aim. The long term goal, because of the limited 
supply of crude oil, is to ease the replacement of petroleum as the 
dominant source of the world's energy. To coordinate efforts In
this direction, the Agency's Governing Board has adopted a program
19that contains three principle elements. These elements are: (1)
an obligation from participating governments to push energy con­
servation efforts in their respective countries; (2) an agreement 
to work towards removal of obstacles which might impede the 
accelerated development of indigenous fossil fuel resources; and 
(3) several specific measures to stimulate the development of
19,,IEA Adopts a Long Terra Energy Cooperation Programme,"
The OECD Observer, January-February, 1976, p. 32.
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alternative energy sources. These obligations are less precisely 
specified than are those relating to embargo protection. The purpose 
of this examination is to provide a background for discussing how 
these various provisions might influence the monopoly power of the 
oil-exporter PEC.
1. Joint Conservation
The energy conservation obligations are recognized as only
a partial measure in the attempt to reduce OPEC’s monopoly power.
Because of the long lead times required to find and institute the
use of substitute oil and energy sources, conservation is the only
near term way to reduce dependence of OPEC oil. Energy conservation
is specifically defined by the OECD as reduction in the amount of
energy consumed without significant reduction in Gross Domestic
Product, general standard of living, or level of personal comfort.
It is restricted to a reduction in the wasteful use of energy and
20an increase in the efficiency of conversion and end use. Parts 
of the conservation effort do require lead-in times for the conver­
sion to a more energy efficient capital stock. But the avoidance 
of calling for the sacrifice of personal utility in the obligations 
should make their realization more certain, if less significant.
Feasible aggregate conservation in the next five to ten 
years may be itself be far from sufficient to bring real collective
20Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Energy Prospects to 1985, Vol. I (Paris: OECD, 1974), pp. 24-25.
192
21pressure on OPEC. But, coordinated obligations should Insure that
one country's conservation Is not offset by another's waste. This
provision can enhance the ability of Individual IEA governments to
push conservation efforts. For Instance, net imports of oil were
down from 11 to 20 per cent in six IEA countries in 1975 from 1974
levels, down 1 to 10 per cent in six other IEA nations, and up 1
to 5 per cent in three IEA nations, while for the IEA area as
22a whole they were down 6 per cent. Though these differences might 
reflect temporarily varying conservation capacities and recession 
depths, established obligations are Intended to assure that each 
country will exert similar conservation effort. The latter situ­
ation, in turn, might be expected to induce individual countries 
to more completely fulfill their Import conservation capabilities. 
The establishment of fuelrefficiency standards for autos in the
U. S. is a policy that works toward fulfilling these long
23term conservation obligations.
The more recent worry with energy conservation efforts
24seems to be that interest In eliminating waste may fade. Some 
21Supra, p. 145.
^"IEA Adopts o£. cit., p. 32.
23Section 301 of the Energy Policy Act requires that the 
fleets that domestic automobile makers and Importers sell average 
18 mpg in 1978, 19 mpg in 1979, and 20 mpg in 1980, and 27.5 mpg 
in 1985.
^"Conservation of Energy: How Are Countries Performing?"
The OECD Observer, No. 83, (September/October, 1976), pp. 4-9.
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items such as liquor and tobacco, for instance, seem to follow a
pattern of a drop in consumption just after Increases in government
taxation and adverse advertising, only to be followed by a rebound
25in demand as consumers adjuBt to the higher price. The unusual 
result of this behavior is that short run demand elasticity is 
higher than intermediate and long run demand elasticity. To avoid 
the same pattern in oil consumption, importer authorities may feel 
compelled to devise ways for periodically rekindling conservation 
interest.
2. Supply Addition Obstacles
The agreement to remove obstacles that might impede the
accelerated development of indigenous energy resources seems to be
the least firm of the IEA thrusts to date. Soon after the
establishment of the IEA the U. S. companies were trying to pressure
Norway, with its huge potential reserves in the North and Norwegian
Seas, to join by threatening that her failure to do so would limit
access to U. S. offshore drilling equipment. Norway refused to
become a regular member of the IEA because its government Insisted
on the exclusive right to limit and control the development and
26output of its offshore areas. To the extent that Norway's 
refusal to join inhibits the development of its offshore reserves,
25Ian Smart, oj>. cit., p. 265.
26The New York Times, November 13, 1974. The chief Factors 
in this insistence seem to have been the environmental concerns 
expressed by its important fishing industry, and the attempt to 
assure the U. S. S. R. of its promise that the oil rigs would not
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the IEA goal of encouraging the development of substitutes for OPEC 
crude Is frustrated.
Also, the cooperation package under study requires a major 
shift In the exploration policies of several European members. This 
package involves a commitment that no preference be given to
27national companies in the allocation of development projects. How­
ever, current license allocation policies in Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland require that exploration companies, if not of 
national origin, should be nationally registered. Policies, such 
as the one in the United Kindgom which gives the national oil 
company (BNOC) first refusal over unlicensed (leased) blocks in 
the North Sea adjacent to ones where oil is found or in a block 
where an operator wishes to retire, can dampen private incentive 
to explore in IEA territory. Companies that help finance and 
explore a lease lose out on the right to capitalize on the potential 
value of proximate areas which their finds make promising.
The major obstacle to added indigenous supply to which 
most IEA members point (in defense of their own policies) is 
the control of the price of domestically produced crude oil In the
become observation posts for other Western nations. The New York 
Times, September 11, 1974, and November 1, 1974.
^"IEA Foundering on National Interest," Oil and Gas 
Journal, January 5, 1976, p. 57; and "Drilling Delay Likely for 
New U. K. Blocks" Oil and Gas Journal, March 7, 1977, p. 83.
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28U.S. The belief Is that oil companies are thereby encouraged to 
concentrate on more profitable non-U. S. exploration and production. 
Even the U. S. program to Increase domestic crude oil prices at 
up to 10 per cent per year would continue to lag behind world 
prices which could Increase at or close to that rate for several 
years.
The cooperative agreement among the IEA representatives Is 
Intended to allow wider, more profitable access to and thus swifter 
development of Indigenous crude oil resources. Political constraints 
Imposed by insular national interests promise to make the negotiating 
costs of achieving this degree of cooperation quite high. In view 
of the vulnerability the oil-exporter PEC may have to the pressure 
of entry Into the world energy market, the pay off to efforts 
aimed at changing national licensing and price control laws can be 
substantial.
3. Indigenous Fuel Development
The measures to stimulate investment In energy development 
involve: (1) a project-by-project approach; (2) a common minimum
safeguard price (CMSP) of U. S. $7 per barrel for imported oil; 
and (3) a joint strategy for research and development. The pro- 
ject-by-project approach denotes efforts by expert groups within 
an IEA subgroup to develop and execute cooperative programs in
7.R"IEA Head: U. S. Key to Energy Economy," Oil and Gas
Journal, April 18, 1977, pp. 24-25; and "Reducing OECD Countries' 
Dependence on Imported Oil," The OECD Observer, No. 80 (March/
April, 1976), p. 29.
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29sixteen specific areas. Those areas where joint programs were 
In progress In 1976 Include coal technology and nuclear reactor 
safety. Those areas where cooperative efforts had advanced through 
the planning stage by early 1976 were radioactive waste management, 
controlled thermonuclear fusion, conservation, solar heating and 
cooling, hydrogen extraction from water, energy from municipal 
and Industrial waste, and waste heat utilization. Seven more 
areas for the exploration of mutual Interests In cooperative work 
were approved In November, 1975. These are the study of high 
temperature reactors for process heat, geothermal energy, solar 
power systems, wave power, wind energy, ocean thermal energy, and 
biomass conversion.
The long lead-in times required to institute application 
of the products of these research efforts means their effect on the 
oil market will not be significant until the 1980’s at the earliest. 
The development and funding of all these projects would commit the 
IEA nations to a policy of adjusting to high energy prices and to 
a comprehensive and diversified energy resource use program. As 
such, future excessive dependence on one energy source, with its 
dangerous market control potential, is less likely. At the same 
time these countries seem to hereby be acquiring a vested Interest
29For a summary of progress in those areas as of the end of 
1975 see The International Energy Agency With Special Emphasis on 
the Subgroup on Energy Conservation Working Patty, Division of 
Buildings and Inudstry, Office of Conservation, Energy Research and 
Development Administration, December, 1975.
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In continuing the present level of oil prices. Olsen suggests 
that this program is based on an extrapolation of the 1973-43 
conditions, which may not persist.
A provision with the same inherent dangers and diversifica­
tion benefits is the $7 CMSP. The intent of this measure is 
threefold. First, it seeks to insure new domestic Investment in 
conventional sources of fossil fuels against predatory pricing by 
OPEC members, should they decide to exercise their significant cost 
advantage in the face of this new competition. Second, it serves 
to spread the risk of providing this insurance to most of the 
industrialized world. If the OPEC price does fall below $7 per 
barrel, industries in nations like Japan and Germany would be 
prevented from gaining competitive advantage over U. S., British, 
and Canadian energy users, who would be committed to higher cost 
domestic sources. Third, it should prevent a surge in the quan­
tity of domestic demand should the world oil price fall very far.
If permitted, a resurgence of consumption would return the IEA to 
a vulnerable level of dependence on unreliable oil sources.
The concern with this consumption stimulating possibility 
must have outweighed the efficiency advantages of protecting 
domestic producers with direct subsidies (rather than the CMSP) 
in the minds of the IEA directors. The across-the-board guarantee
30U. S. Congress, Senate, Multinational Subcommittee of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Multinational Hearings, 94th Congress, 
1st session, 1975, part 11, p. 231.
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In the CMSP can shelter high cost producers and can give excessive 
profits to low cost producers. If the price does dip below the 
CMSP, however, the energy consumer, rather than the government and 
the general taxpayer, subsidize the domestic producer.
The IEA understanding commits member nations to use quotas,
31tariffs, and/or variable levies to implement the CMSP. The 
tariff or levy guarantee should not protect oil-exporters. If the 
world price falls to say $6 per barrel, the OPEC exporter gets the 
$6, the domestic oil buyer pays $7, and the importer government 
collects $1 per barrel of imported oil. The use of a quota system 
to implement CMSP could present problems. The particular advantage 
of the quota tool, ability to restrain even highly inelastic import 
demand to a target level, would appear unimportant to the CMSP 
intent of promoting domestic energy investment. Further, the 
complicated task of designing and revising quota amounts so as to 
insure the floor of $7 per barrel would make it an administratively 
expensive tool to use to implement the CMSP.
The multiple purposes of this measure may severely limit 
its effectiveness at achieving any one of these purposes. More 
importantly, the Energy Policy Act specifically states:
31David B. Johnson, "Analysis of the Common Minimum Safe­
guard Price and Policy Elaboration" (preliminary draft of an 
unpublished paper, April 22, 1975), p. 1.
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The President shall have no authority, under this Act 
[or the Emergency Petroleum Act of 1973]..., to pre­
scribe minimum prices for crude oil (or any classification 
thereof), residual fuel oil, or any refined petroleum
product.32
Without amendment, this wording seems to preclude U. S. Government 
participation in a price guarantee, whether it be domestically 
or internationally instituted. Forbldance of permission to set 
a price floor is probably aimed more at preventing U. S. parti­
cipation in an oil ICA, but it also may prevent CMSP participation. 
Political considerations appear to be important in this prohibition. 
The practical difficulty of Identifying and insuring that all 
foreign crude carries a $7 price leaves room for importer and 
refiner cheating in their use of such a fungible commodity. Also, 
that activity may put the Department of Interior in the 1980’s
in the same predicament as the Department of Agriculture in 
33the 1950's. Consumer reaction might make the enforcement of a 
high internal price for so vital a commodity impossible for some 
IEA governments, if the world oil price does break. This danger 
would seem most likely in the case of countries like Japan and 
Italy, which will have little domestic production to protect and 
thus, little domestic support for a policy of artifically high 
prices.
^Section 402.
33Arthur Okun, Multinational Hearings, part 11, op. cit.,
p. 55.
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Because of the enforcement difficulties that the CMSP may 
encounter, its ability to avert a resurgence in the IEA demand 
for oil imports, should the cartel price break, could be more 
apparent than real. Uncertainty about implementation may also 
undermine the guarantee it is supposed to provide to domestic 
investors. The latter drawback is less likely if the participating 
governments do ratify the CMSP proposal; they would appear to be 
committed to guaranteeing high cost energy investments even if the 
final consumers cannot be forced to pay the equivalent of $7 per 
barrel of oil for it.
The overall research and development strategy of the IEA 
seems to involve two key points, one less controversial than the 
other. First, in developing cooperative programs "the lead 
country or organization" approach seems to have been adopted as 
the most effective. Individual countries are ahead in the develop­
ment of specific kinds of technology —  the U. S. in solar and 
nuclear energy production, the Europeans in the field of coal 
gasification and liquificatlon, the Scandinavians in the field
of home insulation, and the Japanese in the field of cleaning
34stack emissions of coal burning electricity generation. The 
lead country in the cooperative efforts apparently takes over 
responsibility for further efforts under joint government auspicies
34Cooperative Approaches to World Energy Problems (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 36.
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In the development of technology In Its comparative advantage 
field. Other Interested IEA government agencies are apparently 
expected to provide support research and funds In exchange for 
access to advances.
The second part of the R & D strategy —  total member
access to all new energy developments sponsored by the agency —
has led to proprietary concerns over Intellectual advances. The
provision Is obviously Intended to speed the widest possible
adoption of energy alternatives and savings devices, and thereby
Intensify the cutback pressure on OPEC production. However, by
undercutting the rationale for patents it does risk the opposite
effect —  slowing the spread of new technologies. In legally
reserving the right to use a new innovation to the Inventor of
35record, patent laws serve two purposes. First, they stimulate 
inventive activity by guaranteeing the right to collect the 
monopoly rewards for the commercial utilization of the invention 
for some definite period. Second, they speed the widespread 
introduction of the new technology by reducing the need to keep 
it secret so as to preserve access to these rewards. An IEA 
commitment to share breakthroughs, that does not adequately 
protect commercial or national proprietary interests of the 
developer, may induce secrecy and the concomitant slowing of the 
disclosure of oil saving technology.
35F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), pp. 380-82.
C. Summary Assessment
Because of the newness of the IEA and the long range nature 
of many of its programs, an empirical assessment of its effective-* 
ness is not yet possible. The various comments about its programs 
reviewed or developed in this chapter provide some insights, though, 
about where consumer cooperation should be most effective. The 
detailed development of the mutual aid scheme for emergencies along 
with the current progress toward its implementation promises a 
reduction of the importance of the embargo factor in world oil 
market relations. Governments in oil-importing countries should 
have greater certainty and confidence about their ability to 
minimize the effect of an embargo. The accumulated financial 
surplus of OPEC and OAPEC nations may increase their ability to 
apply an embargo. However, oil exports would have to be withheld 
for a much longer period than was done in 1973-74, if the IEA 
sharing scheme works as it is designed.
The information and consultation sections facilitate 
collaboration by increasing the ability of peers to monitor both 
each others1 diligence and the oil companies' performance. The 
danger of these provisions is that they may also lay the groundwork 
for development of a sort of permanent international regulatory 
agency along the lines of the U. S. Federal Power Commission. Oil 
may have come to occupy a position in modern society similar to 
that of the railroads or public utilities —  "vitally affected with 
the public interest." However, the sale of petroleum lacks the
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common property justification for regulation that oil producing 
has. Sales by the industry have been effectively conducted on a 
competitive basis, except in emergencies. With the added dif­
ficulty of the prospect of regulation by a committee of sovereigns, 
rather than a single government, this extension of these provisions 
should be considered only as a last resort.
Enough data to permit the preparation of an overall assess- 
ment of the effectiveness of the import reduction measures in 
various stages of implementation by the IEA has not yet accumulated. 
Even if those measures together have the capability to aggravate 
the price control task of OPEC in time, if is far from certain all 
will be tried. Aggregate conservation potential in limited for at 
least the next five to ten years in the extent to which it can put 
pressure on the entire cartel. Attempts to remove obstacles to 
International exploration and development of the indigenous crude 
oil reserves of individual members may be frustrated by participants 
clinging to nationalistic priority. Joint sponsorship of alterna­
tive energy source development in danger of institutionalizing 
the current high level of relative energy prices and/or of violating 
porprietary reasons for allowing the market to distribute innova­
tions. The distinct possibility exists that the CMSP will not be 
adopted and that even it if is, it will not be enforced should 
the need arise.
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If the IEA programs could be made to work approximately 
as well as their framers Intend, they can have several effects 
on the oll-exporter PEC. The price reduction Influences of some 
IEA programs is the subject of the last half ot the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SOME EFFECT OF EXISTING AND POTENTIAL IEA 
PROGRAMS ON POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PRICING
The International Energy Agency achieved legitimacy during 
1976, when most of Its provisional participants (including the U. S.) 
had enacted enabling legislation for at least some of its programs. 
The emergency sharing scheme, Information, and consultation pro­
visions promise to help its members weather another oil embargo 
with less anxiety and discomfort. Plans for long range joint efforts 
that are before the participants are not as well developed and may 
enjoy less enthusiastic support. Though the IEA is in a sense a 
consumer PEC, it should be plagued with fewer of the internal prob­
lems that go with that composition than should OPEC, because of the 
more moderate scope of these collusive activities. More aggressive 
actions by the IEA (or major consumer nations) have been contemplated, 
however.1 The task of this chapter is to analyze the impact that
Several available studies offer brief discussion on how 
overt importer pressure, say through the use of quotas, tariffs, or 
changes in Interest rates, may Influence the oil Income of the pro-; 
ducing governments. See, Hendrik S. Houthakker, The World Price of 
Oil; A Medium-Term Analysis (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute of Public Policy Research, October, 1976), pp. 29-34; 
Richard Schmalensee, "Resource Exploitation Theory and the Behavior 
of the Oil Cartel." European Economic Review, Vol. VII, No. 3 (April, 
1976), pp. 271-73; or Giorgio Basevl and Alfred Steinberr, "The 1974 
Increase in Oil Price: Optimum Tariff on Transfer Problem,"
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various roles assigned and suggested for the IEA might have on the 
durability and price selection of the political-economic coalition 
of oil-exporters.
The presence of two formal organizations, one representing 
most of the crude oil export capability in the world and the other 
representing most of the petroleum Import demand in the world, im­
plies the evolution of a bilateral monopoly in this international 
market. Indeed, the one clause of the IEP that was not mentioned 
in the previous chapter is a recommendation that participating 
nations endeavor to promote cooperation with oil producing countries 
and with other oil consuming countries. That provision may be 
envisioned as only an attempt to portray the IEA as something other 
than a brazen adversary of OPEC. However, if adopted by the member­
ship, it does imply that the consumer group might not be opposed to 
the development of a bilateral monopoly arrangement with the producer 
group.
This chapter argues that a bilateral bargaining approach
2cannot be expected to provide any real benefit to oil consumers.
Welfwirtschaftliches Archiv., Heft 2 (1976), pp. 264-70. With the 
exception of a warning by Houthakker, these discussions overlook 
the difficulty that a group of democratic nations (as compose the 
IEA) may have in implementing unified and daring responses con­
cerning so vital a commodity as oil, or that such responses may 
only serve to solldfy the OPEC group politically.
^For a contrary opinion, see Richard Kosobud, "An Inter­
national Oil Agreement Through Bilateral Bargaining," (an unpub­
lished paper received from the author in September, 1976).
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Moreover, the political-economic composition of the oil-exporter 
cartel amplifies the disadvantages of that response to IEA depen­
dence on oil Imports. This argument has two components. One, 
producers would hold the bargaining advantage for at least the next 
several years, and even in the long run, the IEA gains little and 
OPEC much from the establishment of a formal international commo­
dity agreement for oil. Two, negotiated prices, amounts, and 
enforcement obligations foreclose a real opportunity that several 
IEA programs have for undermining the resolve of the oil-exporter 
PEC to maintain the present real price level.
A. Formal Bilateral Responses 
Bilateral monopoly occurs when a monopolistic seller 
trades with a monopsonlstic buyer. OPEC now has the power to set 
the price at which major exporters sell crude oil. Earlier chapters 
question whether this agreement is durable enough to permit that 
organization to engage in give-and-take bargaining with a unified 
adversary. Pending subsequent support, assume that if the proper 
inducement arises, OPEC would be granted the necessary flexibility 
on behalf of its members.
1. Bilateral Cartel Bargaining 
Suppose the major oil consuming countries set up exclusive 
government purchasing agents for imports, whose activities are
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coordinated through the IEA.^ With that structure authorities In 
the Importer nations would be able to directly limit the demand 
for OPEC exports and thereby be In a position to engage In bi­
lateral monopoly bargaining with the seller group. Figure 7-1 can 
be used to depict the preferences of the two sides. Let HCQ repre­
sent the marginal cost curve for the seller group.^ At prices 
which the sellers considered fixed, MCQ indicates the aggregate 
quantities that would be supplied. A dominant buyer group may then 
regard MCg as its average cost curve. Since the purchase of increased 
quantities requires paying more for the intramarginal units as well 
as the extra unit, the monopsonist faces a marginal cost curve (MC^) 
above its average cost curve (MCS).
Assume that the monopsonlstic buyer immediately resells 
the commodity it purchases without incurring any further production 
cost and that this agent is the sole outlet from which downstream 
consumers can acquire the product. The average value of a barrel of
^The Energy Policy Act directs the Federal Energy Admin­
istration to study and report to the U. S. Congress on the first 
part of this proposal. A franchised monopsony or oligopsony of 
international oil companies, rather than importer governments, seems 
to be excluded for two reasons. One, there is the fear that the 
companies do not have the leverage or will to bargain very success­
fully with oil producing nations. Two, there is a widespread con­
viction that profit making companies will not pass-through, as fully 
to consumers, the gains they might extract in bilateral bargaining 
with OPEC as would a public agency.
^For a justification of rising marginal coBt, see footnote 
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oil to the monopsonlst Is equal to the price at which It can be 
resold. The average value product curve (AVP) Is then Identical 
to the end product (oil imports) demand curve. Marginal to this 
curve Is a marginal revenue product curve (MRP), which shows the 
revenue associated with buying and then reselling an extra unit of 
the commodity. The monopsonlst would elect to operate at output 
and to pay the seller P^ If It were a profit maximizer, for 
there Its marginal cost equals Its marginal revenue.^ If the 
monopsonlst preferred competitive distribution, it would choose a 
price Pc and induce the seller group to increase output to Qc .
In today's world oil market, buyer preferences do not 
dominate. Prices are set by the sellers and consumers select 
quantities along AVP. This curve therefore, represents the average 
revenue available to the seller. The curve that is marginal to AVP 
(MRP) represents the additional revenue derived from extra sales by 
the monopolist. The profit maximizing monopolist will Impose a 
price of P® and an output of Qs on its customers. The task for a 
monopsonlst In this situation becomes one of inducing the monopolist 
to lower the price it sets.
A monopsonlst's bargaining leverage is its ability to 
limit the demand presented to the monopolist. The resolve of
5This goal would permit consumer cartel governments to 
distribute the monopoly gain to their own second stage consumers 
by means of subsidies, tax reductions, rationing, etc.
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democratic governments In industrial nations to force constituents 
accustomed to an energy Intensive life style to accept artificial 
shortages of oil in hopes of pressuring OPEC to reduce its prices 
is probably not very great.® Also, if this government buying opera­
tion follows the procedure of other public purchasing activities, 
winners and prices must be publicly announced.^ Information the 
producer cartel could use to monitor its price is thus provided. 
Hence, political constraints on officials can make the leverage of 
importer governments in formal, bilateral bargaining rather weak.
If the exporter cartel can suppress chiseling, even a 
successful conservation program in IEA countries may not be very 
efficient at driving oil prices down. Suppose the monopsonlst 
reduces the Import demand at each price by 25 percent, depicted in 
Figure 7-2a by a shift of the AVP curve taken from Figure 7-1 to 
AVP'. The commensurate change in MRP to MRP' decreases the profit 
maximizing quantity for the monopolist (Qs to Qg *) much more than 
the profit maximizing price (P® to P®’). Actions which do not 
change the elasticity of demand at given prices generally have this
®This concern has been expressed by Congressmen during 
hearings in which proposals to Impose reductions were discussed.
XI. S. Congress, Senate, Multinational Subcommittee of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Multinational Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st 
session, 1975, part 11.
^Requirements for published bidding results are usually 



















result.® Total revenue for the monopolist Is cut significantly, 
but, since the product is a nonrenewable resource, the sale foregone 
now is not lost forever, or Is not as damaging to sellers as it 
might be.
Successful conservation by Importers may even reduce the
elasticity of demand for petroleum.^ Since crude oil is used in a
variety of ways, the least necessary consumptions of petroleum will
be curtailed most under a general conservation regime. The composite
elasticity derived from the demands that are still serviced is made
less than was the case before limitations were imposed. Figure 7-2b
demonstrates that, under conditions otherwise identical to those
shown in Figure 7-2a, the profit maximizing price for the monopolist
could be increased (from Pa to Ps") if the assumed 25 percent importm ®
reduction at the initial price results In a less elastic average 
value product (AVPM) or demand curve.̂  In either case the key
®For a formal proof of this outcome, see Joan Robinson, 
The Economics of Imperfect Competition (2nd Ed.; New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 67-70. Paraphrasing Professor Robinson, 
the extent to which monopoly price must decrease will depend on the 
rate at which costs are rising and the amount of the decrease in 
demand. Only if the monopolist's marginal cost rises sharply with 
output (is quite inelastic) and demand is greatly reduced will the 
profit maximizing price fall significantly. In fact, with only 
moderate elasticity in the MCS or moderate reductions in quantity 
demanded at P®, the monopolist's profit maximizing price may even 
rise in response to conservation efforts by buyers.
®M. A. Adelman, Multinational Hearings, op. cit.
^Robinson, op. cit., p. 73, notes this possibility and 
Raymond Plccini, "On the Effect of Energy Conservation on OPEC 
Pricing," The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. Ill, No. 1 
(Autumn, 1977), pp. 190-192, applies it to OPEC.
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finding is that the price choice of the unified monopolist is 
minimally affected by conservation alone.
The assertion has also been made that even if bilateral 
negotiations and obligations do not lead to lower prices, the con­
sumers still benefit.-^ Buyer-seller cooperation supposedly would 
reduce chances for economic disruption caused by another supply 
interruption. In light of the recent experience of the private, 
international oil companies with negotiated concessions from OPEC 
members, promises by the latter not to use oil embargos may not be 
very binding. The IEA stockpiling and sharing scheme could be 
necessary to Insure the fulfillment of that obligation by exporters. 
If the emergency sharing scheme among importer country governments 
does effectively discourage embargos, the OPEC commitment to renounce 
them costs producers very little.
In contrast to the small benefit promised by a bilateral 
monopoly to oil consumers, producers obtain substantial benefit.
That arrangement (complete with mutual obligations) would serve to 
validate monopoly control in a major product market where the basic 
economic argument for orderly markets does not hold. Annual "oil 
crops" do not fluctuate as do crops of wheat, sugar, coffee, etc.
llRosobud, op. cit.
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because of uncontrollable weather conditions.^ The producer cartel 
also gains Improved enforcement (over that provided by only its 
internal agreement) of the price established via negotiation with 
buyers. Complicity by at least two parties, one on each side of 
the market, is required to violate the agreement if the consumer 
cartel includes all significant importers. Data on transactions 
between the two groups would reflect any significant cheating.
2. Noncooperative Coercion
Xn an attempt to avert this one-sided arrangement, IEA 
nations could avoid forming a negotiating front and seek to bring 
unilateral pressure on OPEC nations to reduce price. For example, 
quotas on oil imports by major oil consuming nations or for the IEA 
as a whole may be employed in place of an exclusive government pur­
chasing operations. Quota tickets could be sold only for the 
quantity of oil that policy makers want to allow in. If the 
tickets are sold in secret and easily transferable, there is a 
greater likelihood of attracting chiseling within OPEC, since the 
identity of exporters and the prlceB they receive could be shielded 
from detection.
l^Arthur Okun, Multinational Hearings, op. cit., p. 51.
The redistribution argument for aiding less developed countries can 
still make this support worthwhile on equity grounds. Drawbacks to 
foreign aid in this form are mentioned on page 160, however.
13This type of response is what Professor Adelman has been 
pushing. For a sketch of his proposal, see Multinational Hearings. 
op. cit., pp. 4-5 and 13-15 or The Petroleum Economist, XLIII, No. 6 
(June, 1976), p. 207.
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Responding to an export cartel by Imposing a general 
Import quota has a basic conceptual flaw, however,^ Any potential 
price cutter la presented with a perfectly Inelastic demand curve 
over an attainable region by that action. Consequently, a ceiling 
Is put on the benefits but not the costs that chiseling can generate 
for an Individual price maker. Relative to tariffs, though, quotas 
are considered flexible Instruments that could be changed fairly 
quickly as needed. The Incentive problem connected with a general 
Import quota could be overcome then with a promise of and probably 
ability to enlarge them as prices are cut. Such a promise places 
the IEA into a direct confrontational relationship with OPEC, and 
risks returning Importers to a more vulnerable level of dependence 
on insecure sources of crude oil as quotas are relaxed.
Presumably, a selective quota system could be formulated 
to avoid limiting the potential gain available to OPEC chiselers. 
Very limited quotas might be assigned to imports from nations that 
have threatened or attempted to withhold exports or to imports of 
(so-called sour crude) oil that is not as environmentally acceptable 
as is other (sweet crude) oil. Where these differences are asso­
ciated with key producers, those with embargo reputations or largely 
sour crude oil output would be forced to accept a disproportionate 
share of the overcapacity in OPEC. If this measure of relative
^T. D. Willett, "Oil Import Quotas Are Not the Answer," 
The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. I, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), 
p. 244.
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well-being within that cartel la Important to member nations, some 
may begin price chiseling In an attempt to capture sales not covered 
by Import quotas. However, It Is doubtful that the challenge 
presented to OPEC by this conservation tactic would be less promi­
nent than that of a general Import quota with chiseling rewards 
offered explicitly. Further, authorities In Importing countries 
would face the more complicated task of monitoring not only the size 
but also the source of oil shipments. Due to the funglbility of 
crude oil, this additional requirement can prove quite burdensome.
Another way to avoid the rigidity flaw of the general 
import quota on oil is through the use of a tariff on OPEC exports.
If oil demand Is reasonably elastic, a result similar to that of the 
quota Is achieved. In contrast to the quota, though, exporters 
willing to chisel are not presented with a perfectly Inelastic demand 
if they attract sales from other than their OPEC associates. Simu­
lations reported by Houthakker indicate that a common IEA tariff 
of $3.25 per barrel (with demand elasticities In the range of -0.25 
to -1) would reduce oil Imports to a range (18.5 MBD to 10.9 MBD In 
1980 from the Middle East) that should severely strain OPEC sta­
bility.15 Aside from uncertainty about the extent of elasticity In 
the demand for crude oil, the political difficulty that governments 
In Importer countries will encounter in enforcing measures that
150p. cit., p. 32.
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further Inflate fuel prices and require obvious sacrifice by consti- 
tutents can dissuade authorities from attempting to use tariff 
leverage on OPEC. Appreciation of the Inefficiency (described 
above) of a response that may do little more than reduce the volume 
of oil consumed can add to this reluctance.
Earlier political economic analysis Infers that antago­
nistic efforts, such as exercising formal or informal monopsony 
power, may have a perverse effect on the exporter PEC. A serious 
weakness In a nation-state cartel Is the difficulty that its members 
are expected to have In overcoming antipathy for formal proratlonlng. 
Overt actions by the IEA nations might Induce OPEC producers to 
scramble for markets on an Individual basis. It is also a real 
possibility that aggressive public purchasing, quotas, and/or tariffs 
will lead to the opposite behavior. A direct challenge could induce 
major oil-exporting nations to accept an output allocation scheme 
as a necessary evil to defend what they consider to be a just price. 
The group of major Importer nations may well be perceived as a 
common enemy, much as Israel and the U. 8. were by OAPEC in 1973.
In effect, a focal polht for exporter indignation is established 
which can push individualistic producers into joint controls they 
would not otherwise seriously consider. After all, the nations in 
the IEA group accepted an automatic emergency sharing scheme involv­
ing their domestic reserves only after experiencing the OAPEC 
embargo. The "David and Goliath" perspective that Hansen discusses 
may contribute to the desire by the less developed oil-exporters
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to achieve a unified stand against the powerful Industrial 
nations.^
The common foe effect provides support for the earlier 
assumption that OPEC would adopt coordination tactics necessary to 
function as a bargaining unit with the right provocation. An 
Influence that stabilizes OPEC further diminishes the chances that 
buyers can force oil prices down. Recall that import reduction alone 
is not likely to decrease the profit maximizing price for a unified 
monopolist. Total revenue and probably total profit available to 
the cartel would fall with demand restraint, though, and can lead 
to chiseling by members whose dissatisfaction cannot be controlled.
In a cartel where outside threats have redirected member suspicion 
away from each other, there is the prospect that national producers 
would lose the willingness or ability to cheat on the group. By 
undermining the chiseling facility and Incentive in the existing 
exporter cartel, a collective buyer venture may be the very con­
dition that precludes the one chance conservation has for moving 
oil prices back toward a competitive level.
If less provocative actions are available to consumer 
interests, more favorable results may be envisioned by avoiding 
the adoption of a monopsony-like response to OPEC. Before ela­
borating the effects of some alternative importer responses to the
^Supra, p. 185.
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oil-exporter PEC, one additional kind of assistance the OPEC monopoly 
may derive from the XEA organization should be noted.
3. The Effect of Personal Motives
"Collegiality" relationships and attachment to the non- 
pecunlary rewards provided by international organizations could 
develop within the IEA, and thereby create an incentive to per­
petuate the need for its existence. Resultant efforts might consist 
of propaganda accentuating the danger of OPEC and of the need for 
more than market inducements to develop energy alternatives to oil. 
Such publicity can strengthen OPEC by increasing the confidence of 
producers in the security of their market dominance. Perfecting 
information gathering and disseminating apparatus on the international 
oil market provides OPEC with unintended assistance by making it more 
difficult to secretly chisel. These suppositions do not impute 
sinister motives to IEA officials. Rather they suggest that for 
personal utility reasons, some joint activities that benefit IEA 
bureaucrats may, as a by-product, help stabilize the oil-export 
cartel.
The activities discussed in this and the previous sections 
are only potential. None of the direct countermeasures by consumer 
countries have been adopted. No evidence can be cited that OPEC has 
benefited from the functioning of the IEA or its officials. Can 
actions by the IEA which avoid confronting OPEC with an aggressive 
adversary bring real pressure on monopolistic prices?
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B. Pricing Influence of Actual IEA Activities 
Four specific measures have been adopted or are under 
consideration by the IEA. These Include procedures to lessen the 
effect on the membership of another oil embargo by exporters* 
detailed conservation obligations* the removal of obstacles to the 
development of alternatives to fuel imports* and cooperative re­
search into non-oil energy sources. The avowed purpose of these 
joint actions is to limit the Influence that dependence on crude 
oil Imports can exert on member economies. As such, they are less 
likely than the actions considered above to be perceived as an 
assault on oil producer objectives. The political-economic charac­
teristics attributed to OPEC in Chapter Five open up some ways in 
which these relatively Innocuous measures by IEA countries can under­
mine the unilateral pricing ability of the oil-exporter cartel.
1. Leverage of Substitution and Conservation 
Non-manditory fuel conservation by IEA countries sufficient 
to trigger an actual reduction in oil prices In the near future has 
been assigned rather limited potential in earlier analyses. OPEC 
appears to have the economic capability to accept substantial cuts 
in aggregates sales with very little sacrifice in development pace. 
Financial accumulations by some members enhance this capability to 
do with less generous oil income should a need arise.
Without an embodied external threat, the Insistence on 
national sovereignty is more likely to enfeeble attempts by OPEC
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officials to minimize joint sacrifice by reappointing the shutdown In 
production that may be imposed at the cartel price, however. Infor­
mal allocations of a reduction in output below expected levels are 
unlikely to achieve as much production cutback in the aggregate as 
are formal procedures. The collective capability of OPEC to frustrate 
indirect consumer attempts to induce price decreases Is thereby less 
than that of an equivalent cartel that may have less aversion to 
centralized quota allocations. To succeed, the overall IEA strategy 
designed to bring pressure on oil price levels should not have to
reduce the total demand for OPEC exports by 46 percent by 1980, as
17has been computed by C. A. Gebelein. Greater significance attached 
to political calculations by the national members of a cartel should 
make smaller reductions harmful to coordination. Since this limi­
tation is only a qualitative factor, no quantitative correction to 
Gebelein’s estimates can be offered.
As a simple illustrative example though, assume that pro­
rationing via an informal voluntary method is only able to achieve 
1/2 the reduction in cartel output as is a formal program before 
some individual members must begin to make real spending sacrifices. 
Restricted to the former scheme, this cartel may be only able to 
collectively and voluntarily hold production below its estimated 
aggregate capacity of 38 MBD to 27.3 MBD, rather than 16.6 MBD —  the
^"Effects of Conservation on Oil Prices; Analysis of 
Misconceptions.” The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. I,
No. 1 (Autumn, 1975), p. 67.
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absolute minimum amount these countries should have to produce to
18fund feasible spending projects in 1980 out of current income.
Concern for relative shares also suggests that a few 
financially strong members cannot be counted on to diligently pro­
tect any price chosen by a majority of the group. The importance 
of international status restricts the extent to which countries will 
serve as residual suppliers in the face of reduced or even moderately 
limited growth in demand for OPEC crude oil. The suspicion has been 
voiced that many oil producers within OPEC could come to treat the 
cartel price as a truly parametric figure and leave to the Persian 
Gulf sheikdoms the burden of accepting the lion's share of the 
required production restraint. The nation-state composition of the 
cartel companies and the prospects for future substitutes for OPEC 
oil should make the latter members wary of being put in this position.
Efforts by the IEA that advance the development of alter­
natives to crude oil imports can also create reapportionment problems 
for OPEC. In addition theae activites provide leverage, absent from 
conservation efforts, that encourages the monopolist to decrease oil 
prices. Figure 7-3, which applies the analysis embodied in Figure 5-1 
(page 151) to the initial conditions used in Figure 7-2 (page 212), 
can be used to explain. Without entry, the exporter group's demand 
curve is Dg (AVP in Figure 7-2), and Dg is the more elastic demand
^®Ibid., p. 65 provides the first and last figures used 
in this example.
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curve for the producer group occasioned by the entry of non-OPEC 
sources Into the energy market. The corresponding marginal revenue 
curves are MRg (equivalent to MRP In Figure 7-2) for Dg and MRe 
for De . Panel 7-3a demonstrates that the price preferred by the 
monopolist falls from P® to P® following the entry alteration of 
Its demand curve. This result contrasts with that found previously 
In connection with the simple monopsony restriction of demand, where 
elasticity would not be increased and may even be reduced. Further, 
this effect can be achieved with neither the risk of provoking 
greater OPEC unity nor the obligation of assisting In the maintenance 
of a negotiated price.
IEA aid that enhances the evolution of alternatives to 
oil Imports can accelerate the development of elasticity in the 
demand for OPEC's product. Public subsidies that foster attempts 
to utilize nonconventlonal energy sources and government stockpiles 
on top of those accumulated by Industry may even increase the elas­
ticity of demand for oil imports beyond that due to the private 
efforts elicited by a price above the limit price (P^). This latter 
effect is reflected by an additional rotation of the cartel's demand 
curve through to the curve De * in Panel 7-3b. Following some 
displacement the revenue and output left to the producer cartel, 
and any residual suppliers In particular, that are committed to 
supporting P® is more likely to be reduced (to P^ckO at Ok, and 
to ackh at hk for the residual producer) as a consequence of IEA 
substitution programs. Some of these programs may even further
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depress revenue and output to P®nqO at Oq and anqh. at hq for the 
cartel and the swing producer, respectively.
If the exporter cartel does adjust to De (or De ')» Its 
revenue may not fall because at P® output Is expanded to Qe (Panel 
7-3a). Stress within the cartel will still develop, though not in 
the way depicted In Panel 7-3b. For nonresidual producers already 
operating at or near capacity, the expanded market at the reduced 
price (P®) is of no benefit. Instead, their revenue actually falls 
with their stable output Oh, while the residual producer receives 
the revenue associated with the extra sales of Qs to Qe . The key 
finding remains that, whether or not the monopolist chooses to lower 
his price, the development of alternative energy sources creates 
internal tension In a cartel where relative shares are important.
Figure 7-4 indicates the unusual result that this model 
imputes to the simultaneous development of new energy sources and 
the realization of conservation. The profit maximizing output 
(Qs) for the seller group is found by the intersection of the MCS 
and the (unshown) MRg or MRP curves, as in Figures 7-2a and 7-3a.
As in Figure 7-3b initial revenue is split within the seller group 
between residual producers (afQsh) and other producers (P®ahO).
With substitution, the demand curve for the cartel moves to De 
and with reduced consumption it moves to a position like that 
Indicated by DeM. The offsetting effects may change the optimal 
output for the monopolist very little (or not at all as depicted), 
while reducing the preferred price to P®". Though aggregate
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Figure 7-4 







real revenue falls, the relative shares received by the firms or 
subgroups comprising the cartel do not change. That Is,
P®"a'hO/a'f'Qh equals PsahO/afQ h, so the political prerequisiteu* 8 Q 8
to stable but Informal collaboration Is preserved.
This analysis has been conducted In static terms. Its 
findings extend to a secularly growing market (one where energy 
demand expands over time) If the growth in imports from the oil 
producer PEC is slowed below the growth In OPEC production poten­
tial and/or spending potential. To the extent that IEA support 
assists the search for alternative fuel sources, pressure on the 
oil monopoly to reduce prices is Intensified. Politically inspired 
concern for relative position within the exporter cartel can disrupt 
efforts by the seller group to adjust to the altered conditions of 
demand for Its product, whether caused by Import substitution or by 
energy conservation. The development of additional fuel supplies 
and energy conservation combine to enhance the downward pressure on 
monopoly prices and revenues, but may alleviate some of the internal 
tension blocking a joint adjustment by OPEC.
By shifting attention to Individual decision making it 
is possible to conceive of other ways that certain defensive IEA 
provisions can precipitate a fall in world oil prices.
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2. Effects of a Floor Price for Imports
The full adoption of the' common miTHimim safeguard price 
(CMSP) by the IEA may have the unseen benefit of tilting the decision 
of the Individual exporter toward chiseling. Part of the cost 
weighed by the prospective price cutter In his decision to chisel 
on the group price is that he may set off a price war which will 
subside only when the price has fallen to the level of costs. The 
designation of a $7 price floor on Imports by principal consumers 
(presumably their estimation of the long run cost of producing 
substitutes for OPEC oil), provides a focal point for export price.
A level Is established at which handsome profits are still afforded 
OPEC producers but at which a spiral of price cuts may spontaneously 
c e a s e . T h e  fruits of any chiseling below $7 per barrel must not 
only be Increasingly shared with consumer governments but also more 
completely borne by displaced rivals. Any price cuts from above $7 
will Increase aggregate oil sales If there is any elasticity In the 
demand curve. Empty storage capacity can permit buyers to take 
advantage of such bargain prices quickly.
Thia effect can be demonstrated with a simple diagram, 
Figure 7-5. The demand curve that the Individual member faces is 
given a kink at $7 by the CMSP. Chiseling down to a $7 per barrel 
price can Increase the price cutter's sales volume by up to the
19For a review of focal point theory, see F. M. Scherer, 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago:











amount ab for two reasons. He gains sales at the expense of rivals 
and, to the extent that there Is elasticity In the market demand, 
from the sales added to the market total. If many International oil 
companies are tied by long term purchase commitments to the crude 
oil of certain countries, most of the chiseler's Increased volume 
would come from market expansion rather than from sales taken from 
rivals.
Further cuts below $7 will not lead to a change In final 
product price if the CMSP holds. Chiseling below this level will 
add to the sales of the price cutter only at the expense of displaced 
rivals (in the amount be for instance). The market cannot expand so 
further price cuts have less attraction for the potential price 
chiseler.
Perception of the zero sum nature of further price cuts 
below $7, and thus the greater potential they have for inciting 
destructive retaliation, may collectively convince the competitive 
chlselers that they have exhausted all the extra benefits they can 
reasonably hope to gain from chiseling. The prospect that this 
point of diminishing returns may be recognized by all chlselers can 
create the feeling that rounds of price reductions one may Inadver­
tently set off will stop at that point. As such, the danger of 
causing the complete loss of monopoly benefits is less, or the 
(discounted) cost of chiseling Is less.
A traditional Internal policing method in a cartel —  
dumping in a chiseling rival's market —  is also made even less
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attractive by this retail price floor. With production costs so low 
relative to price throughout the cartel, the dominant producer cannot 
put immediate pressure on a rival who feels compelled to chisel.
Price must be pushed to a small fraction of the current level to make 
it unprofitable for any member to continue production. The source of 
advantage the dominant member has is that its reserves permit it to 
outlast rivals —  underselling as long as they can still produce and 
then returning to very high profit levels after they are pumped 
nearly dry. In Patlnkln's words, "in the event of a price war, 
victory is not to the most efficient but to the one with the largest 
[financial] reserves." To the extent that a CMSP and supportive 
measures reflect the resolution of oil consumers to reduce Imports 
(seemingly regardless of developments in the cartel), this ability 
to out-last could be of little use. By the time the chlselers have 
been exhausted or reformed, the market that is left to OPEC exports 
could be worth little relative to what it has cost to obtain. The 
certain $7 price now may look better than the uncertain prospect of 
one, even several times that size, in the remote future. Strenuous 
buyer efforts to develop alternatives may have displaced oil by the 
time the dominant firm has the market to Itself.
20"Multiplant Firms, Cartels, and Imperfect Competition," 
Readings in Microeconomics, eds. William Brelt and Harold M.
Hochman, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968),
p. 308.
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Since it has come to appear that OPEC will not soon 
collapse by itself, the CMSP no longer seems in danger of needlessly 
perpetuating high oil prices. In time as IEA nations with little 
oil potential begin to use alternative high cost energy sources in 
place of oil —  coal, nuclear, solar —  the reluctance to underwrite 
this price may fade. Also, since the $7 figure may serve as a focal 
point for a regrouping of OPEC, should it collapse at the higher 
price, the Importer governments may not have to perform the unpopular 
task of collecting Import duties to defend the CMSP.
3. Importance of Individual Substitution 
A sensitivity to relative position by members of OPEC also 
suggests that the IEA need not push its total access to break­
throughs policy too vigorously. If the flow of oil exports from 
individual OPEC members are concentrated on specific IEA members —  
Indonesia to Japan, Venezuela to the U. S., Libya and Algeria to 
Southern Europe, etc. —  rather than spread uniformly over the whole 
IEA group, a technological breakthrough In one country can have a 
disruptive effect on OPEC. If Japan, say, institutes new technology 
that reduces its demand for Indonesian crude oil significantly, then 
this exporter will suffer a spurt in overcapacity if it is unable to 
find a roughly equivalent substitute buyer. If the Indonesian pro­
ducing company has a high regard for its relative position, it will 
have to reduce price to induce buyers to move its oil to other
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markets. Any such successful penetration will be countered by other 
national firms Interested In their relative status.
The implication for the IEA Is that there Is less need to 
artificially stimulate the spread of energy breakthroughs. The FEC 
characteristics that OPEC should come to embody suggests that success­
ful policies for countering OPEC need not concentrate just on bringing 
aggregate pressure on It. Pressure on the exports of selected 
countries can be more effective, given the current and predicted 
amount of overcapacity with which most of these exporters appear 
laden.
4. Pricing Consequence of Embargo Protection
Finally, there is a latent potential in the IEA to disrupt 
the oil PEC. The existence of the emergency sharing scheme promises 
to allow IEA nations to less painfully endure at least the early 
stages of another embargo. The prospect of a drawn out affair before 
tangible results are seen can make the attempt to apply another 
embargo for political or economic purposes undercut the oil cartel 
In one of two ways. One, some members may refuse to go along because 
they fear that the consumer country sharing scheme will cost them 
too much In Interim lost sales relative to what It will ultimately 
gain. If this fear denies OPEC the ability to effectively come 
through on an embargo threat by some members, resentment may bar 
further cooperative efforts among these factions In the cartel. Two, 
less committed members may back out before an applied embargo has 
had much effect. Those that continue to shut off shipments risk
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permanently losing markets and stature If and as their partial 
embargo continues. This reasoning suggests that another actual 
embargo may be as dangerous for OPEC as for the members of the IEA. 
As such, the sharing scheme can serve as the measure which under­
mines OPEC'b apparent unity if It becomes too aggressive.
C. Summary of IEA Price Effects
Efforts by oll-lmport country authorities to set up a 
bilateral bargaining arrangement with OPEC would appear to be 
counterproductive. Monopsony efforts to nudge a price established 
by a monopolist down by limiting demand would be politically diffi­
cult to Institute and probably Ineffective even If applied. Worse, 
a good chance exists that that assertive response would solidify 
the producer cartel where national sovereignty would otherwise 
attenuate the bond among producers. Also, an organization of the 
world oil market would confirm monopoly control where justification 
on efficiency grounds is absent and where other developments might
undermine the loose knit cartel.
IEA support for the discovery and utilization of substi­
tutes for oil imports can result in the monpolist choosing a lower
real price. Market displacement or conservation successes tend to
disrupt the operation of a PEC where relative shares appear vital.
In combination, these activities may neutralize each other's effect 
on the Informal distribution of cartel profits, though they will 
certainly lower the total amount to be divided. The CMSP floor may
have an Insidious Influence on whether producers refrain from 
breaking the cartel price agreements. Political perspectives can 
also make the exporter cartel susceptible to fuel substitution or 
savings by individual oil importers and to hasty embargo bids. 
Whether or not these IEA inspired effects succeed at lowering price 
soon, they appear preferable to more direct assaults on the oil 
price determined by OPEC.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this study has been to sort out the effects 
that nationalization together with activation of the IEA might have 
on the world oil price. Three elements are analyzed. First, a 
review of the economic conditions found in the oil producer cartel 
was conducted. The result was the identification of both a dif­
ference in individual member Interests over the profit maximizing 
price choice for the group and a set of structural features that 
may suppress dissatisfaction with a compromise choice. Second, an 
assessment was developed of how some noneconomic concerns, that 
might be injected into the oil-export cartel with the takeover of 
producing properties by member grovemments, tend to alter the 
effectiveness of that coalition. The basic outcome was a discovery 
that factors Identified in literature on public enterprises and on 
international relations can enhance the incentive of major producing 
entities to act in concert, but may lessen their ability to do so. 
Third, utilizing these Insights, the influences of projected and 
hypothetical activities of the IEA on the price decision and sta­
bility of OPEC were deduced. That reasoning Indicates that mere 
conservation and/or monopsony bargaining are not as effective at 
inducing OPEC to reduce the real price of oil as other, less aggres­
sive IEA activities can be.
237
238
A. Recap and Impressions
The thrust of the arguments supporting those conclusions 
can be summarized In about five paragraphs. An unusually tight 
market and a decline In the dominance of the oil majors In the world 
oil network coincided with and probably significantly contributed to 
the Impressive performance by OPEC In the early and mld-1970's. 
Uncoordinated responses by the governments In large consumer coun­
tries also facilitated the initial efforts by oll-exporters to 
establish and uphold a fourfold Increase In real oil prices. OPEC 
thus became established as a pricing force under very advantageous 
political and economic conditions, and Its cohesiveness has not been 
seriously tested yet.
The nationalization of oil operations in the LDC's that do 
and may In time belong to OPEC appears Inevitable due to a combina­
tion of cupidity, nationalistic fervor, and the vulnerable position 
of the foreign owners. January, 1976 seems to be a reasonable point 
from which to date the transformation of OPEC Into a cartel of state 
enterprises. This change can give the oil companies more freedom to 
shop for bargain priced oil and can complicate the enforcement task 
for the cartel. Also, completion of the takeover phase terminates 
a need which encouraged solidarity by producer country governments; 
namely, the joint ability to prevent multinational oil companies 
from penalizing individual nations that expropriate oil properties. 
Despite the end of this inducement to combine, nationalization may 
have little effect on the stability of the exporter cartel because
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of the strong tradition of monopolization on the supply side of the 
oil market and of the continuation of Importer equivocation about 
whether and how to respond.
Pure economic cartels are expected to be unstable over the 
long run because of the ever present chiseling incentive and the 
growth of non-cartel competition. OPEC has a concentrated, high 
entry barrier structure much like Industries where firms seem to be 
able to avoid competition for extended periods. Product peculiarities 
support the collusive atmosphere by making secret chiseling more 
difficult and by easing pressure to avoid output cutbacks. However, 
the oil cartel also faces a difficult coordination task due to the 
magnitude of Its price-cost disparity, basic member differences about 
the importance of potential competition, and its weak organizational 
development. This last difficulty is reflected in the fact that 
members have failed to establish consistent price differentials for 
their heterogeneous products and have been unable to agree on quota 
assignments. The persistence of an appreciation by Individual mem­
bers of the advantage of coordinated over uncoordinated actions, 
rather than formal prorationing, appears primarily responsible for 
the economic stability that OPEC enjoys.
The political-economic considerations made more prominent 
by nationalization can alter this balance In several ways. The 
rallying property of common foes, the added dimension for conducting 
Internal bargaining, the bureaucratic rewards from joint action,
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and various indirect forms of assistance provided by governments in 
large consumer areas can reinforce the economic glue that holds OPEC 
together. The jealousy by sovereigns on any kind of central agency 
with the power to pool the restriction capabilities of the diverse 
members, arbitrate disputes, and enforce group decisions constrains 
the cartel's ability to withstand export slumps. An abiding concern 
for relative shares and possible political inclination to maximize 
short term benefits can aggravate this source of instability in the 
oil-export PEC and can provide a lever by which discreet consumer 
force might lower the price.
The IEA has adopted programs that apparently make oil- 
importers much less vulnerable to an embargo by major exporters than 
was the case in 1973-1974. Joint actions that can bring pressure on 
OPEC to moderate oil prices have enjoyed less support by consumer 
country governments. The inaction seems traceable in part to a 
preoccupation by officials with short term costs and individual 
national priorities. Due to rigidities within the oil-exporter PEC, 
limited IEA achievements that permit or advance the development of 
energy alternatives and the realization of conservation may do more 
than lessen an oil-based balance of payments deficit. By increasing 
the elasticity of demand for Imports, the promotion of energy sub­
stitutes and the installation of oil storage capacity can lower the 
monopoly oil price, particularly when aided by reduced consumption. 
Conservation that is not achieved at the expense of provoking
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administered prorationing can rupture the state of concord among 
oil-exporting nations.
B. Perspective 
This analysis does not lead to a definitive prediction 
about the collapse of the OPEC cartel. The study does suggest that, 
though this new variant of international cartel enjoys some advan­
tages over purely economic coalitions, it need not be considered 
more permanent. An examination of the effects that two recent 
developments, producer country nationalizations and a consumer 
country organization, can have, individually and jointly, on the 
durability of the current oil monopoly leads to this conclusion.
The asymmetrical loss inflicted by prospective entry of energy 
alternatives and the inability to subdue sovereignty objections to 
transfer schemes that permit the implementation of a limit pricing 
strategy now, place the exporter cartel in a precarious position.
An overly aggressive IEA may, however, provide the common foe or 
formal assistance that rescues OPEC from this danger.
By the beginning of 1977 a clear majority of the IEA
nations had ratified the IEP and most of the larger members of OPEC 
%
had completed nationalizations. These developments are still quite 
recent and much of their effect appears to be long term in nature. 
Thus, the suppositions expressed herein cannot yet be subject to 
empirical test. With the accumulation of evidence on a longer
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period since the beginning of 1977, such tests can become feasible. 
The value of the above effort is in isolating some effects that 
nationalizations and the IEA may have on the durability and price 
decision of the OPEC cartel. Future work in this area can aim at 
augmenting, refining, or rejecting the effects that have been iden­
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